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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis traces the development of thought in the philosophical and other writings 
of three nineteenth-century thinkers, whose work exemplifies that century’s attempts 
to think beyond the divisions of culture from nature and to reconcile empirical science 
with metaphysical truth. Drawing on nineteenth-century debates on the origin of 
language and evolutionary theory, the thesis argues that the ideas of John Henry 
Newman, George Eliot and Lady Victoria Welby were cultural precursors to the 
biosemiotic thought of the second half of the twentieth century and beyond, 
specifically in the way in which these three thinkers sought to find a ‘common 
grammar’ between natural and human practices.  
While only Lady Welby communicated with the scientist, logician and father of 
modern semiotics, Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), all three contributed to the cultural 
sensibility that informed subsequent work in biology/ethology (Jakob von Uexküll 
(1864-1944), zoosemiotics (Thomas A. Sebeok (1920-2001), and the development of 
biosemiotics (Thomas A. Sebeok and Jesper Hoffmeyer (1943-present), Kalevi Kull 
(1952-present) among others. Each of these nineteenth-century writer’s intellectual 
development show strong parallels with the interdisciplinary endeavour of 
biosemiotics. The latter’s observation that biology is semiotics, its postulation of the 
continuity between the natural and cultural world through semiosis and evolutionary 
semiotic scaffolding its emphasis on the coordination of organic life processes on all 
levels, from simple cells to human beings, via semiotic interactions that depend on 
interpretation, communication and learning, and its consequent refusal of Cartesian 
divide, all find distinct resonances with these earlier thinkers. 
iii 
 
The thesis thus argues that Newman, Eliot and Welby all gave articulation to what the 
thesis identifies as the growth of a ‘biosemiotic imagination.’ It argues that Newman, 
Eliot and Lady Welby envisaged a unity, or a holistic understanding, of life based on 
a European developmental tradition of biology, philosophy and language which was 
familiar to Charles Darwin himself. This evolutionary ontology called forth a new 
epistemology grounded in a mode of unconscious creative inference (biosemiotic 
imagination) akin to Charles S. Peirce’s concept of abduction. Abduction is the logical 
operation which introduces a new idea and, as such, is the only source of adaptive and 
creative growth. For Peirce, it is closely tied to the growth of knowledge via the 
evolutionary action of sign relations. The thesis shows how these thinkers 
conceptualised their own version of what I suggest can be understood as this 
biosemiotic imagination and the implications this has for understanding creativity in 
nature and culture. For John Henry Newman, it was a common source of inspiration 
in religion and science. For George Eliot, it lay at the basis of any creative process, 
natural and cultural, between which it forged a link. Similarly to Eliot, Lady Victoria 
Welby saw abduction as a signifying process that subtends creativity both in nature 
and culture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am above all grateful to my director of studies Emeritus Professor Wendy Wheeler 
for her generous attention, enthusiastic encouragement and wise supervision. Her trust 
in me and belief in this project enabled me to pursue and complete my studies. 
I would also like to thank Professor Paul Cobley for his support during difficult times 
and for the countless conversations that, among other things, enabled me to view things 
from a different perspective. 
My life during my studies has been variously enriched by the joy, support, humour and  
friendship provided by Dr Sara Cannizzaro, Dr Sarah Law, Trevor Norris, Dr Martin 
Murray, Dr Adam Beck and Dr Christopher Ryan.  
For the help and support in administrative and research  matters I would like to thank 
the staff in the department of Social Sciences and Humanities, specifically Cathy 
Larne, Hema Joshi, Dr Anna Gough-Yates and Megan Redmond.  
The love and support of my dear friends Valentina Fachin, Penelope Jones, Vera 
Guštin, Helen McKenna, Catherine Mitsaki and Matt Potter have been indispensable 
in the achievement of this project. 
A very special thank you goes to Matevž Peterlin and to my family. Without my 
mother Tanja, father Guido and sister Andra and their endless love, belief and support 
it would have been much harder to complete my project. This thesis is dedicated to 
them and to the memory of my dear uncle Marko.  
v 
 
CONTENTS 
 
Abstract          
Acknowledgements         
Abbreviations          
Introduction 1  
Chapter 1          21 
An Introduction to the Philosophical Origin of Biosemiotics: Charles 
S. Peirce and Jakob Von Uexküll     
Chapter 2          61 
Language and Species: Signs and Evolution in Victorian Frames of 
Mind 
Chapter 3         98 
John Henry Newman and the Illative Sense as Abduction: the 
Challenge to the Epistemology of the Enlightenment 
Chapter 4          136 
George Eliot and the Semiotic Web: The Role of Aesthetic 
Imagination and Sympathy as Underlying Aspects of 
Biosemiotic Realism 
Chapter 5          179 
 Lady Victoria Welby’s Significs: Mother-Sense, Meaning, 
Significance      
Conclusion         221  
Bibliography         227 
           
 
v 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
This thesis follows the standard notation employed by Peirce’s scholars to reference 
his work. All references will appear in the standard form in the text: the volume in 
Arabic numerals, a period, and the paragraph in the volume cited, using the form CP. 
and EP. 
 
CP Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. 8 volumes; Vols.1-6 eds. Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931- 1935; 
Vols. 7-8 ed. Arthur Burks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958. 
 
 
EP The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. 2 Vols. Eds. Nathan 
Houser, Christian Kloesel, and the Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992-99. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The key question lying at the root of all this is: How could natural history 
become cultural history? (Jesper Hoffmeyer)1 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to trace the development of thought in the 
philosophical and other writings of three nineteenth-century thinkers, namely John 
Henry Newman (1801-1890), George Eliot (1819-1880) and Lady Victoria Welby 
(1837-1912) whose work exemplifies that century’s attempts to think beyond the 
divisions of culture from nature and to reconcile empirical science with metaphysical 
truth. This dissertation argues that these three thinkers sought to find a ‘common 
grammar’ between natural and human practices, in what this thesis identifies as the 
biosemiotic imagination. It argues that their ideas contributed to the cultural milieu 
that gave rise to the semiotic theoretical biology (which arose in the second half of the 
twentieth century) and its view of the continuity between the natural and cultural world 
through semiosis. 
Newman, Eliot and Welby lived in an era, which in 1858 sir Henry Holland, 
Charles Darwin’s cousin, defined as ‘a period of great transition.’2 Although each 
historical era is an age of transition, as Walter E. Houghton points out, many people 
seemed to be especially aware of the profound changes that were taking place on a 
social and intellectual level, where traditional political, social, moral and religious 
beliefs were challenged by a new, emerging worldview.3 The latter was partly indebted 
                                                     
1 J. Hoffmeyer. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996, p. viii. 
2 H. Holland.Quoted in Walter E. Houghton. The Victorian Frame of Mind 1830-1870. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1957, p. 1. 
3 See for instance Walter E. Houghton. The Victorian Frame of Mind 1830-1870. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1957; T. W. Heyck. The Transformation of Intellectual Life in Victorian 
England. New York: St .Martin’s Press, 1982; A. Briggs. The Age of Improvement 1783-1867. 2nd ed. 
London: Routledge, 1979; P. Davies. The Victorians. Vol.8. 1830-1880. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002; A. Cruttenden. The Victorians: English Literature in Its Historical, Cultural and Social 
Contexts. New York: Facts on File, 2003 and R. Gilmour. The Victorian Period: The Intellectual and 
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to rapid industrialization, the transition from a rural, agrarian society to an industrial 
and democratic one. With the development that came with the use of new machines 
and communication, a sense of faster living brought about a change in the very form 
of experience of life and fostered a sense of displacement and anxiety which took firm 
hold in the various frames through which the Victorians thought about their world.  
Where industrialisation was at the heart of societal transformations, science, or 
rather, scientific assumptions and methods were at the core of the changing intellectual 
frameworks and the emerging understanding of culture in Victorian England.4 As Suzy 
Anger points out, Victorian science transformed people’s relation to almost 
everything, from travelling to communicating, and perhaps most importantly to the 
perception of self.5 Indeed, concepts of human identity and agency – central to the idea 
of culture – were changing in the framework of nineteenth-century scientific 
naturalism. The idea of human culture as a natural, adaptive condition originating in a 
remote past drew on this naturalist tradition which developed over centuries of 
observations of organisms, including human beings. The nineteenth century 
contributed to this framework with the geological idea of a deep time and an increasing 
understanding of instinct as a source of human behaviour.6 As a consequence, culture 
was increasingly understood as an expression of the natural order, and it was believed, 
that its purposes and qualities, could be understood through the study of developmental 
                                                     
Cultural Context of English Literature, 1830-1890, London; New York: Longman, 1993.  
4 Raymond Williams observes that the term culture was only starting to be seen as a ‘thing in itself’ in 
the nineteenth century. This was because, according to Williams, the term had a very different meaning 
in its early use where it referred to the ‘tending of natural growth’ and by analogy to a process of human 
training. See R. Williams. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London: Fontana, 1987, 
pp.87-89. 
5 S. Anger, J. Paradis. Ed. Victorian Science and Literature. vol. 2. London: Pickering and Chatto, 2011, 
p. xiv. 
6 Ibid., pp. xiv-xvi. 
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processes and natural sciences.  These, by the 1840s, ‘were beginning to fall under the 
spell of materialism and positivism.’7  
  The extension of scientific assumptions and methods from the physical and 
biological world to the whole life of men were at the basis of the fundamental shift in 
the Victorian ways of thinking about their society. This brought a feeling of anxiety 
since they challenged, on the one hand, the established moral and religious beliefs. On 
the other hand, they posited, mostly as a result of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory, the even more intricate question of the relation between natural and cultural 
evolution and the ‘natural history’ of cultural life. After the publication of Darwin’s 
Origins of Species (1859), as Houghton observes, the idea that the historical process 
was an organic process and that the possible discovery of its dynamic laws could be 
applied to the study of history and human nature, became an important assumption of 
the time and offered new possibilities in understanding culture.8 As the literature of 
the time amply indicates, the expansion of the physical science and natural science had 
a strong impact on the emerging and complex idea of culture. Some of this emerging 
thinking, for instance, can be seen in Thomas Henry Huxley’s essay ‘Science and 
Culture’ (1880) where he emphasises science as an essential element of modern culture 
and claims that a scientific education is as effective as the more traditional literary 
studies, or in Samuel Butler’s novel Erehwon (1872) where he draws on theories of 
life and self-evolving matter in order to blur distinctions between man and machine. 
Another example is John Stuart Mill’s essay ‘Nature’ (1872) where he ponders on the 
meaning of the term ‘nature’ and discusses the issue of agency in both nature and man. 
What Huxley’s and other writings of the time reveal is the importance of the Victorian 
                                                     
7 A. Bowie. Schelling and Modern European Philosophy. An Introduction. London: Routledge, 1993, 
p. 4. 
8 W. E. Houghton, op.cit., 1957, p. 33. 
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naturalistic thinking about culture and the extensive interrelation between scientific 
and cultural practices. 
In fact, a common assumption in nineteenth-century writings was that ‘the 
inter-weaving of scientific and cultural practices would create an organic wholeness.’9  
John Addington Symonds’ essay ‘Culture: Its Meaning and Uses’ (1893) is a good 
example. In his essay he discusses how both poetry and metaphysics had contributed 
to the formation of evolutionary theory and how evolutionary sciences such as 
philology have contributed to understanding culture.10 The confrontation between 
philology and science also found an earlier distinctive voice in S. T. Coleridge’s Aids 
to Reflection (1825) and Constitution of the Church and State (1829) where he 
elaborated a concept of culture which would draw on discourses of organic evolution 
as opposed to the mechanistic sensationalist science.  
With evolutionary theory, ideas of organic wholeness, of relatedness and 
connectedness, became a growing concern and a distinguishing feature of the second 
half of the Victorian period. Drawing on each other’s metaphors, the intellectuals of 
the time incessantly tried to create a model of synthesis that would encompass rather 
than separate all aspects of life. In this respect Trevor H. Levere observes that German 
Naturphilosophie offered an important model of thought since, in contrast to the 
increasingly mechanistic worldview in the nineteenth century, it did not endorse the 
traditional distinction between disciplines, but instead proposed a unified view.11  
Naturphilosophie, stemming from the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Johan 
Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-
1854) focused on the organic core of nature and emphasised its living, creative and 
                                                     
9 D. Amigoni. Colonies, Cult and Evolution: Literature, Science and Culture in the Nineteenth Century 
Writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 17.  
10 J. A. Symonds. Quoted in D. Amigoni., op.cit., 2007, p. 13. 
11 T. H. Levere. Poetry Realized in Nature. Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Early Nineteenth-
Century Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 2. 
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self-organising nature. This new type of epistemology had a direct impact on the 
understanding of nature and organisms which took firm hold of eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century thinkers. In particular, it influenced Darwin’s conception of nature 
as self-organising as well as George H. Lewes’s understanding of organisms as living, 
evolving wholes.12 For both, empirical reductionism - the mode of analysis which 
presupposes the dissection of a biological entity or system into its constituent parts in 
order better to understand it13- seemed to miss the very nature of organisms. 
 This organic conception of nature, proposed by the Naturphilosophen, and 
endorsed by many Victorian intellectuals, such Charles Darwin, George H. Lewes 
(1817-1878), James Ward (1769-1855), George J. Romanes (1848-1894), George 
Eliot and Lady Welby, opposed the growing mechanistic interpretation of the living 
world in Victorian Britain which was endorsed by such tinkers as T. H. Huxley (1825-
1895), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), William Thompson (1775-1833) and James 
Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879). The basic postulate of mechanical philosophies was that 
nature operates according to mechanical principles, the regularity of which can be 
expressed in the form of natural laws, formulated in mathematical terms. Romantic 
biologists, in line with Kant’s analysis of the similarity between teleological and 
aesthetic judgement and Schelling’s postulation that nature and mind are one - mind 
being the product of nature - maintained that creative imagination was at the basis of 
understanding nature and its creative, self-organising processes. In other words, for 
                                                     
12 Robert J. Richards points out that contrary to now-yielding beliefs that Darwin’s concept of natural 
selection was conceived in a mechanistic way, Darwin never explicitly referred to natural selection as 
operating in a mechanical fashion. Instead, nature, to which selection gave rise, was perceived in its 
parts and whole, as a teleologically, self-organising structure. (See his argument in R. J. Richards. The 
Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy at the Age of Goethe. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 533-545). 
13 C. R. Woese provides this definition in his article “A New Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology 
and Molecular Biology Reviews Vol. 68 n. 2, June (2004): 173-186, p. 174. 
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Naturphilosophen it was through aesthetic imagination that we gain access to the 
otherwise intelligible world. 
Schelling’s account of imagination, nature and mind is echoed, albeit 
differently, in S. T. Coleridge’s system of thought where he endeavoured, as other 
Naturphilosophen, to put all knowledge into harmony. The influence of German 
idealism, however, is clearly visible in Coleridge’s insistence on the active role of 
mind in nature, which was itself organic, alive, developing and intelligible, and in his 
belief in the Absolute and corrective and unifying force of Ideas which, when 
apprehended in knowing minds, reveal essential relations in nature. Every perception, 
according to Coleridge, involved a creative act of mind, that in order to be incorporated 
in science it needed to be organised by ideas. This led him to distinguish between 
secondary and primary imagination. The latter he defined in a rather cryptic phrase as 
‘the repetition of the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.’14 
In this definition Coleridge relates creation, God, the self and nature in a unity that can 
be explored through the biblical account of creation.15 Indeed, for Coleridge human 
reason and the world of nature are both created by God, by his will and reason and the 
role of ideas is to mediate between what is real in mind and what is real in nature. In 
this way, Coleridge is able to relate the imaginative life of men with life of God through 
experience in nature. Most importantly, for Coleridge imagination understood as a 
cognitive perception is not disjointed from reason, on the contrary, it is a pre-stage of 
reason from which faith stems. In this respect John Coulson notes that this view 
preserved Coleridge from believing that the existence of God, and faith in general, 
                                                     
14 S. T. Coleridge. Biographia Literaria. Ed. by Nigel Leask. London: Everyman, 1997, Ch. xiii, p. 
212.   
15 T. H. Levere, op.cit., 1981, p. 7. 
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‘could be demonstrated or empirically verified by evidence or other forms of 
“mechanical understanding.”’16  
Coleridge was particularly interested in defending theology from the 
consequences of mechanistic thought and in his prose writing on Christian Revelation, 
such as Aids to Reflection (1825), he ponders on both, the particular inflection of the 
philological science of language (underpinned by Horne Tooke’s (1736-1812) 
etymology)  which was exerting an ever larger impact on the understanding of religion; 
and the importance of imagination as an intuitive-inferential process as the origin of 
religious belief. Drawing on the organic conception of life, Coleridge insisted that 
words, as incarnate history, are ‘living powers’17 rather than mere counters of social 
intercourse. With this idea Coleridge countered the materialist constructions of 
philology which were largely based on the arbitrary and material nature of connections 
between word and idea.18 As living powers, words should be understood in their 
primary meaning, that is, in the metaphorical meaning, since metaphor is the 
innovative and non-standard use of language on which the act of reflection – 
understood as a mental process – is based.  
It is precisely the idea of imagination as an intuitive-inferential process, based 
on metaphor, as proposed by Naturphilosophen and further elaborated by Coleridge, 
that will become the defining force in both Newman’s elaboration of the argument for 
the common grammar between faith and reason in Grammar of Assent (1870), and also 
in Eliot’s argument for the common enterprise of the scientist, novelist and ethicist 
whose willingness to explore the significance of that which cannot be registered by 
                                                     
16 J. Coulson. Religion and Imagination: In Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 
1981, p. 12. 
17 S.T. Coleridge. [1825] Aids to Reflection and the Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit. London: 
George Bell and Sons, 1884, p. LXVI. 
18 L. Dowling. Language and Decadence in Victorian Fin de Siecle. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986, p. 7. 
 8 
 
instruments and unaided senses is based on the same process of imagination. It will 
also bear importance in Welby’s conceptualisation of Mother-Sense as the underlying 
force subtending creativity in nature and culture.  
Newman, Eliot and Welby all sought to find a common grammar between 
natural and human practices - between nature and culture - through their postulation 
of what, in the light of subsequent developments, I will argue we can now think of as 
proto-biosemiotic imagination. Although Newman’s, Eliot’s and Welby’s works were 
in part the product of their time and environment, with its shifting notions in science, 
religion, interpretation and meaning, their works show important parallels with 
theories in biosemiotics specifically in the way in which they address the issue of 
continuity within a religious, literary and philosophical framework. All three authors 
tried to propose ways of thinking that would encompass, rather than separate various 
disciplines. Among these, the most important they drew from, were evolutionary 
theory and language theory. Newman, Eliot and Welby envisaged a unity of life, a 
unity of natural and cultural life, which was based on a new epistemology (arguably 
largely informed by Darwin’s evolutionary theory and Naturphilosophie) grounded in 
a mode of non-conscious inference. They believed the sacred, aesthetic and scientific 
and practical aspects of life are deeply ingrained and intermixed in this non-conscious 
inference. 
 Newman identified this non-conscious inference as the illative sense which he 
believed was a common source of inspiration in science and religion. Differently from 
other theologians of his time, and where his originality lies, is in his objection to the 
assertion that a belief cannot be held before it is proved to be true or certain. Eliot, on 
the other hand, believed that this form of inference, which she identified as aesthetic 
imagination, both underpinned any creative process, natural or cultural, and also 
forged a link between these two types of processes. Lady Welby, echoing Peirce, saw 
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abduction as a signifying process that subtends creativity in both nature and culture. It 
is their elaboration of the non-conscious creative process, together with their 
distinctive ways of bridging the Cartesian divide, that constitute their most important 
contributions to the development of the biosemiotic insight that culture is 
evolutionarily emergent in nature through semiosis.  
Biosemiotics and its key concepts 
 Biosemiotics (‘bios’-life, ‘semeion’-sign) is a non-reductionist, non-
mechanistic inter-disciplinary field founded in the mid-1960s by the linguist Thomas 
A. Sebeok (1920-2001). It was developed in Europe by, among others, molecular 
biologist Jesper Hoffmeyer, (1943-present) theoretical biologist and philosopher Claus 
Emmeche (1956-present), and naturalist and Professor of Biosemiotics Kalevi Kull 
(1952-present). Biosemiotics as a field is based upon the recognition that ‘life is 
fundamentally grounded in semiotic processes’19 and that signs and meaning exist in 
all living systems. Biosemiotics holds that all living systems – cells, organisms and 
ecologies – are scaffolded by semiosis. The latter is the production, exchange and 
interpretation of signs. What this view implies is that semiotic interactions among 
individual organisms are part of the natural world and that purposeful behavioural 
patterns emerge because of a network of semiotic interactions, which Hoffmeyer terms 
‘semiotic scaffolding devices’.20 These semiotic interactions, in other words, provide 
the necessary conditions for living systems to perform their tasks and are based on the 
capacity of living organisms to interpret and act upon their interpretation of signs. 
                                                     
19 J. Hoffmeyer. Biosemiotics: An Examinations into the Signs of Life and Life of Signs. Scranton and 
London: University Scranton Press, 2008, p. 1.  
20 J. Hoffmeyer, op. cit., 2008, p. 4. Biosemiotics doesn’t deny that living systems originate from 
molecular processes; however, Hoffmeyer points out, that ‘these cannot be exhaustively explained in 
chemical terms since such processes, by virtue of their very participation in the constitution of the 
fundamental processes of life, functionally become distinctive bearers of life’s critical semiotic 
relationships.’ J. Hoffmeyer. “Semiotic Scaffolding in Living Systems.” Ed. M. Barbieri. Introduction 
to Biosemiotics: The New Biological Synthesis. Berlin: Springer, 2007, pp. 149-166, p. 154. 
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Importantly, this suggests that processes of sign and meanings cannot be assumed to 
be the fundamental criteria marking human communication alone, and thus cannot be 
assumed to distinguish the realms of nature and culture. Rather, as the molecular 
biologist and biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer states, cultural processes can be 
viewed, as ‘special instances of a more general and extensive biosemiosis that 
continually unfolds and acts in the biosphere.’21 Nature and culture, thus stem from a 
continuous, unified and creative evolutionary process which is based on sign 
interpretation.  
By placing greater emphasis on organisms’ capacities for interpretation and 
meaning, biosemiotics opposes a more traditional mechanistic and reductionist view 
that has been endorsed in biology by the Neo-Darwinian Modern Synthesis. As Claus 
Emmeche has pointed out, ‘by representing an organism merely as a composition of 
small non-living bodies that interact according to mechanical forces or quantum 
mechanical laws, we may never reach the description of life itself’22 which is what 
biosemiotics is partly concerned with. Indeed, a central tenet of the biosemiotics view 
proposed by Thomas A. Sebeok is that ‘life and semiosis are coextensive.’23 This view 
was elaborated by Sebeok after his discovery of Jakob Von Uexküll’s (1864-1944) 
concept of Umwelt. This concept refers to the species-specific ability to create a 
phenomenal world through what he termed Funktionskreis, or functional cycle 
whereby an organisms models its phenomenal world through recursive semiotic 
feedback loops. These involve an organism’s ability to perceive signs, act upon them 
and then communicate something to others in the environment, who will in turn 
                                                     
21 J. Hoffmeyer, op.cit., 2008, p. 3. 
22 C. Emmeche. Quoted in Marcello Barbieri. Introduction to Biosemiotics: The New Biological 
Synthesis.  Doordrecth: Springer, 2008, p. 213. 
23 K. Kull, C. Emmeche, D. Favareau. “Biosemiotic Questions.” Biosemiotics Vol. 1. (2008): 41-55. 
 11 
 
communicate something back to the organism. In so doing the organism adapts to the 
new information and therefore is able to change, evolve and therefore learn. 
Biosemiotics bases its understanding of the sign on the semiotics of the 
nineteenth-century American scientist and semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-
1914) who famously stated that ‘the universe is perfused with signs, if it is not 
composed exclusively of signs’ (EP 2:394). This implies that all living organisms - not 
only human beings and animals, but also plants and microorganisms - are able to 
engage creatively with their environment through the active interpretation of signs. 
Crucially, unlike the anthropocentric and dyadic Saussurean sign, the Peircean sign-
relation is triadic, connecting the representamen, to its object through an interpretant. 
This relation, which Peirce called semiosis, is dynamic, and thus evolutionary, and 
includes both natural and cultural signs. The differences between Saussure and Peirce 
are fundamentally important in understanding biosemiotics and they will be discussed 
in Chapter One.  
Peirce’s semiotics provides a central underpinning for the biosemiotic insight 
that natural forms of semiosis are not separated from cultural forms, but rather, that 
they are antecedent to and a condition of the cultural ones. Moreover, Peirce’s 
evolutionary thinking leads to his recognition that an important form of semiosis in 
culture and nature is related to a non-conscious creative process that Peirce called the 
‘logic of abduction’. The latter represents a substantial part of what, in this thesis, I 
term the biosemiotic imagination. Peirce’s logic of abduction provides the theoretical 
underpinning with which to analyse what John H. Newman, George Eliot and Lady 
Victoria Welby identify as Illative Sense, Aesthetic Imagination and Mother Sense, 
respectively and which I discuss in chapters Three, Four and Five. 
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In order to investigate these three central authors’ proto-biosemiotic thought, 
this thesis will embrace three necessarily interlinked fields of study. These are 
biosemiotics, philosophy and literature, where biosemiotics will provide the main 
theoretical framework structuring the thesis which reflects the inter-disciplinary nature 
of this research. Through applying a biosemiotic framework of interpretation to these 
different Victorian thinkers and their contributions I wish to highlight those aspects of 
their thought that, for a variety of reasons, have been left unconsidered or 
underdeveloped by engagements in literary criticism in the late twentieth and early 
twenty first centuries. For instance, George Eliot’s novels and critical writings have 
received particular attention from a number of important critics such as Sally 
Shuttleworth (1984), Gillian Beer (2000), Rosemary Ashton (2007), George Levine 
(1981), David Carroll (2006), and Ken M. Newton (2011),24 all of whom were 
interested in exploring and documenting in various ways the novelist as an 
extraordinary representative of Victorian intellectual life and a pioneer in integrating 
evolutionary theories with literary work. Shuttleworth and Beer in particular have 
explored Eliot’s understanding of society as a living and evolving organism, whereas 
Levine has looked at patterns of science in Victorian fiction with specific attention to 
Eliot’s hypothesis of reality. Ashton, Newton and Carroll, have highlighted Eliot’s 
indebtedness to German philosophical thought, (specifically in relation to 
Romanticism and hermeneutics) for the development of her own philosophical 
thought. Although some very important research has been done to uncover the depth 
                                                     
24 The available literary criticism on Eliot is so vast that it is impossible to include all in this introduction, 
therefore I have selected those authors that have contributed most significantly to the body of literature 
surrounding Eliot’s work. See Gillian Beer. Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George 
Eliot and Nineteenth Century Fiction. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; David 
Carroll. George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations: A Reading of the Novels. Cambridge: CUP, 
2006; Sally Shuttleworth. George Eliot and the Nineteenth Century Science. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984; George Levine. The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein 
to Lady Chatterley. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981; Ken M. Newton: Modernizing George 
Eliot: The Writer as Artist, Intellectual, Proto-Modernist, Cultural Critic. London: Bloomsbury 2011; 
Rosemary Ashton. George Eliot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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and broadness of Eliot’s views, there has been no further work researching and 
interpreting her ideas on the interconnectedness between society and environment. 
This may be due to a general avoidance of focusing on matters potentially associated 
with socio-biology, more recently known as evolutionary biology.25 In the latter, the 
persistence of a reductive, mechanistic and gene-centred account (as well as potentially 
its eugenics implications) has meant it has been an uneasy fit with the humanities, 
whose preoccupations tend to concern the socially constructed nature of both nature 
and culture. A biosemiotic account potentially helps to resolve a traditional schism 
between nature and culture because biosemiotic theory advances a non-reductive, non-
mechanistic, emergent systems view.  Hence this thesis intends to offer a biosemiotic 
reading of Eliot’s work which I hope will cast new light on the implications for the 
human-nature relationship in Eliot’s work and her understanding of the interplay 
between language and environment.  
 There is also an extended body of literature on Cardinal John Henry Newman, 
one of the most significant theologians of the nineteenth century. This has seen the 
rediscovery of the Cardinal Newman not only as theologian, but also as a profound 
and under-explored philosophical thinker more broadly. His insights on conscience, 
on reasoning and faith and imagination have been documented in the works of Ian Kerr 
(1990; 2004; 2009), Terrence Merrigan (1990; 2009), Gilley Sheridan (2002) and J. 
Coulson (1981), to name only a few examples.26 Notably, Newman’s concept of 
Implicit Reason as an inferential process which underpins both faith and science has 
                                                     
25 E. O. Wilson. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1976; E. O. 
Wilson. On Human Nature. Harvard:  Harvard University Press, 1978. 
26 See for instance Terrence Merrigan. Ed. Essays in Honor of the Centenary of John Henry Cardinal 
Newman 1801-1890. Front Royal, VA: Christendom Press, 1990; Terence Merrigan. “The Imagination 
in the Life and Thought of John Henry Newman.” Cahiers Victoriens & Edouardien Vol. 70 (2009): 
187-217; Sheridan Gilley. Newman and His Age. 4th ed. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2002; Ian 
Kerr. Ed. Newman the Theologian: a Reader. Notre Dame Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1990; 
John Coulson. Religion and Imagination. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. 
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usually been discussed within a philosophical framework that emphasises its 
metaphysical foundations. However, in this thesis I will explore this idea within a 
biosemiotic framework where I highlight the fact that the inferential process that 
Newman describes is akin to Peirce’s logic of abduction and thus grounded in natural, 
biosemiotic forms of logic. An implication of this, namely that faith is not founded on 
investigation, argument and proof, but it is the result of our abductive reasoning or 
creativity, is developed further in the chapter on Newman. 
Lady Welby has been recognised in recent years as the ‘founding mother’27 of 
the twentieth-century semiotics alongside Charles S. Peirce with whom she 
corresponded. However, Welby’s name is not well known outside semiotic studies and 
is not present in mainstream accounts of Victorian literature. Nevertheless her 
influence on leading figures in the world of science and literature in her time, as 
documented by her published letters, was great. 28 With the exception of the pioneering 
work of Walter H. Schmitz (Essays on Significs: Papers Presented on the Occasion of 
the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912), and Susan 
Petrilli, (Su Victoria Welby: Significs e la Filosofia del Linguaggio 1998; Victoria 
Welby: Senso Significato Significativitá, 2007; Signifying and Understanding: 
Reading the work of Lady Victoria Welby 2009, Semiotica Special issue on Victoria 
Welby 2013 and Victoria Welby and the Science of Signs, 2015) there is little scholarly 
work on Welby that reflects her importance as a thinker during this era and, in 
particular, the unique contribution she made through her theory of signs  and meaning 
                                                     
27 S. Petrilli and A. Ponzio. Semiotics Unbounded: Interpretive Routes through the Open Network of 
Signs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2005, p. 81. 
28 See Nina Cust. Ed. Echoes of Larger Life: A Selection from the Early Correspondence of Victoria 
Lady Welby. London: Jonathan Cape, 1929; Charles S. Hardwick. Ed. Semiotic and Significs: 
Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. Lubbock: Texas Tech University 
Press, 2001; Lawrence P. Jacks. Other Dimensions: a Selection from the Later Correspondence of 
Victoria Lady Welby. London: Jonathan Cape, 1931. 
. 
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which she called Significs. This thesis will integrate her work with that of Newman 
and Eliot in order to highlight their connections and the continuity of their thought 
particularly in relation to what I shall describe as proto-biosemiotic imagination. 
An original contribution made to knowledge by this thesis takes three forms.  
First, it introduces biosemiotics as a theoretical framework for the analysis and 
interpretation of Victorian texts. Second, it contributes originally to the scholarship on 
the religious and literary work about Newman and Eliot by introducing them as 
thinkers who think in terms of non-conscious knowing or abductive logic and 
communicative webs in relation to (scientifically and biologically informed) religion 
and literature. For Newman, non-conscious knowledge or, what he calls illative sense, 
is at the basis of faith, while Eliot identifies aesthetic imagination as that type of 
inferential logic which subtends any knowledge in art and science. Third, my research 
into Lady Welby and the analysis of her work introduces her as a thinker and 
philosopher and places her among those intellectuals, such as Charles K. Ogden (1889-
1957) and Ivor A. Richard (1893-1979), who contributed to the development of 
semiotics in Victorian England. This represents a new contribution to Victorian 
studies. 
To address the central question, namely ‘does the biosemiotic imagination 
identified in the thesis allow the comparison of creativity in nature and human beings?’ 
the present thesis has been structured as follows: 
Chapter One introduces the theoretical and philosophical background of biosemiotics 
by analysing the main concepts that historically underpin it, namely Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s semiotics and logic of abduction and Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory. I 
discuss how Uexküll’s understanding of biology as dealing with organisms as holistic 
units, which stemmed from Naturphilosophie, prompted him to recognise that all 
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living organisms are capable of building a conceptual model of the outer cognised 
world (Umwelt) through semiosis, that is, through the active interpretation of signs. I 
show how these interpretive acts in the animal world are primitive as compared to 
human acts of interpretation. Nonetheless, both acts stem from the non-conscious 
interpretation of signs or what Peirce identifies as abductive inference. Drawing on 
Peirce’s doctrine of signs which he sees as a branch of logic, I discuss how abduction 
is the only logical operation that introduces a new idea and as such is the only source 
of adaptive and creative growth. I show how, for Peirce, abduction is closely tied to 
the growth of knowledge via the evolutionary action of sign relations and I will relate 
this to Gregory Bateson’s understanding of natural metaphor.  
Chapter Two presents a contextual background to the cultural and intellectual 
climate that informed and shaped the work Newman, Eliot and Welby. Here I focus 
on the conceptual heritage from German Romantic thought -Naturphilosophie- in 
relation to nature and language, in order to show how the conceptual transfers between 
comparative philology and evolutionary theory informed and shaped broader 
epistemological debates in religion, science and mind that dominated the Victorian 
period. I show how Newman, Eliot and Welby addressed these debates and explain the 
influence Naturphilosophie - with its emphasis on the common role of the scientist and 
poet in uncovering and understanding nature through imagination - had on the way in 
which these three authors postulated the continuity between nature and culture through 
what I term biosemiotic imagination. I also discuss the influence Naturphilosophie had 
on Darwin’s conceptualisation of natural selection. Contrary to now yielding beliefs 
that Darwin conceived it in mechanistic terms, I argue that he endorsed a view that 
was much closer to the one proposed by Naturphilosophen. 
 Chapter Three examines the work of John Henry Newman in more detail. It 
considers how Newman saw that the perceived opposition between the developing idea 
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of scientific rationality, on the one hand, and the truth of faith, on the other, constituted 
a historically new challenge for the Christian tradition. Contrary to other theologians 
of his time, Newman tried to overcome this problem by using reason precisely to argue 
against the certainty of conscious reason and, instead, for reason’s basis in states of 
belief. I discuss how Newman opposed the rationalist theory of knowledge associated 
with Aristotle’s Logic by ascertaining that religious truth and faith are discovered and 
transmitted not merely in self-conscious reason but in ways of which mankind is 
sometimes hardly conscious through what he called implicit reason. These ideas, 
which he also drew from his readings of Joseph Butler’s Analogy of Religion (1725) 
and S. T. Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection (1825) were discussed as illative sense or 
imagination in University Sermons (1826-1840), and in his Essay in Aid of a Grammar 
of Assent (1870). I show that both implicit reason and illative sense are in fact a type 
of natural inference or reasoning and I will argue that as such they can be understood 
in terms of Peirce’s abductive logic and Gregory Bateson’s natural metaphor.  
 Chapter Four focuses on George Eliot’s philosophical thought and on her 
attempts as a novelist and critic, to unravel the relation between mind, language and 
observed reality, by engaging with epistemological questions about the relationship 
between human knowledge and mind, and thus between language and any act of 
cognition. I argue that Eliot’s adherence to the evolutionary or organic understanding 
of nature, which found its core in Darwin’s theory and in Naturphilosophie, as well as 
in language theory and George H. Lewes’s work, brought her to see and understand 
our experience of reality as a web of organic and semiotic relations and to propose the 
continuity between the natural and the cultural worlds through aesthetic practice. The 
chapter discusses Eliot’s understanding of reality by analysing her poem ‘I Grant you 
Ample Leave’ and by looking at her novel Middlemarch, where her proto-biosemiotic 
thought seems to be most evident. Drawing on Jakob von Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt 
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and upon Thomas A. Sebeok’s modelling theory I argue that Eliot’s realism is a 
biosemiotic realism. I also discuss the importance that Eliot places on aesthetic 
imagination as an inferential tool and therefore as a source of knowledge and growth 
which I address through a discussion of characters in Middlemarch. I further argue that 
Eliot’s aesthetic imagination is akin to Peirce’s logical category of abduction and, by 
inference, to the evolutionary biosemiotic notion of semiotic scaffolding, whereby 
evolutionary development lays down the organic layers of meaning. Emphasising 
metaphor as a source of creativity and world disclosure, I argue that metaphors are at 
the basis of Middlemarch’s characters interpretation and understanding of their own 
reality or Umwelten which is nested through recursive feedback loops into a wider web 
of semiotic relations that form the novel. I suggest that this understanding afforded her 
the possibility of exploring in her novels the spiritual, psychological and ethical 
implications of nature as embodied through the human relational capacity for 
sympathy, which is, I will suggest, equally grounded in abductive logic.  
 Chapter Five introduces and explores Lady Victoria Welby’s theory of signs and 
meaning which she called Significs. Drawing partially on her biographical information 
and on her extended correspondence with eminent scholars of the time, such as Charles 
S. Peirce, C. S. Stout (1860-1944), Max Müller (1823-1900) and C. K. Ogden (1889-
1957), the chapter considers how Significs, with its particular focus on the generative 
nature of signifying processes and  their capacity for development and transformation 
as a condition of human experiential, cognitive and expressive capacities, sets 
Significs apart from other philological-historical approaches to the study of language. 
I show how Welby’s early engagement with theories of meaning and interpretation in 
religious matters raised her awareness of the need to view language and meaning in its 
dynamic and evolutionary form, in its ‘plasticity’ rather than in its fixed form.  Welby 
recognised that plasticity of language - the ability to for creating connections among 
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seemingly different concepts through metaphors - is an essential characteristic of 
thought and language and she held that linguistic expressions are alive and dynamic in 
a way similar to living organisms. This is why she established an analogy between 
word and context similar to that of an organisms and its environment. This view I argue 
grew out of her keen interest and engagement with biological theories, specifically 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory. The latter had an important impact on her understanding 
of relatedness between the cultural and biological realms which she expressed through 
her meaning- triad of sense, meaning and significance, whereby meaning and 
significance are specific to the human dimension, whereas sense or what she termed 
Mother-Sense, is to be understood as the immediate or interpretive intuition which she 
equates with the spontaneous reaction of an organism to its environment.  Welby 
identified the original concept of Mother-Sense as being the originating source of all 
signifying processes at large, which she believed are shared by all living organisms. 
Understood in this way, Mother-Sense is common to all living organisms as it is the 
pre-condition for evolutionary adaptation and therefore survival of all species. 
Exploring the concept of  Mother-Sense I will emphasise the importance of Welby’s 
concept of plasticity  and ‘translation’, her specific contribution to the study of 
language, as a key method for understanding creative discovery on the one hand, and 
as a key capacity for the interconnectedness and interdependency among signs, on the 
other. In emphasising continuity between natural and cultural realms, which are 
grounded in the logic of interpretive-translative processes – abduction – and by 
identifying that human beings uniquely possess the capacity for articulate language, I 
will argue that Welby’s thinking prefigures ideas that later emerged within and were 
refined by the field of biosemiotics. 
Finally, the conclusion, offers a summary and synthesis of the main themes and 
arguments advanced in the thesis. I will hopefully demonstrate that the notion of a 
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biosemiotic imagination as originally identified in the thesis, and as it has developed 
in the humanities from the nineteenth century, offers a useful way of both comparing 
and deriving important continuities between creativity in nature and culture. The 
application of a biosemiotic framework for the analysis of the major works of 
Newman, Eliot and Welby appears to open up new ways of exploring, firstly, proto-
biosemiotic thinking and, secondly, the nature and development of thinking within and 
between the disciplines of theology, literature and philosophy in the nineteenth 
century.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
An Introduction to the Philosophical Origin of Biosemiotics - Charles 
Sanders Peirce and Jakob von Uexküll  
 
It is a crude mistake to oppose nature and culture, organism to 
environment. “Culture,” so called, is implanted in nature; the 
environment or Umwelt, is a model generated by the organism.  Semiosis 
links them. (Thomas Sebeok)1 
 
This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the theoretical background 
of biosemiotics by analysing the main concepts that historically underpin it, namely 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s (1839-1914) semiotics and logic of abduction and Jakob von 
Uexküll’s (1864-1944) Umwelt theory. Even though biosemiotics is represented, as 
Donald Favareau and Prisca Augustyn explain, by a very diverse group of molecular 
biologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists, philosophers, psychologists and cultural 
theorists, these two concepts have been broadly accepted as the core or philosophical 
foundation of this growing inter-disciplinary field.2 The reason for this is that 
Uexküll’s Umwelt – the subjective species-specific phenomenal world created by a 
living organism – inspired Thomas A. Sebeok’s (1920-2001) definition of semiosis 
and the consequent view that ‘life and semiosis are coextensive.’3 
Peirce’s semiotics, on the other hand, derives from the pre-Socratic tradition 
which embraced both natural and cultural signs as the focus of its study as well as 
                                                     
1 T. A. Sebeok. Global Semiotics. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001, p. vii. 
2 D. Favareau. “The Evolutionary History of Biosemiotics.” Ed. M. Barbieri. Introduction to 
Biosemiotics: The New Biological Synthesis. Berlin: Springer, 2007, pp. 1–67; P. Augustyn. “Uexküll, 
Peirce and Other Affinities between Biosemiotics and Biolinguistics.” Biosemiotics Vol. 2 (2009): 2-
17, p. 2.  
3 K. Kull, C. Emmeche, D. Favareau. “Biosemiotic Questions.” Biosemiotics Vol. 1 (2008): 41-55, p. 
43. 
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from the Latin tradition of John Poinsot (1589-1644), who identified triadic relations 
as the being common to all signs, natural and cultural.4 The implication for 
biosemiotics is that Peircean semiotics offers a wider scope of investigation into the 
life of signs, because contrary to the European structuralist tradition of the twentieth 
century which restricted its field to the study of arbitrary and conventional signs used 
by humans, Peircean semiotics points towards the importance of biological sign 
processes as being antecedent to, rather than separated from, cultural ones. 
 Both Peirce and von Uexküll understood culture and nature through the analysis 
of signs and sign processes. They believed that all living organisms, not only human 
beings and animals, but also plants and microorganisms, are able to engage creatively 
with their environment through the active interpretation of signs.5 This view not only 
challenges a mechanistic and reductionist understanding of nature as gene-centric and 
driven by biochemical processes and governed by physical laws as advocated by Neo-
Darwinism, but it also leads to the biosemiotic insight that culture is evolutionarily 
emergent within semiotic nature.6  
Biosemiotics holds that semiotic interactions among individual organisms are part 
of the natural world and that purposeful behavioural patterns emerge because of a 
                                                     
4 Paul Cobley points out that Thomas Sebeok repeatedly mentioned that semiotics derives from pre-
Socratic thought. The more direct link to semiotics is through the figure of Hippocrates (490-370 BC) 
and the study of natural signs on the body. See P. Cobley. The Routledge Companion to Semiotics. Ed. 
Paul Cobley. London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 5-6. It is however Augustine of Hippo (354-430 BC) who 
asks whether cultural signs function in the same way as natural signs. Augustine’s general definition of 
a sign as ‘anything that, over and above the impressions on the senses, brings something other than itself 
into awareness’ transcended the. Anything (either natural or cultural) that makes an impression on the 
senses in such a way as to bring forth in our awareness something other than itself functions as a sign. 
For that reason it transcends the nature/culture divide.  See J. Deely. “Objective Reality and the Physical 
World.” Green Letters: Studies in Ecocriticism Vol. 19. n. 3 (2015): 267-279, p. 268. 
5  Winfried Nöth points out that among the agents of semiosis Peirce mentions not only animals such as 
‘a chameleon and many kinds of insects’ (MS 318: 205-206) but also microorganisms such as ‘a little 
creature’ under a microscope (CP 1.269), but also “plants that make their living by uttering sign, and 
lying signs, at that’. (MS 318: 205-206). See W. Nöth. “Ecosemiotics and the Semiotic of Nature.” Sign 
System Studies Vol. 29. n. 1 (2001): 71-81, p. 74. 
6 Although it is true that life is driven, among other things by biochemical processes, the semiotic 
framework - of which the sign relations are part - is important if we are to understand the experiential 
life of living organisms and their reference to meanings and purposes.  
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network of semiotic interactions, which Hoffmeyer terms ‘semiotic scaffolding 
devices.’7 These scaffolding devices, Hoffmeyer explains, ‘assur[e] that an 
organism’s activity become[s] tuned to an organism’s need.’8 These semiotic 
interactions, in other words, provide the necessary conditions for living systems to 
perform their tasks and are based on the capacity of living organisms to interpret and 
act upon their interpretation of signs. Hoffmeyer points out that throughout evolution, 
‘whole new kinds of semiotic scaffoldings have been built on top of the existing ones 
and thus became available to our species.’9 Evolutionary layers of meaning are built 
on preceding meanings (scaffolds) which may be altered by subsequent ones and so 
on. This is why semiotic scaffolding involves both learning and development. Forms 
of natural semiosis are, therefore, antecedent and repeated with a greater degree of 
complexity in culture. Differently put, we could say that cultural semiosis emerges 
from natural semiosis inasmuch as all species on Earth, humans included, share some 
capacity for iconic and indexical referencing (to use Peirce’s classification of signs). 
Yet the complexity of cultural scaffolding is embedded in symbolic referencing. This 
according to biosemiotics is what distinguishes human beings from the rest of the 
living world, and is what ‘makes recursive messages available, thereby opening an 
infinitude of complex meanings to be thought out and socially shared.’10 Wendy 
Wheeler suggests that this growth (complexity) of meanings, both in biology and 
                                                     
7 J. Hoffmeyer, op.cit., 2008, p. 4. Biosemiotics doesn’t deny that living systems originate from 
molecular processes; however, Hoffmeyer  argues, that ‘these cannot be exhaustively explained in 
chemical terms since such processes, by virtue of their very participation in the constitution of the 
fundamental processes of life, functionally become distinctive bearers of life’s critical semiotic 
relationships.’ J. Hoffmeyer. “Semiotic Scaffolding in Living Systems.” M. Barbieri ed. op.cit., 2007 
pp. 149-166, p. 154. 
8 See also T. Deacon. The Symbolic Species:The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Compamy, 1997; T. Deacon. Incomplete Nature. How Mind Emerged from Matter. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company Ltd., 2012; T. Schilhab, F. Stjernfelt, T. Deacon. Eds. “The 
Symbolic Species Evolved.” Biosemiotics Vol. 6 (2012): 9-38. 
9 J. Hoffmeyer. “Semiotic Scaffolding: A link Between Sema and Soma.” The Catalyzing Mind. Beyond 
Models of Causality. Annals of Theoretical Psychology. Eds. K. R. Cabell and J. Valsiner. Vol. 11 
(2014): 95-110.  
10 Ibid.,p. 108.  
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culture works via Peirce’s abductive logic or via what Gregory Bateson, following 
Peirce, called natural metaphor.11 
It must be said at the outset that von Uexküll and Peirce were writing, to various 
extents, in the tradition of German Romantic Naturphilosophie of Kant, Goethe and 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Naturphilosophie focused specifically on the 
organic core of nature and its relationship to mind, while the Romantic part, as Robert 
J. Richards points out ‘added aesthetic and moral features to this conception of 
nature.’12 The consequence was that nature was seen as a creative, evolutionary force 
and, for German Naturphilosophen, the artist and scientist were especially capable of 
the profound articulation and understanding of such creativity. The latter lay, for 
Peirce, in the logic of abduction – in that non-conscious inference, often or usually 
expressed in the form of a hunch or guess, that precedes deduction and induction and 
is at the basis of any knowing (CP 5.172). It is this non-conscious knowing that 
becomes one important aspect in understanding the link between nature and culture 
in biosemiotics. It also provides the theoretical underpinning for analysing the 
biosemiotic imagination in the work of John Henry Newman, George Eliot and Lady 
Victoria Welby in this thesis. 
This chapter will firstly introduce contemporary biosemiotics and its core 
concepts. It will then go on to analyse Uexküll’s Umwelt theory and its relation to the 
biosemiotic concept of semiosis and modelling drawn initially from the semiotic work 
of Juri Lotman (1922-1993). Next it will focus on Peirce’s semiotics and logic of 
abduction. This analysis will involve a discussion of the differences between two 
                                                     
11 W. Wheeler. “The Wrecked Vessel: The Effects of Gnosticism, Nominalism and the Protestant 
Reformation in the Semiotic Scaffolding of Modern Scientific Consciousness.” Biosemiotics Vol. 8 
(2015): 305-324.  
12 R. J. Richards. The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe. 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 516. 
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schools of semiotics - Saussurean Semiology and Peircean Semeiotics - and their 
understanding of sign and sign relations.13 In addition, the discussion of abduction 
will introduce Gregory Bateson’s understanding of abduction as natural metaphor. 
This will show the link between abduction and the biosemiotic imagination in the 
work of Newman, Eliot and Welby. 
Biosemiotics and the nature/culture paradigm 
Biosemiotics (bios = ‘life’ and semeion = ‘sign’) is an interdisciplinary field of 
research including among others molecular biology, neurobiology, theoretical 
biology, cybernetic and system theory, philosophy of mind, psychology and cultural 
theory, which is based on the recognition that ‘life is fundamentally grounded in 
semiotic processes’14 and that signs and meaning exist in all living systems. This 
implies that processes of sign and meaning cannot be assumed to be the fundamental 
criteria marking human communication alone, and thus distinguishing the realms of 
nature and culture. Rather cultural processes can be viewed, as the molecular biologist 
Jesper Hoffmeyer explains, as ‘special instances of a more general and extensive 
biosemiosis that continually unfolds and acts in the biosphere.’15 In other words 
nature and culture stem from a continuous, unified and creative process which is 
based on semiosis or the ‘production, exchange and interpretation of signs.’16   
The unifying process of signification has been extensively described by Charles 
S. Peirce and other semioticians, most notably Thomas A. Sebeok. As it will become 
clear in the section on Peirce’s semiotics a sign or representamen is for Peirce 
‘something which stands to somebody for something in some respect’ (CP 2.228). 
                                                     
13 Peirce used Semeiotics - although not very frequently- as an alternative spelling to Semiotics.  
14 J. Hoffmeyer, op.cit., 2008.  
15 Ibid., p. 3. 
16 J. Hoffmeyer. “God and the World of Signs: Semiotics and the Emergence of Life: A Biosemiotic 
Approach to the Question of Meaning.” Zygon Vol. 45. n. 2 (2010): 367-390, p. 368. 
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According to Peirce, a sign is in its very essence a triadic relation where the sign 
(representamen) stands for, represents or conveys an object of awareness (something 
other than itself) to a third thing or cognitive power (interpretant). The structure of 
the sign is thus triadic, always linking these three elements, but the being of the sign 
is the triadic relation itself, not the elements related to or structured according to their 
respective roles within the relation. The implication of this view is that a sign, or what 
is usually called a sign in common usage, is not a sign, but is a particular being which 
can be either internal (psychological state) or external (sound or movement) that 
occupies the position of ‘standing for’ in a triadic relation referring what is stood for 
as object to some third (a cognitive organism either human or not).17 Peirce 
recognised that anything can become a sign regardless of its subjective constitution 
since anything among the terms of the sign triad (sign, object, interpretant) is what 
makes something we can see, smell, hear, point to be called a sign.  Differently put, 
a sign is not a physical thing or experienced object, but is the very relation that unites 
the sign to its semiotic object through the production of an interpretant. This triadic 
relation is what Peirce calls semiosis and is what transcends the orders of nature and 
culture precisely because it is not linked to the identification of a sign with any 
definite class of things, existing either as a physical or psychological realities, but is 
the very relation itself where a sign signifies beyond itself.   
Investigations into the semiotic nature of living systems is not new, as John 
Deely’s Four Ages of Understanding (2001)18 and Donald Favareau’s introduction to 
the Essential Readings in Biosemiotics (2006)19 demonstrate. However the 
                                                     
17 J. Deely. Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of “Human Being” Transcending Patriarchy 
and Feminism. South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2010, p. 22. 
18 In his book John Deely offers a sustained argument on the centrality of the theory of signs in our 
understanding of the world from ancient Greek philosophy, through the medieval times into the 
twentieth century. See J. Deely. Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey from 
Ancient Times to the turn of the Twenty-First Century. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2001. 
19 D. Favareau, op. cit., 2007, pp. 1–67. 
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examination of the close relations between living systems and their sign systems took 
a long time to emerge in human understandings, mainly because of the prevailing 
ontological and metaphysical assumptions of both the natural and the human 
sciences.20 These assumptions had been set in motion in the early modern 
development of science in seventeenth-century Europe informed mainly by Cartesian 
dualism and Newtonian mechanics which contributed to the separation between 
natural and cultural realms. The effects of the Reformation, coupled with the 
development of nominalism (which disallowed the reality of universals, such as 
relations among things) and the deterministic and materialistic account of nature, 
brought the exclusion of the study of signs relations from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century science.21 It was only with the emergent interest in philology in 
the nineteenth century that the rediscovery of signs began. However, this interest 
regarded the study of cultural and linguistic signs (as used by humans alone) and the 
natural sign was still excluded from the study of semiotics.  As a consequence, in the 
Anglophone humanities, semiotics in the early twentieth century was regarded as a 
human science and as such promoted the view of the ‘ability to produce, communicate 
and understand signs as a human privilege.’22 A direct result of this was that structures 
of nature were investigated in the Anglophone humanities, as Winfried Nöth 
observes, ‘within a cultural framework as content structures of texts. Such semiotics 
of nature’, he continues, ‘is not a theory of natural semiosis or sign processes, but a 
theory of how human culture interprets nature.’23 
                                                     
20 J. Hoffmeyer, op. cit., 2008, p.4. 
21 P. Harrison. The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001.  
22 F. Stjernfelt. “Biosemiotics and Formal Ontology.” Semiotica Spec. issue Biosemiotica Vol. 127. n. 
1/4 (1999): 537-566, p. 538. 
23 W. Nöth, op.cit., 2001, p. 73.  
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This lingering anthropocentric or glottocentric understanding of nature was 
challenged in the mid-1960s by Thomas A. Sebeok.24 Today regarded as a founding 
father of contemporary biosemiotics and a linguist by training, Sebeok saw linguistics 
as a branch of biology. Thus, he ‘uprooted semiotics from the philosophical, linguistic 
and hermeneutic terrain in which it has been cultivated for centuries and replanted it 
into the larger biological domain from where it sprang originally.’25 Sebeok did this 
initially through his concepts of zoosemiotics (1963) and later through biosemiotics 
(1991) and finally through global semiotics (2001).26 Although Sebeok’s work in the 
humanities was seminal in the conceptualisation of biosemiotics,27 its proliferation, 
to use Sebeok’s term, is not only attributable to his work, but also to the work of 
biologists in the sciences. As Donald Favareau points out, it was the joining together 
of “Sebeok’s people”, that is, semioticians exploring biology such as John Deely and 
Floyd Merrell, with “Hoffmeyer’s people”, that is, biologists inspired by semiotics 
such as Kalevi Kull, Claus Emmeche and Anton Markoš, that signalled the 
development of the contemporary field of biosemiotics.28 From the early 1990s 
important publications such as The Biosemiotic Web by Sebeok and Jean Umiker-
Sebeok (1991), The Garden in the Machine by Claus Emmeche (1994), Terence 
Deacon’s The Symbolic Species: the co-evolution of language and the human brain 
(1997) as well as Jesper Hoffmeyer’s Signs of Meaning of the Universe (1996)29 all 
                                                     
24 T. A. Sebeok. Global Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001, p. 31. 
25 M. Danesi quoted in D. Favareau, op.cit., 2007, p. 34. 
26 Sebeok defines zoosemiotics as “a discipline within which the science of signs intersects with 
ethology, devoted to the scientific study of signalling behaviour in and across animal species” in T. A. 
Sebeok. “Communication among Social Bees; Porpoises and Sonar; Man and Dolphin.” Language 39. 
(1963): 448-466.  
27 The term Biosemiotics was not coined by Sebeok. It was firstly used by Juri Stepanov in 1971. Sebeok 
came across the term possibly soon after the book was published, however he hesitated to use the term 
until much later. See K. Kull. “Sebeok and Biology.” Cybernetics and Human Knowing Vol. 10. n.1 
(2003): 8-20. 
28 D. Favareau. Ed. Essential Readings in Biosemiotics: Anthology and Commentary. Berlin: Springer, 
2010, p. 49. 
29 According to Favareau (2010), this book remains one of the most widely read and cited books in 
biosemiotics. 
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contributed to the maturation of biosemiotics as an interdisciplinary field concerned 
with investigating life as semiosis.30  
Yet the theoretical and philosophical foundations of biosemiotics owe much to 
Sebeok’s re-discovery of the work of two important thinkers, namely the American 
scientist and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and the Estonian-born 
German biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944). Their respective concepts of the 
action sign processes – especially Peirce’s logic of Abduction and von Uexküll’s 
Umweltlehre (the proto-semiotic theory of Umwelt) came to play an important role in 
the biosemiotic understanding of life as based on sign relations as a semiotic 
scaffolding for physical processes.31 This also involved the consequent view that 
culture is evolutionary and emergent in natural evolution rather than a wholly 
different process often thought of as opposed to it. The following section will discuss 
Jakob von Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt in more detail and show its relation to 
Sebeok’s conceptualisation of semiosis and modelling theory. 
Umweltlehre and World Modelling 
Cited by both Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) and Nico Tinbergen (1901-1972) as the 
founder of modern ethology, Jakob von Uexküll devoted his entire life to the study of 
animals, first as a zoologist and later as a physiologist.32 In his early monograph 
(1905)33 he made a very clear distinction between the roles of physiology and biology. 
Uexküll held that: 
                                                     
30Other key writings are: Marcello Barbieri. Introduction to Biosemiotics: The new Biological Synthesis. 
Berlin: Springer, 2007; Jesper Hoffmeyer. A Legacy for Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as a 
Precursor to Biosemiotics. Berlin: Springer, 2008a; Jesper Hoffmeyer. Biosemiotics: An examination 
into the Signs of Life and Life of Signs. Scranton and London: University Scranton Press, 2008b; Donald 
Favareau. Essential Readings in Biosemiotics: Anthology and Commentary. Berlin: Springer, 2010; 
Wendy Wheeler. Biosemiotics: Nature/Culture/Science/Semiosis. January 2012. Web. 23 March 2013. 
31 J. Hoffmeyer, op.cit., 2014. 
32 See D. Favareau, op.cit., 2010,p. 30. 
33 J. von Uexküll. Leitfaden in das Studium der experimentellen Biologie der Wassertiere. Wiesbaden: 
J.F. Bergmann, 1905. 
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Physiology’s role is to organise the knowledge of organic systems by 
looking for causalities. Having preserved the experimental method, it 
should help inform biology. In distinction to physiology, biology has to 
use the scientific method to go beyond the investigation of causalities 
and to focus on exploring those laws that account for the purposefulness 
of living organisms. Therefore biology should not study organisms as 
objects, but as active subjects and focus on the organisms’ purposeful 
abilities that provide for the active integration into a complex 
environment.34 
Biology’s role was, therefore, to deal with organisms as holistic units and to study 
the interactive unity between the environment and the world sensed by it. This unity 
is what von Uexküll termed Umwelt.  Differently put, Umwelt is the phenomenal world 
of the animal species, or rather, the subjective world as the animal itself apprehends it. 
As John Deely observed, von Uexküll uniquely realised that the physical environment 
which may be said to be the ‘same’ for all living organisms, is not the world in which 
an organism lives out its life. This is because each organism, by nature of its distinctive 
bodily constitution, develops different cognitive capacities, which allow it to construct 
different models of the reality it inhabits.35 According to von Uexküll, this reality – 
die Natur – reveals itself only through signs.  
In Bedeutungslehre (Theory of Meaning) which was published in 1940, von 
Uexküll illustrated this point by giving the example of a flower stem and its 
transformation in the four Umwelten (plural) of a girl, ant, cicada larva and a cow. The 
flower stem represents a decoration, a path, a supplier of material for a building of a 
house and food respectively.36 He explained that because each of these acts ‘imprints 
its meaning on the meaningless object […] every object becomes a conveyor of 
meaning in each respective Umwelt.’37 In other words, meaning does not reside in the 
object, but in the organism’s relation to the object. What this example shows is that 
                                                     
34 J. von Uexkül, quoted in D. Favareau, op.cit., 2010, p. 30. 
35 J. Deely. “Umwelt.” Semiotica Vol. 134 n.1/4 (2001): 125-135. 
36 J. Von Uexküll. “The Theory of Meaning.” In D. Favareau. Ed., op.cit., 2010, p. 102. 
37 J. Von Uexküll. “An Introduction to Umwelt.” Semiotica Vol. 134 n. 1/4 (2001): 107-110, p. 108. 
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although the physical environment is objectively the same for all, its subjective world 
or the world as a particular organism is aware of as either cognized or apprehended, is 
something different. What exists in an organism’s awareness depends on the aspects 
of the environment which evolution has sculpted access to in sensation, which 
represents the ‘direct channel through which physical features of the environment are 
objectified, or made into semiotic objects for the organism.’38  In addition to sensation 
which, as an external sense, only selects among environmental features that can be 
objectified, the cognitive process of an organism also needs an internal sense that 
organizes the objectified features in awareness. This internal sense, which comprises 
memory, imagination, estimation, is perception. The latter ties sensations together to 
form our objects of experience. It is important to stress here that von Uexküll was 
among the first to see that the difference between objects of experience and elements 
of sensation is not determined by anything in the physical environment as such, but by 
the relation, or network and set of relations. These relations concern above all how the 
limited and partial sensory aspects of the physical world are connected among 
themselves in such a way as to form objects of experience for a sensing organism.39 
John Deely argues that it is ‘through these various channels or avenues of 
internal (perception) and external (sensation) sense working together, the Innenwelt, 
(the interior state or ‘pyschology’ on the basis of which the organism relates to its 
physical surroundings) which is subjective, and Umwelt, which is objective, develop 
as correlative structures.’40 Moreover, it is the relation between the two, the internal 
and external, subjective and objective, Innenwelt and Umwelt that permits each species 
to construct (or model) and live within its own life world. This whole process is 
                                                     
38 J. Deely, op.cit, 2001a, p. 7. 
39 J. Deely, op.cit., 2001, p. 127. 
40 Ibid., p. 8. Von Uexküll also argued the same in his major monograph Umwelt and Innenwelt der 
Tiere (The Outer world and The Inner World of Animals) 1909.  
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executed, as von Uexküll understood, by means of signs, and more precisely, by what 
he terms Funktionskreis (or functional cycle).41 Every living organism, according to 
Uexküll, lives in its Umwelt, which is constructed via semiotic loops whereby the 
organism perceives the signs, acts upon them and then communicates something to 
others in its environment. As Wheeler points out these semiotic loops ‘flow ceaselessly 
between Umwelten and Innenwelten (semiotic-inner worlds) of creatures, each making 
a ceaseless ecological process.’42 Von Uexküll’s Funktionskreis is widely recognized 
as an early expression of cybernetic understanding concerning information flows.  
As Hoffmeyer indicates, animals throughout their lifetime conjure up models 
of the outer reality that they have to cope with.43 However, the non - human animal is 
quite unaware that this happens, since, as Deely points out quoting Maritain, ‘it [the 
organism] simply uses signs without realizing for a moment that there are signs.’44 For, 
Deely argues, ‘whenever one element of experience makes present something besides 
itself, be that other real or not, the element in question is functioning as a vehicle of 
signification.’45 In other words, no non-human animal knows the objects of its world 
in their entirety, because all it has access to is the relation of something other than itself 
rather than the direct object of its being. Thus experience is based on whatever is 
accessible, or on that (the representamen) which signifies an object for its observer, 
that is, to signs of that world.   
In Peirce’s semiotics, a sign is neither a physical thing (a candle or car) nor a 
psychological reality, but a triadic relation that unites the sign to its semiotic object 
through the production of an interpretant. Although the structure of the sign, as already 
                                                     
41 J. von Uexküll. [1920] Theoretische Biologie. Frankfurt am Main: Surhkamp, 1973, p. 116.  
42 W. Wheeler. “Semiotic Nature of Life.” Ecocritical Theory: New European Approaches. Eds. Axel 
Goodbody and Kate Rigby. Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2011, p. 272. 
43 J. Hoffmeyer, op.cit., 2008, p. 174. 
44 J. Deely. The Green Book: The Impact of Semiotics on Philosophy. 2000. PDF File. Web. 15 Apr. 
2012, p.17. 
45 Ibid., p.17. 
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noted, always links these three elements, the being of the sign is the triadic relation 
itself which is neither subjective (observer dependent) nor objective (observer 
independent), but as Deely points out, is suprasubjective.46 What Deely means is that 
for a cognizing organisms neither the relation nor the thing become object (in one’s 
cognition) is inside the knower, but is over and above both of them. In order to 
understand this view, it is essential to note the following interrelated points; the first 
is that although object and thing have become synonymous in modern day English, the 
two notions are not quite the same. In fact, as Deely argues, a thing refers to what it is 
as it is regardless of being known, whereas an object, to be an object, requires a relation 
to a knower in and through which relation the object apprehended exists as a 
terminus.47 So whatever exists as an object does so only within a network of sign 
relations (that Sebeok characterized as semiotic web and von Uexküll called Umwelt) 
indifferently from nature or mind. Von Uexküll compared each Umwelt to an invisible 
bubble within which each species lives.48 The bubble is invisible precisely because it 
consists of relations, since all relations as such, in contrast to things which are related, 
are invisible.  So it is possible to see that the objective meaning of each world depends 
less on physical being than it does on how the relations constituting the Umwelt 
intersect. As Deely notes, the difference between objects and things makes mistakes 
possible, but it is also what makes for the possibility of meaning in life, and different 
meanings in different lives.49 
The second interrelated point to note is that these relations do not exist in the 
individual, but between the individual and whatever the individual is aware of, and 
whatever the individual is aware of exists, as pointed out above, as the terminus 
                                                     
46 J. Deely. Purely Objective Reality. Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter, 2009, p. 5.  
47 J. Deely, op.cit., 2015, pp. 271-272. 
48 J. Deely, op.cit. 2000, pp. 18-19. 
49 J. Deely, op.cit, 2001, p. 130. 
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(semiotic object) of the relation. A relation thus functions as a semiotic bridge 
connecting some things that are known to some things that exists independently of 
being known. Sign relations always involve three factors: that on which the 
relationship is founded (basis), the relationship itself, and that at which the relation 
terminates.50 The relation itself, however, is in neither the basis nor terminus, but over 
and above both, in other words is suprasubjective. So the experiential worlds of living 
organisms or Umwelten are suprasubjective as they are based on sign relations where 
‘the interpretant of the Peircean triad is foregrounded as the active mediator between 
the physical universe of things and the objective universe that includes things, but is 
not reducible to them.’51 In biosemiotics terms, reality is a triadic relation which 
includes an experiencing organism (an interpretant), the object experienced and the 
basis on which the object exists (representamen or the sign vehicle or basis) as 
experienced.  
Although humans and other animals live in a world or realm of signs, sign 
relations are not manifest to the animal because they are imperceptible, that is, they 
are neither mind-dependent nor mind-independent. Indeed, animals are aware of their 
specific Umwelten, but not of the relations themselves since all relations as such, in 
contrast to things which are related, are invisible. Only human animals are aware of 
relations because they are able to distinguish things from objects (and the relation from 
both) within anthroposemiosis (the human use of signs).52 What this means is that 
although human beings share the awareness of being-in-the-world as objective with 
animals, ‘their objective world is further structured through language which convey a 
                                                     
50 J. Deely, op.cit. 2001, pp. 6-7. 
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52 Ibid., pp. 60-62. 
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cultural heritage linked to a specific biological constitution.’53 This distinction lies at 
the heart of the difference between animal Umwelt and human Lebenswelt and is going 
to be addressed in the section on Sebeok’s modelling system theory. 
The importance of seeing semiotic relations as suprasubjective is threefold; 
firstly, by recognizing that relations are an intrinsic dimension of being means that 
these persist or exist regardless of the circumstances under which they came into 
existence, whether in nature or thought. This understanding not only defies the 
traditional dichotomy of realism vs nominalism, but also posits the basis of a continuity 
between nature and culture through semiosis. Secondly, by accepting that relations are 
an intrinsic dimension of being, it is possible to see how the continuity between natural 
and cultural forms of semiosis is based on von Uexküll’s Funkionskres (semiotic 
loops) where every being, from the less complex to the more complex organism 
(including human beings), becomes the active centre of a web of semiotic relations 
with other beings.54 The Umwelt, or semiotic web is thus a network of interpretive 
relations which constitute objects as such as publicly accessible elements shared by 
every member of each biological species. In this way every subject also becomes 
inserted into an environment not merely as a physical thing, but as a semiotic subject. 
In other words, and this is the third interrelated point, the notion of subjectivity or self 
rather than being linked to a psychological state, is here expanded, since it exists as a 
sign relation.  
As noted before, von Uexküll’s idea of organisms as active agents, able to 
create their own Umwelten and in so doing become a part of nature’s design, stemmed 
from his understanding of Naturphilosophie and this is partly the reason why his 
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(1992): 299-319, p. 309.  
54 P. Bains, op.cit., 2006, p.76.  
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Umwelt theory was not well received in the main stream twentieth-century biology.55 
The latter was less interested in the creative dynamic processes in organisms and more 
in what, after the modern synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s, was to be seen as 
behaviourism, namely the view that organisms were to be understood as being 
operated upon by external forces of mutation and environmental selection.56  
Nevertheless, von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory became an important contribution 
to biosemiotics. Although von Uexküll never used the term biosemiotics, and, as 
Hoffmeyer suggests, it is highly unlikely that he was acquainted with Peirce’s work 
which is at the basis of the biosemiotic understanding of sign relations,57 his theory 
attracted the attention of such thinkers as Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
as well as Thomas Sebeok, John Deely and Jesper Hoffmeyer precisely because he 
showed that living organisms respond to signs rather than causal impulses as held by 
twentieth-century mainstream biology.58 Organisms are, from a biosemiotic 
perspective, selective interpreters – perceiving, acting subjects – that do not respond 
to the environmental stimuli merely in causal-mechanical ways, but also in a semiotic-
causal way, or by way of sign interpretation. Life, in biosemiotic terms, is therefore 
characterised by semiosis, by natural relations which are suprasubjective and are not 
reducible simply to chains of causal mechanical interactions. Life, according to this 
view, is made of many non-human signs, biological messages and narratives from 
                                                     
55 Uexküll’s theory presents an important conceptual tool in the biosemiotic re-evaluation of natural 
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which human narratives emerge and this is why biosemiotics breaks with the 
traditional materialist and mechanical understanding of life. 
Another significant contribution of the Umweltlehre is to be found in Sebeok’s 
definition of semiosis as ‘the processual engine which propels organisms to capture 
the “external reality” and thereby come to terms with the cosmos in the shape of 
species specific internal modelling systems.’59 What Sebeok means is that all living 
organisms, humans included, possess an internal model of the outer cognized world – 
Umwelt – that they inhabit through the circulation of signs. Sebeok adopted the concept 
of world-modelling from the Moscow-Tartu school (A. A. Zaliznjak, V. V. Ivanov, V. 
N. Toporov and J. Lotman). In 1967 Juri Lotman defined the modelling system as:   
A structure of elements and of rules for combining them that is in a state 
of fixed analogy to the entire sphere of an object of knowledge, insight 
or regulation. Therefore a modelling system can be regarded as a 
language. Systems that have a natural language as their basis and that 
acquire supplementary superstructures, thus creating languages of a 
second level, can appropriately be called secondary modelling system.60  
 
Natural or non-verbal language, according to this model, is understood as a 
primary modelling system, or as Sebeok comments as ‘the basic infrastructure for all 
other human sign systems.’61 Other sign systems could include religion or myth, 
literature and art, and these superstructures which are based on a primary modelling 
system, form secondary modelling systems. Sebeok noted that in Lotman’s semiotic 
study of culture, language is viewed as carrying out a specific communicative function 
which indicated that the linguistic and communicative capabilities of human beings 
were taken as a starting point of semiotic analysis. Sebeok found that, in this 
predominantly anthroposemiotic analysis, the Soviet school did not take into account 
                                                     
59 T. A. Sebeok. Global Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001, p. 15. 
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how human beings could communicate or build cultures before their ability to use 
speech. The latter, according to Sebeok, organises and externalises language.62 
Sebeok held that language appeared as an adaptation much earlier than speech 
in the evolution of the genus Homo. Along with other scholars such as Merlin Donald 
and Terence Deacon,
63 he referred to the archeological literature to point out that 
hominids, Homo habilis and Homo erectus possessed only a mute verbal modelling 
device (mute syntax) which would allow, for instance, the use of tools or the 
organisation of settlements, but not the encoding of communication in articulate linear 
speech.64 For Sebeok believed that language at its inception was not used for exterior 
communication, but ‘only as an interior modelling device – a modelling device or 
system being a tool wherewith an organism analyses its surroundings.’65 Members of 
early hominids species communicated through non-verbal means very successfully 
(Homo erectus lasted for 2 million years) and it was only with Homo sapiens that 
‘speech developed out of language as a derivative exaptation.’66 The exaptation of 
language into speech developed as a biological adaptation in order to enhance the 
survival of the species.67 
In his reconstruction of the phylogeny of the genus Homo, Sebeok showed that 
there are systems that are antecedent to linguistic systems and are based on non-verbal 
communication. This type of semiosis is an adaptive communicational system 
possessed by all living organisms.  According to Sebeok, only human beings possess 
both, the non-verbal and the verbal, or in Sebeok’s words ‘only hominids possess two 
mutually sustaining repertoires of signs, the zoosemiotic nonverbal, plus, 
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superimposed, the anthroposemiotic verbal.’68 Sebeok pointed out that Lotman failed 
to see that anthroposemiosis is linked to zoosemiosis and that human semiosis is 
played out predominantly in the pre-linguistic, extra verbal mode. In light of the 
recognition that there is non-verbal communication prior to the verbal, Sebeok 
proposed a re-conceptualisation of the Russian semiotic modelling by considering 
non-verbal language or Umwelt as the primary modelling system. 69  
The secondary modelling system, which in the Russian school was the primary, 
is based on language. As we saw, every species is endowed with a model-Umwelt that 
produces its own world, but language is one that belongs to human beings alone. As a 
modelling device, human language is completely different to other modelling devices 
of other species since it rests on what Sebeok called mute syntax.70 This syntax orders 
the events and objects of human experience, transforming them into elements of their 
Umwelt. Susan Petrilli, Augusto Ponzio and John Deely all agree that language thus 
understood functions like a ‘Tinkertoy set’ or ‘Lego Building Blocks’ where a limited 
number of pieces can be assembled and reassembled creating an indefinite number of 
models or rather possible worlds.71 
The tertiary modelling system is based on symbolic modelling processes and 
is the human cultural system which includes literature, religions, mathematics and so 
on. It is this system that the Moscow-Tartu school has traditionally called a secondary 
modelling device and that Sebeok redefined as tertiary. According to Sebeok, it is on 
this level that ‘nonverbal and verbal sign assemblages blend together in the most 
creative modelling that nature has thus far evolved.’72 
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Von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory has pointed to important semiosic 
commonalities between humans and animals and to the link between nature and culture 
in semiosis. As we saw, the human communication repertoire includes primary 
modelling – Umwelt – which is at the basis of more complex and sophisticated forms 
of communication that take place in the secondary and tertiary modelling levels. The 
concept of Umwelt brings forth the realisation that living organisms are not passive 
entities but are active agents that create their own world through the interpretation of 
signs. The interpretive acts in the animal world are extremely primitive compared to 
human acts of interpretation. As we saw, the latter are somewhat different in kind, 
since they involve linguistic competence. However, as Hoffmeyer argues, human life 
depends only marginally on processes of conscious interpretation.73 In fact, the 
majority of human choices depend on the non-conscious interpretations of signs which 
Charles Sanders Peirce identified as abductive inference which is invariably based on 
non-verbal components. Abduction is for Peirce that act of inferential logic that is at 
the basis of formulating hypotheses and is creative since it introduces newness. 
Newness or creative discovery are not based on rational syllogistic logic, but 
nonetheless require a semiotic operation. This is hidden from conscious thinking and 
is grounded in natural logic or in what Peirce called iconic and indexical signs. The 
next section will discuss Peirce’s logic and his doctrine of signs in more detail in order 
to show the relevance of Peirce’s sign theory in biosemiotics’ conceptualisation of 
biological sign relations – semiosis in different types of Innenwelten and Umwelten. 
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Semiotics and Logic 
Regarded as the founding father of contemporary semiotics, Charles Sanders Peirce 
was among ‘the most informed logicians of his time’74 and one of the true polymaths 
of the nineteenth century. Deeply involved in the main currents of thought in 
mathematics, philosophy and logic, Peirce was convinced that the mission of logic 
ought to be the study of representation, argument and inference and that it should make 
classifications and establish norms within these areas. Logic, according to Peirce, 
should not be the foundation of mathematics, but a beneficiary of it since mathematics 
provides the formal structures and relational models needed in logic.75 Peirce’s early 
opinion was that logic, in the broadest sense, was to be equated with semiotic, or as he 
put it: ‘logic is another name for semiotic (sémeiötiké), the formal doctrine of signs’ 
(CP 2.227). In Logic of Mathematics (1896), Peirce elaborates his view and states that:  
Logic is the science of the necessary laws of thought, or still better, 
(thought always taking place by means of signs) it is general semeiotic 
treating not merely of truth, but also of the general conditions of signs 
being signs. (CP 1.444) 
Two things are important to note in the quotes above: the first is that for Peirce 
every thought is a sign, and consequently every act of reasoning consists of the 
interpretation of signs. The second is that Peirce’s sign logic is fundamentally a 
scientific one. This is because his philosophical system is firmly embedded in 
mathematics, and for Peirce mathematics also included the relations that are part of 
what we call today formal logic.76 The focus of Peirce’s logic, however, is not 
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conclusions from purely hypothetical constructions independently whether these constructions are real 
or not. From mathematics he turns to philosophy which is divided into three categories: phenomenology 
(which considers what comes before the mind when we reason), the normative sciences (ethics, 
aesthetics and logic) and metaphysics. Physics and psychology are considered as special sciences. See 
C. De Waal. On Peirce. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001. 
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restricted to the theory of right reasoning and truth, but includes also the study of a 
sign qua sign and the laws that signs follow in their inter-relating. This is why he 
divided semiotics into speculative grammar, critical logic, and speculative rhetoric or 
methodeutic, since each division serves as a way of distinguishing different semiotic 
functions. 
Speculative grammar refers to the criteria something must meet to be a sign and 
studies the classification of signs.77 Critical logic refers to what we usually understand 
as logic, or the theory of reasoning and modes of inference. It is related to 
representation, which studies the conditions under which a sign can refer to its object. 
Speculative rhetoric or methodeutic is, for Peirce, the analysis of communicational 
interactions and strategies, and their bearing on the evaluation of inferences.78 Rhetoric 
is the study of the conditions under which signs can refer to their interpretants. It is 
important to stress that each of these branches or divisions rely on the preceding one 
for its result: for instance, the first division defines a sign as such, the second builds 
on that definition and focuses on the reference of signs to objects. The third builds on 
the preceding ones and focuses on the interpretation of signs or the effects of the sign 
on the interpreter. This division is related to Peirce’s triadic theory of sign.   
Peirce spent a considerable amount of time elaborating a definition of the sign. One 
of the early definitions, as seen already, is that a sign or representamen ‘is something 
which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity’ (CP 2.228). De 
Waal argues that this definition is somewhat vague and prone to Peirce’s own critique 
of confusing logic with psychology.79 Although it may be vague, this definition already 
                                                     
77 Speculative is intended by Peirce as in Latin ‘speculari’, meaning theoretical.  
78 R. Burch. “Charles Sanders Peirce.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Winter 2014 
Edition. Web. 5 Jun. 2014. 
79 Peirce critiqued the emotivist response to logic which holds that logic should be grounded in a 
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introduces one of Peirce’s distinctive ways of seeing signs, namely signs are not things, 
but triadic relations. Hoffmeyer’s example of a child who breaks out in red spots is a 
fine explanation of how this triadicity works. He points out that as a consequence of 
the child having red spots, the mother will take the child to the doctor, who will 
establish that the child has measles. To the doctor the red spots are a sign of measles, 
yet to the mother these red spots mean that the child is unwell. So the red spots are not 
automatically a sign of measles to anyone, but just to ‘someone’. The sign as a whole 
consists of the relation between the sign vehicle, or representamen (red spots), the 
object to which the sign vehicle refers (something wrong with the child, or the illness 
showing on the skin) and the interpretant (the process that goes on in the physician’s 
or the mother’s mind).80 For a sign to be a sign, it has to have all three of these 
elements: a representamen or sign vehicle, an object and an interpretant. Anything can 
be a sign that is used as a sign. Nothing is a sign unless is used as a sign. 
Another definition Peirce offers is that a sign: 
[...] is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect 
to a Quality, in such a way as to bring as Third thing, its Interpretant, 
into relation to the same Object. (CP 1.92) 
According to this definition, signs are always potential since there are always things 
whether material (a stone), or immaterial (a unicorn), or whether external (a sound) or 
internal (a psychological state) which are not necessarily signs, but which can also 
become or act like a sign for some living, embodied entity or cognitive organism 
(human or not). This sign-relation, as we saw, is triadic connecting the representamen 
to its object through the production of an interpretant. It is the triadic relation that Peirce 
called semiosis. These relations, it is important to recall here, are not material.  Peirce 
believed that signs can give rise to new signs in an unlimited process of semiosis. In 
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this process the representamen refers to an object, which upon engagement produces 
an interpretant, which in turn becomes a representamen referring to a new object that 
creates another interpretant in a new sign relation. Semiosis is potentially illimitable.  
Semiotics versus Semiology  
According to Peirce any act of semiosis cannot involve less than three entities. In 
fact, semiosis is ‘the cooperation of three subjects, such as sign, its object, and its 
interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions 
between pairs’(EP 2.411). This statement goes right to the heart of the critique in 
contemporary semiotics of Ferdinand de Saussure’s Semiology and his approach to 
signs.81 Although Peirce and de Saussure were contemporaries, they developed their 
views independently of each other and with very different results. They seemed, 
however, to be in accord with one aspect of their sign model, namely that it is a 
relation.82 Saussure’s semiology is fundamentally anthropocentric, since it is 
concerned with human language alone and it takes into consideration the linguistic 
sign only. This sign is based on a dyadic relation which unites a concept or a signified 
(signifié) with an acoustic sound or signifier (signifiant)83 and it is entirely arbitrary, 
which means that it is decided by conventional rules. The arbitrariness comes from the 
fact that Saussure observed that different cultures would use different acoustic images 
for the same concepts; therefore he thought that the arbitrariness must be a defining 
characteristic of the sign and consequently of semiosis. Another consequence of his 
insistence on the arbitrariness of signs is that Saussure excluded natural signs, the extra 
                                                     
81 The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure along with Charles Peirce has been the key figure in the 
development of semiotics. De Saussure’s Course de linguistique generale (1916) inspired the work in 
semiology in the later twentieth century and was taken up by semiologists (such as Roland Barthes) 
who confined their analysis to a limited range of cultural artefacts, which were analysed using linguistic 
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regarded today as the founder of modern semiotics. 
82 J. Deely, op.cit., 2010, p. 20. 
83 F. De Saussure. Course of General Linguistics. Transl. by Ed Baskin, Perry Meisel and Haun 
Saussy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
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linguistic signs such as the red spots on the child for instance, from his study. Although 
he did not deny the existence of natural signs, he felt that as a linguist he did not have 
to dwell on those.  
From this brief account we can see that there are substantial differences between 
the two schools of semiotics. Contrary to Saussure who develops semiotics as a general 
theory of linguistic sign, Peirce’s semiotics is a general theory of signs which focuses 
on sign and sign activity whether in humans, animals or any other living organism and 
encompasses all signs, linguistic and natural. A second difference is that by making 
semiotics part of linguistics, which Saussure considers part of social psychology, 
semiotics becomes a psychological theory. Peirce, on the contrary, grounds semiotics 
in logic and mathematics as well as semantics. A third difference is that Peirce defines 
a sign as a triadic relation between a representamen, object and interpretant, and shows 
how this relation or semiosis is potentially unlimited since it points toward a generation 
of new sign relations and consequently growth.84 Saussure, on the other hand, defines 
the linguistic sign as a dyadic, arbitrary relation between a signifier and a signified, 
where semiosis is intrinsic in the arbitrariness of the sign.   
These differences have fundamental consequences in understanding sign and sign 
relations. Peer Bundgaard and Frederik Stjernfelt highlight that the emphasis on 
language as the central example of a semiotic system leads to the structuralist 
‘linguistic imperialism’, which is defined as the notion of understanding all other 
                                                     
84 Deely points out that Peirce’s understanding of signs stems from his extensive reading of the Latins, 
specifically of St. Augustine (A.D. 354-430) and John Poinsot’s (1589-1644) semiotic theory. St 
Augustine was among the first to distinguish clearly between natural signs (symptoms, animal signals) 
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Poinsot who saw the triadic relation of signs first, yet it was only through the influence of Peirce that 
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op.cit., 2001. 
 46 
 
semiotic phenomena through a linguistic model.85 Thomas Sebeok referred to this view 
as the ‘pars pro toto fallacy’ since it mistakes the part (human signs and in particular 
verbal signs) for the whole (all possible signs, human and non- human).86 Peirce’s 
model, on the other hand, represents a clear departure from the standpoint advocated 
by cultural semiotics since it extends sign action across all living nature.  
Semiosis and Mind 
For Peirce, anything can be a sign as long as it has an interpreting living organism. 
In this respect, it is important to note that the third element in Peirce’s sign relation is 
called an interpretant and not an interpreter. This is because Peirce wanted to avoid 
confusion in the way mind interprets things. For Peirce, mind is not narrowly identified 
with the concept of human mind, but is a process of semiosis, a pure relation. Another 
way to put this is to say that mind, thought and semiosis are basically synonyms.87 
This is why he proposed the radical thesis that where there is semiosis there is mind. 
According to Peirce, thinking and ideas belong to all living organisms and not only 
human minds, since ideas and concepts are themselves signs, or rather provenating 
relations of something other than themselves. For Peirce even the universe is, in some 
sense, minded since he states the universe ‘is perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
exclusively of signs’ (EP 2.394).  
A similar idea was expressed by Gregory Bateson (1904-1980), another important 
precursor of biosemiotics.88 Much like Peirce, Bateson believed that thinking and ideas 
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belong to all living organisms. For Bateson, working within a cybernetic theory, a 
mental process or ecology of mind is the activity involved in receiving and responding 
to information or signs and since all living organisms respond to signs, Bateson claims 
that ‘the living world is a single intermeshing hierarchy of process relationships that 
are all mental in kind: comparable to thought.’89 This is why Bateson states that ‘mind 
is everywhere, in the entire living world’90 and mind, just like semiosis for Peirce, is 
for Bateson not a thing, but a kind of pattern, the systemic relating via recursive sharing 
of information.91 
By equating mind with semiosis/information, both Peirce and Bateson transcend 
Cartesian dualism and postulate a new kind of epistemology. This is one which 
emphasises that the process of knowing is based on the capacity of all living organisms 
‘to respond to differences, on the one hand, ... [and to interact] with the material world 
in which those differences somehow originate, on the other.’92 In other words, 
knowing is a form of learning evidenced by the ability of living organisms or organic 
systems to respond to information93 ‒ here understood in Bateson’s terms as ‘a 
difference which makes a difference’ and to change their patterns of behaviour 
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accordingly.94 The interaction among living systems, Gregory Mengel points out, 
‘brings forth patterns of relationship that then establish the conditions for novel forms 
of interaction, and so forth.’95 In Peircean terms these patterns are in fact semiosis, and 
similarly to semiosis which grows and evolves, these patterns also grow and develop 
or evolve forming what Hoffmeyer terms semiotic scaffolding for new forms both 
physical and cultural. Following Peirce’s and Bateson’s insight, evolution can be 
defined as an all-embracing, learning and creative process, since learning is evidenced 
by adaptive evolutionary change, and creativity is demonstrated when new forms, 
patterns or types of activity emerge. This is why Bateson proposed that ‘evolution is a 
mental process’96 and that the particular mental process known as human mind is best 
understood as a subsystem of these larger processes.  
As we have seen for both Peirce and Bateson, mind and semiosis or mind and 
patterns that connect nature and culture, are synonyms, yet the capacity of living 
organisms or systems to recognize and interpret signs which form their Umwelt is very 
different. Based on Peirce’s classification of signs according to the way they relate to 
their object, biosemiotics tends to distinguish three types of Umwelt: a vegetative, an 
animal and a cultural.97 Before explaining this division, a description of Peirce’s 
classification is needed. In A Sketch of Logical Critics (1909) Peirce makes a 
distinction between three signs: icon, index and symbol98 and explains that: 
[...] the most frequently useful division of signs is by trichotomy into 
firstly Likenesses, or, as I prefer to say, Icons, which serve to represent 
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their objects only in so far as they resemble them in themselves; 
secondly, Indices, which represent their objects independently of any 
resemblance to them, only by virtue of real connections with them, and 
thirdly Symbols, which represent their objects, independently alike of 
any resemblance or any real connection, because dispositions or 
factitious habits of their interpreters insure their being so understood. 
(EP2. 460-461) 
In Peirce’s view, icons refer to their objects by means of similarity (a diagram, 
a picture, image, metaphor etc); indices refer to their objects by a direct connection 
(e.g. smoke as the sign of fire); whereas symbols refer to their objects by means of 
habit or convention (language, road signs etc). In this trichotomy, icons represent the 
most basic level of meaning, whereas indices and symbols appear through more 
logically complex interpretants. Applied to the biosemiotic concept of Umwelt, Kalevi 
Kull states that the most basic typology of Umwelt is the vegetative since it is based 
on iconic signs; the animal Umwelt is both iconic and indexical, whereas the cultural 
is iconic, indexical and symbolic.99 What this division shows is that where iconic and 
indexical relations occur throughout nature (plants, animals, fungi, human beings), 
symbolic relations are used and produced by humans alone. In The Symbolic Species, 
Terrence Deacon argues that there is an evolutionary component to the way iconic, 
indexical and symbolic signs are related. In fact, when reflecting upon the human 
ability to think and communicate via symbolic reference, he highlights that this 
capacity does not appear out of the blue, but that it develops from the capacity for 
iconic reference, which gives rise to the capacity for indexical relation which becomes 
the basis for the symbolic one.100  
As can be seen from this discussion, Peirce’s semiotics provides an important 
theoretical basis for the biosemiotic postulation of the continuity between nature and 
culture through semiosis. It also points to the understanding that communication and 
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sign processes are not, as Claus Emmeche observes, ‘solely bound to human society, 
but are also bound to the several levels of organization beneath conscious human 
semiosis.’101 Human sign processes are emergent from natural ones since human 
beings not only share the iconic and indexical sign relations with the natural world, 
but their symbolic sign relations emerge from those. Wendy Wheeler suggests that the 
implication of this view is the understanding that ‘human beings as “semiotic animals” 
are evolutionarily grounded in forms and layers of semiosis which are natural.’102 
Forms of natural semiosis are not separated from the cultural ones, on the contrary, 
they precede and exist alongside them and form the semiotic scaffolding on which 
more complex meaning is built. According to Peirce and Bateson, one of the most 
important forms of semiosis in both nature and culture is that relating to creative 
adaptation in the face of chance. This type of creative process is what Peirce called the 
logic of abduction and Bateson, following Peirce, called abduction or syllogism by 
metaphor. The next section is going to discuss Peirce’s concept and show its links to 
both Gregory Bateson and what I term the biosemiotic imagination in John Henry 
Newman, George Eliot and Lady Welby. 
Abduction as natural metaphor or biosemiotic imagination: the pattern that 
connects nature and culture 
As seen in the previous discussion, Peirce held that every thought is a sign and as 
such connects three elements: a representamen, an object and an interpretant. Thought, 
in Peirce’s system, is thus understood as semiosis, or as a dynamic and continuous 
process of sign action, in which each sign gives rise to an interpretant which in turn 
gives rise to its own interpretant in an endless chain. Peirce also asserted that logic, 
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seen as the ability to reason, is not a divinely inspired faculty equally distributed to all 
men; rather, it is a natural accomplishment grounded in our problem-solving 
activity.103 This problem-solving activity is not something that has been given, but is 
the result of men’s evolution since it is based on the countless problem-solving 
activities that previous generations engaged in. Reason, rather than being eternal, 
develops over time.  
Peirce’s evolutionary thinking is also seen in his belief that the ability to reason is 
the product of our interaction with or adaptation to the universe. For Peirce, human 
reason is a reflection of the order of the universe and not a special instantiation of 
Divine power. In other words, Peirce believes that the universe is itself reasonable and 
our ability to reason is a reflection of that. This belief, as we saw, leads to Peirce’s 
postulation of the principle of continuity he called synechism, where mind and the 
natural environment are seen as a continuous unity rather than separated entities. 
Peirce’s argument, as Winfried Nöth states, is that our knowledge of the natural 
environment comes from our co-evolution with nature104 and this is why ‘human 
intellect is particularly adapted to the comprehension of laws and facts of nature’ (CP 
2.750).  
This naturalist account also influenced Peirce’s view of the relationship between 
reason and instinct. Instinct, like reason, is for Peirce a product of the individual’s 
interaction with the environment and a reflection of the ‘reasonableness’ of the 
universe.105 What distinguishes Peirce from his contemporaries and from the 
traditional classical view that reason is superior to instinct, is his belief that humans 
are driven primarily by instinct. Instinct is for Peirce an inferential process which he 
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terms abduction. He defines it as ‘the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason’ 
(CP 6.475) and given the attunement to nature through centuries of evolutionary 
development, this faculty endows human beings with the natural inclination of 
‘guessing correctly’ when forming hypotheses. In this respect Peirce states that 
scientific discovery rests on the inferential logic of abduction, which is the only one 
that introduces newness, since induction merely confirms that something is so, 
whereas deduction draws out further logical implications.106  He explains this view in 
his 1903 Lecture on Pragmatism thus: 
Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the 
only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction 
does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the 
necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. Deduction proves that 
something must be; Induction shows that something actually is 
operative; Abduction merely suggests that something may be. […] 
Every single item of scientific theory which stands established today has 
been due to abduction. (CP 5. 172) 
 Although abduction, deduction and induction may appear as three distinct 
methods of thinking, it would be a mistake to assume so. Gerard Deladalle points out 
that these three inferential processes are elaborated on the triadicity of signs processes, 
and are de facto linked, since ‘an unverifiable abduction suggests a general idea from 
which deduction draws various consequences which are put to the test by induction.’107  
These inferential processes are semiotic processes in which abduction is based on 
iconic sign relations, deduction on indexical sign relations and induction on symbolic 
sign relations. In Peirce’s words:  
Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference through 
an icon [...] Induction, or trying how things will act, is inference through 
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an Index, [...] Deduction, or recognition of the relations of general ideas, is 
inference through a Symbol [...]. (PPM 276-277)108 
 The implication of grounding abduction in the iconicity of signs is that it shows 
how knowing is based on semiotic processes which are often hidden from conscious 
reasoning and are grounded in natural forms of logic. These forms of logic are not 
based on syllogism in Barbara as in the classical form of deductive reasoning as in 
‘Men are mortal, Socrates is a man, Socrates is mortal’, but are based on what Gregory 
Bateson termed ‘syllogism in grass’ or metaphorical syllogism from the observation of 
analogic and metaphorical reasoning in the form of ‘Grass die, men die, men are 
grass.’109 According to Bateson, the syllogism in grass is ‘the dominant form or mode 
of communicating interconnections of ideas (a difference that makes a difference is an 
idea) in the pre-verbal world,’110 since syllogism in Barbara presupposes the 
identification of classes and subject-predicates which are only available in language. 
This, however, does not imply that all verbal communication is non-metaphoric. On 
the contrary, metaphors run through culture and are a constituent part of human 
communications. In other words, Bateson sees that metaphor, which is based on iconic 
sign relation or the recognition of the similarity and difference, is the logic upon which 
the biological world has been built and is the pattern that connects nature and culture.   
 Where induction and deduction encourage linear hypothesis building and 
testing,  abduction, understood as syllogism in grass, is a non-linear or recursive 
semiotic process whereby signs or information (understood in Batesonian terms as 
difference that makes a difference) are interpreted by living systems (cells, organism, 
cultures) by way of recognising similarity (iconic-metaphor) and differences which 
bring forth new semiotic associations (indexical signs or metonymy which are 
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associations of signs that are habitually found together). These associations or 
meanings are then fed into the environment which, in turn, feeds them back into the 
system’s biological response which will change according to the information received 
and will feed back into the environment in an endless process. This recursive abductive 
process in which natural and cultural scaffolding are interlinked and connected is, from 
a biosemiotic perspective, at the basis of evolution (or learning in human culture) 
because the development of meaning through metaphors (the recognition of patterns of 
similarity and difference of forms) changes in response to environmental pressure. As 
Wheeler suggests, ‘allowing the possibility of new metaphors emergent from the 
evolution of hierarchically nested meaning provides for the beginning of new 
abductions.’111  
 Peirce and Bateson both recognised that such abductions are at the basis of 
creative evolution in nature and culture and they both held that induction and 
deduction, although important tools for human reasoning, cannot give any account of 
creativity. Creativity, as Brewster Ghiselin notes is ‘a process of change and 
development’112 and is a movement beyond the established. Creative acts in culture, in 
art or science, stem, Ghiselin states, from ‘a hunch or other preverbal intimation.’113 
This hunch is what Peirce and Bateson identified as abductive logic. From a 
biosemiotic perspective, abduction becomes the means by which human beings make 
links between their non-conscious or tacit knowledge based on the interpretation of 
iconic, indexical and symbolic signs, and the possibility of new meanings. As we saw, 
these non-conscious processes are based on natural forms of reasoning. In the human 
mental sphere, Bateson sees that ‘metaphor, dream, parable, allegory, the whole of art, 
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the whole of science, the whole of religion, the whole of poetry, totemism [...] and the 
organization of facts in comparative anatomy’114 are all instances of abduction since 
they all stem from creative processes nested in the recognition or ‘identification of 
similarity of elements where meaning resides in the patterned whole.’115 
 Semiotic processes in nature are also creative precisely because they depend on 
the organism’s ability to interpret or recognise similarities and differences of pattern 
(in iconic signs or metaphors) which will bring new meaning, and therefore a change 
and a move beyond the established. Abduction thus understood not only becomes a 
bridge between living nature and human culture, but also becomes a model of knowing 
which is grounded in biological, non-conscious semiotic processes.  
Biosemiotic Imagination: Approaching John Henry Newman, George Eliot and Lady 
Victoria Welby 
Peirce’s abductive logic is a substantial part of what in this thesis I term 
biosemiotic imagination. It provides the theoretical underpinning in analysing what 
Newman, Eliot and Welby identified respectively as Illative Sense, Aesthetic 
Imagination and Mother-Sense. As I argue in the chapters that follow, Newman, Eliot 
and Welby all sought to find, in their distinctive ways, a common grammar between 
natural and human practices. They did so through their postulation of what in the light 
of subsequent development we can now think of as proto-biosemiotic imagination. All 
three tried to propose a holistic way of thinking about the world which would 
encompass, rather than separate, various disciplines (evolutionary theory and language 
theory being the two main ones) they drew from. In this respect their efforts were very 
close to those that, in the twentieth century, guided Thomas A. Sebeok in his 
endeavour to establish biosemiotics as an interdisciplinary field (by merging semiotics 
                                                     
114 G. Bateson, op.cit., p. 137.  
115 W. Wheeler, op.cit., 2014, [online]. 
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and biology) where living nature and culture are not seen as separate, but, on the 
contrary, culture is seen as being both emergent in nature and repeating, at greater 
levels of complexity and abstraction, antecedent natural patterns.  
 Of course, the cultural climate in which biosemiotics arose in the second half 
of the twentieth century was different to the cultural climate of the Victorian period. 
However, they share two important and interlinked similarities which cannot be 
neglected; the first is the way in which nineteenth-century biologists and linguists (and 
similarly the biologists and semioticians in the second half of the twentieth century) 
were deeply connected in their attitudes toward the understanding and study of living 
nature and the need for an interdisciplinary approach to study it. The second, and 
closely related to the first similarity is that this common attitude toward life and the 
scientific study of all that lives, that we can see in von Uexküll and in Peirce, as well 
as Eliot’s Welby’s and Newman’s epistemologies, was inspired by Naturphilosophie’s 
view of nature as an organic, creative force where its complexities are particularly 
visible to the scientist/poet.   
 Eliot’s indebtedness to Naturphilosophie, for instance, is seen specifically in 
her belief in the correspondence she finds between the creativity in nature and culture 
through aesthetic practice or imagination. Based on Schelling’s demonstration that art 
and science depend on the same activity, which is both conscious and non-conscious 
Eliot comes to argue that creative reasoning in art and science is based on aesthetic 
imagination. Emphasising metaphor, the aesthetic imagination or biosemiotic 
imagination is a form of inferential logic which is akin to Peirce’s abduction and which 
becomes a form of world disclosure or modelling.116 This is most clearly at work in 
Middlemarch where the interlinked web of metaphors - the perception of analogies, 
                                                     
116 A. Bowie, op.cit., 1993. 
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connections and affinities between separate objects - are not only set as examples of 
figurative speech, but rather, they are a source of that type of creativity that begins with 
the discovery of similitude in difference and goes on to explore the nature of semiotic 
relations that Peirce identified as semiosis. Metaphors, as semiotic relations, are at the 
basis of Middlemarch’s characters interpretation and understanding of their own reality 
or Umwelt which is nested through recursive feedback loops into a wider web of 
semiotic relations with other characters. Each character is thus seen as a sign, or rather, 
as a sign relation or interpretant of the Peircean triad in an open evolutionary process 
of semiosis where sign relations become the connective links not only between 
characters, but also between characters, the narrator and reader. 
 Where Eliot rightly sees abduction or biosemiotics imagination as a source of 
creativity in art and science,117 John Henry Newman sees abduction or the Illative 
Sense as a common source of inspiration in his quest to show that science and religion 
are not two entirely separate endeavours, but that they both rely on the same human 
processes of inquiry or investigation. For Newman all significant believing, be it in 
science or religion, is deeply anchored in and mediated through an implicit or non-
conscious inferential process which  he calls in the Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent 
(1870) the  Illative Sense. As it will become clear in Chapter Three, Newman’s Illative 
Sense or natural inference, is similar to Bateson’s natural metaphor and Peirce’s 
abduction. For all of them the belief in God or the intimation of the sacred are 
represented through natural forms of logic that are for Bateson and Peirce also found 
in forms of natural abduction in nature. Newman, following the Naturphilosophen 
tradition, compared natural logic to true poetry and held that it was a gift to all minds. 
                                                     
117 The philosopher of science Russell Norwood Hanson used Peircean abduction to show that abduction 
is an important aspect of scientific discovery. Thomas Khun was influenced by Hanson. See R. N. 
Hanson. Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry in the Conceptual Foundations of Science. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958; T. Khun. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
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In his discussion on Christian Dogma he stresses that the first principle through which 
one perceives God is that of the instinct of the mind which he compares to the instinct 
of other living organisms, thus implying that there is a continuity between the natural 
and cultural realm.   
  Lady Welby, much like Newman before her, also realised the need to consider 
religious questions in relation to other spheres of reflection and research in science and 
philosophy. Echoing Peirce, with whom she corresponded between 1903 and 1911, she 
viewed religion as a system of signs and values which interact with other systems. She 
introduced her philosophy of language, that is, Significs as a methodology which aimed 
to bridge, as Petrilli describes, ‘the various sciences, theoretical trends, and practices 
in human experience, be they scientific or pertaining to everyday’s life.’118 Central to 
Welby’s thought system and her theory of language is the original concept of Mother-
Sense which she defined as the generating source of meaning and language as well as 
of all signifying systems at large. In contrast to intellect, which cannot create any 
newness, Mother-sense is for Welby that creative or abductive type of inference which, 
like natural metaphor, allows for the association of things which would seem distant 
from each other and which, instead, share homological similarities.119 In her writings, 
Welby maintained the importance of the practice of translation, her specific 
contribution to the study of language, as a cognitive–interpretive method grounded in 
figurative expressions of language (metaphor) which is at the basis of understanding 
and interpretation, discovery and new acquisition of knowledge. Significs represents 
Welby’s aim to develop a more comprehensive view of the various dimensions and 
                                                     
118 S. Petrilli. Signifying and Understanding: Reading the work of Lady Victoria Welby. Ed. Paul 
Cobley. Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter, 2009, p. 102. 
119 Peirce and Welby were familiar with each other’s work, yet they developed their sign theory 
completely independently from each other. See G. Deladalle. “Welby and Peirce: Meaning and 
Signification.” Foundations of Semiotics, Essay on Significs. Ed. H.W. Schmitz. Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins Publication, 1990, pp. 133-146. 
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levels of interconnectedness in life as she was aware, just like Peirce, that the universe 
is permeated with meaning, or as Peirce’s would say that ‘the universe is perfused with 
signs’(EP2 394).  
Conclusion 
 This chapter’s main purpose was to introduce the philosophical background that 
underpins biosemiotics and to show how Peirce’s philosophy of signs and Jakob von 
Uexküll’s Umweltehre represent two fundamental concepts which led to the 
biosemiotic  insight that culture and nature are not separated, but rather that culture is 
evolutionarily emergent in nature. Uexküll’s Umwelt as well as Peirce’s semiotics 
introduces a way to see the natural world as being shaped by processes and organisation 
which are based on the living organism’s ability to interpret and act upon the sign 
relations discovered in the environment. The implications of Peirce’s theory are far-
reaching since, on the one hand, it suggests that mind, thinking and reasoning cannot 
be narrowly identified with human cognition; instead, mind, thinking and reasoning 
are a process of semiosis and therefore a capacity of all living organisms.  On the other 
hand, it points to the insight that the bulk of knowing is non-conscious knowledge 
shared by all organisms or living systems, as Bateson would say, throughout the living 
world. These ideas lead to the biosemiotic view that creative knowing in culture is not 
based on linear logic, but emerges from natural metaphor or abduction which is a 
recursive process based on the recognition of similarities and differences of patterns. 
Any form of creativity in art, science and religion is grounded in abductive inferences 
and it represents a link between nature and culture. In the nineteenth century, Newman, 
Eliot and Welby all envisaged a unity of life, or a holistic understanding of life based 
on a different epistemology which I have preliminarily shown is grounded in a mode 
of non-conscious inference, akin to what Peirce called the logic of abduction, in which 
they believed the sacred, aesthetic, scientific and practical aspects of life are deeply 
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ingrained and intermixed. In order to understand how they came to advocate this 
position a contextual background of the cultural and intellectual climate that shaped 
Newman’s, Eliot’s and Welby’s views and work is needed. This is the aim of the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 2 
Languages and Species: Signs and Evolution in Victorian Frames of Mind1 
 
The formation of different languages and distinct species are 
curiously parallel. [...] We find in distinct languages striking 
homologies due to community of descent, and analogies due to a 
similar process of formation.  (Charles Darwin, 1871)2 
 
The aim of the present chapter is to offer a contextual background to the cultural 
and intellectual milieu that informed the work and ideas of John Henry Newman, 
George Eliot and Lady Victoria Welby in relation to their understanding of language 
as an organic medium and their postulation of imagination as an intuitive inferential 
process, which they saw as common source of inspiration in religion, art and science. 
These concepts, and in particular the connection they saw between language and nature 
as well as mind and nature, emerged as I will argue in this chapter, from a shared 
aesthetic ethos that was rooted in German Romantic biology or Naturphilosophie of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Johan Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854).  
Naturphilosophen commonly thought individual organisms and nature as a 
whole to be teleologically ordered. In his Critique of Judgement, Kant observed, for 
instance, that ‘an organised product of nature is that in which everything is an end and 
on the other hand also a means. Nothing in it is in vain, pointless or to be attributed to 
                                                     
1  I have here borrowed the term ‘Victorian Frame of Mind’ from Houghton’s work:  W. E. Houghton. 
The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830 –1870. London: Yale University Press, 1957. 
2 C. Darwin. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. London: John Murray, 1871, pp. 
89-90. 
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a blind mechanism of nature.’3 Although biological organisms may, as the rest of 
nature, obey particular laws, organisms, according to Kant, cannot be solely explained 
in terms of the blind interaction of these laws. This is because Kant noted that 
organisms are self-organising wholes where the parts are the cause and effect, or ‘end 
and means to an end’, of one another rather than a mere assemblage of relatively 
independent parts.4 
Kant’s view of living nature as self-organising had a profound impact on 
nineteenth-century thinkers such as Charles Darwin and George Henry Lewes.5  For 
both, empirical reductionism - the mode of analysis which presupposes the dissection 
of a biological entity or system into its constituent parts in order better to understand 
it- seemed to miss the very nature of organisms.6 Lewes in fact states that: 
Theoretically taking the organism to pieces to understand its separate 
parts, we fall into the error of supposing that an organism is a mere 
assemblage of organs, like a machine which is put together by 
juxtaposition of different parts. But this is radically to misunderstand its 
essential nature and the universal solidarity of its parts. The organism is 
not made, not put together, but evolved.7 
This particular view of nature was endorsed, as already mentioned in the introduction 
to this thesis, by other Victorian intellectuals, such as James Ward, George J. Romanes, 
George Eliot and Lady Welby, and it opposed the mainstream mechanistic 
understanding of nature as advocated by T. H. Huxley, Herbert Spencer, William 
Thompson or James Clerk Maxwell. The basic postulate of mechanical philosophies 
was that nature operates according to mechanical principles, the regularity of which 
                                                     
3 I. Kant. Critique of Judgement. Quoted in A. Bowie. Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant 
to Habermas. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p. 36. 
4 Ibid., p. 37. 
5 As already pointed out, Darwin never explicitly referred to natural selection as operating in a 
mechanical fashion. Instead, nature, to which selection gave rise, was perceived in its parts and whole, 
as a teleologically self-organising structure. See R. J. Richards, op. cit., 2002, pp. 533-545.This point 
was also argued by von Uexküll who held that natural selection cannot be viewed as the only exhaustive 
explanation of end-directed activity in the natural world.  
6 See C. R. Woese op.cit., 2004, , p. 174. 
7 G. H. Lewes. Quoted in G. Levine. The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein to 
Lady Chatterley. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, p. 19.  
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can be expressed in the form of natural laws, formulated in mathematical terms.8 
Nature, in all its beauty and complexity, it was believed, could be explained away 
using aspects of mechanical philosophy. Yet, as Kate Rigby notes, the discovery of 
self-production and evolution, which culminated in Darwin’s Origins of Species 
(1859), revealed that nature was not linear. Rather, nature moved from simple, less 
organised earlier states to more complex and developed states. This is a particularly 
important aspect in Darwin’s theory since it points to the more advanced biosemiotic 
view of the evolutionary complexity of organisms and of the emergence of such 
complexity in terms of semiotic scaffolding as advocated by Jesper Hoffmeyer.  
The move from a linear to an evolutionary (emergent) understanding of nature 
implied that holistic problems in biological discourses, such as evolution, genesis and 
the nature of biological form (organisation) could not be adequately studied through 
the application of empirical reductionism. This is because ‘the parts [didn’t] give a real 
sense of the whole.’9 Romantic biologists, in line with Kant’s analysis of the similarity 
between teleological and aesthetic judgement and Schelling’s theory of creative 
agency of metaphor, came to argue that approaches of art and literature, and more 
specifically imagination, could reveal patterns and meaning in nature that could not be 
uncovered through rationalistic philosophy and science alone. By recognizing the 
fundamental role that imagination or aesthetic intuition plays in both philosophical 
illumination and scientific discovery, Schelling, as Kate Rigby notes, moved towards 
a specifically biosemiotics insight inasmuch as he saw these processes involving what 
Peirce called abduction.10 Schelling theory can be seen as a precursor to what later 
                                                     
8 C. R. Woese, op.cit., 2004.  
9 Ibid., p. 174. 
10 K. Rigby. “Art, Nature, and the Poetry of Plants in the Goethezeit: A Biosemioitc Perspective.” 
Goethe Yearbook. Vol. 22. (2015): 23-44; p. 33. 
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Newman, Eliot and Welby came to identify as illative sense, aesthetic imagination and 
Mother-Sense respectively. 
A further, significant consideration which can be drawn from the shift from a 
liner to an evolutionary understanding of nature is that nature became an historical 
entity and as such was no longer the product of a Creator’s design, who would produce 
a world which was stable, coherent and perfect from the start.11 For Naturphilosophen, 
Richards argues, ‘history was understood as being inherent or inscribed in nature since 
they held that individual organisms recapitulated the history of their species as they 
went through their own ontogenetic development.’12 The inherent historicity of nature 
also had a direct effect on the way language was understood. Naturphilosophen held 
that language is a living organism, just like plants and animals, and as such experiences 
birth and death, as well as continual change, including growth. In nineteenth century, 
for instance, the German linguist August Schleicher (1821-1868), Charles Darwin’s 
contemporary and friend, held that language was part of the evolution of life and 
therefore subjected to the same laws of change and development as nature.13 A similar 
view had already been expressed in 1827 by Franz Bopp who stated that ‘languages 
must be regarded as organic bodies, formed in accordance with definite laws; bearing 
within themselves an internal principle of life, they develop and gradually die out.’14   
What these examples indicate is that German linguists took an evolutionary 
approach to their subject matter long before Darwinian evolutionary thinking had 
become fashionable. Importantly, comparative investigations, as Prysca Augustin 
                                                     
11 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
12 Ibid., p.11.  
13 See P. Augustyn, “Language from a Biosemiotic Perspective.” Biosemiotic Perspectives in 
Linguistics. Eds. Ekaterina Velmezova; Stephen Cowley; Kalevi Kull. Cahiers de l’Institut Linguistique 
et des Science du Langage. Lausanne: Institut de Linguistique et des Sciences du Langage, 2015, 
pp.169-190; J. Richardson. A Natural History of Pragmatism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
2007; G. Beer. Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.  
14 F. Bopp. Quoted in I. Rauch. Semiotic Insights: The Data do the Talking. Toronto, Buffalo, London: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999, p. 34. 
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argues, were well accepted as a consonant methodology before the nineteenth century 
and therefore fully available as a model of evolutionary process at the time when 
Darwin was elaborating his evolutionary theory.15 In this respect Stephen G. Alter 
observes that it was ‘the historical quality that linked philology so readily to metaphors 
of organic growth’ which ultimately led to ‘the comparison with biological 
evolution.’16 In fact the slow transformation of languages provided an apt analogy for 
Darwin’s transmutation of species.  
Evolutionary theory and language theory played an important role in the 
Victorian way of thinking. This is because they offered a concept map or model of 
thought which emphasised kinship and relatedness based on their common 
understanding of nature as a living organic whole. In this way they both questioned 
assumed certainties in revealed religion and mechanistic science and consequently 
challenged the understanding of man’s origin and place in nature.  It must be pointed 
out here, however, that the relationship between science and nineteenth-century 
religion was not, as commonly believed, ‘characterised by crises of faith and 
contentious exchanges between bishops and scientists’17 as the proverbial debate on 
evolution between Bishop Wilberforce and Thomas H. Huxley in 1860 would suggest. 
On the contrary, in early Victorian times as Richard England and Jude V. Nixon 
observe, ‘science and religion shared assumptions about the coherence of a world 
which included God and Nature.’18 Natural theology rather than being  limited to the 
argument from design as seen in William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802) or Robert 
Chamber’s Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844),  was interested in 
                                                     
15 P. Augustyn, op.cit., 2015, pp. 170-171.  
16 S. G. Alter. Darwinism and the Linguistic Image. Language, Race and Natural Theology in the 
Nineteenth Century. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 3. 
17 R. England and J. V. Nixon. Eds. Science, Religion and Natural theology. Victorian Science and 
Literature. Vol. 3. London: Pickering and Chatto, 2011, p. ix.  
18 Ibid., p. x. 
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finding the correspondence between the creator’s and man’s mind and contributed to 
a way of thinking that shaped both scientific and religious narratives. It was only with 
the later division of the intellectual community into specialised fields, and after 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory more specifically, that this common context was 
gradually dismantled or rather eased out.19 This was because, as previously mentioned 
in this chapter, evolutionary theory with its naturalist account of the origins and its 
emphasis on common descent and natural selection, challenged the idea of nature 
bearing everywhere the marks of God’s design. 
 As I will show in this chapter, contrary to now yielding beliefs that Darwin’s 
concept of nature and specifically natural selection was conceived in a mechanistic 
way, Darwin endorsed a view of nature and natural selection, that is much closer to 
the one proposed by the Naturphilosophen and Kant in particular. The emphasis in this 
chapter, therefore, will be to look more closely at the conceptual heritage derived from 
German Romantic thought and to show how the metaphorical transfers between 
comparative philology and evolutionary theory informed the cultural debates 
surrounding the origin of man and human speech and interpretation, on the one hand, 
and the link between mind and nature on the other. Following a brief outline of the 
contribution that German Romantic thought gave to the rise of comparative philology 
in Britain, and the debates these generated in relation to the truthfulness of a literal 
interpretation of Genesis, I will focus on the impact Naturphilosophie and comparative 
philology had on Darwin’s elaboration of natural selection and his view of language. 
Moving from a discussion on the link Darwin finds between the mental capacities of 
animals and human beings, I will conclude by looking at the second important 
influence of  Naturphilosophie, that of  the reconceptualization of the link between 
mind and nature. The latter gave rise to the idea of imagination as a non-conscious 
                                                     
19 Ibid., p. x. 
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inferential tool which paved the way to Newman’s, Eliot’s and Welby’s 
conceptualisation of the biosemiotics imagination. 
 
The German Legacy: Natural language and the linguistic image  
 
The study of language has traditionally been seen as the central question defining 
the nature of man and as such linked to questions concerning intelligence, reason, 
thought, and progress of knowledge. In its eighteenth-century formulation, as Hans 
Aarsleff notes, the origin of language and speech was the key to the history of thought 
and mankind.20 John Locke, for instance, had noted that any inquiry into the human 
race would necessarily involve an inquiry into the origin of language. John Locke 
(1632-1704) and the French philosopher, epistemologist and psychologist Étienne 
Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780). 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) is a philosophical 
landmark devoted not only to the understanding of the nature and limits of human 
knowledge in terms of concepts and ideas, but also to the discussion of the role 
language plays in human cognition. Locke’s classification of science into three 
domains, language falls under the third one which he calls ‘σημειωτικ’, or the Doctrine 
of Signs and which he equates with logic. According to Locke it is the business of 
semiotics, which, like Peirce, he calls the doctrine of signs and, like Peirce, equates 
with logic. Condillac, echoing Locke, based his explanation of the operation of mind 
and the origin of human knowledge on a theory of signs. Condillac’s Essai is divided 
into two parts; the first discussed the operations of mind and postulated the importance 
                                                     
20 H. Aarsleff. “An Outline of Language-Origins Theory since the Renaissance.” Origins and Evolution 
of Language and Speech. Ed. Stevan R. Harnard, Horst D.Steklis, and Jane Lancaster. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences. Vol. 280 (1976): 4-17. Also reprinted in H. Aarsleff. From Locke to 
Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History. London: Athlone, 1982, pp. 278-
292. 
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of an active and deliberate use of signs which he divided into three categories:  the 
accidental, natural and instituted. 
 I distinguish three sorts of signs: 1. accidental signs, or the objects 
which particular circumstances have connected with some of our ideas, 
so as to render the one proper to revive the other. 2. Natural signs or the 
cries which nature has established to express the passions of joy, of fear 
or of grief. 3. Instituted signs or those we have chosen ourselves, and 
bear only an arbitrary relation to our ideas.21 
 
As Aarslef explains, all knowledge, according to Condillac, is based on these 
three internalised signs and its progress depends on the sign’s capability to open the 
way to reflection which is an expression of reason. Progress in knowledge and 
language is possible only from this. However, to be able to use the third type of signs, 
the instituted or conventional ones, human beings need to have control over the first 
two signs.  In order to answer how this is possible, Condillac turned to the study of the 
origin of language which formed the second part of his essay. He argued that language 
developed from animal cries or what he called natural signs which human beings used 
to communicate in situations of danger and fear. It was the repetition of the same 
gestures and cries over a long period of time that enabled man to recall specific signs 
at will rather than use them instinctively as previously done. In this way, Condillac 
believed that mind and the use of signs would interact to the mutual advantage of both.   
Although Condillac’s view of linguistic signs is relegated to the notion that they 
are a special category outside the mind and that they are arbitrary, what is important 
to highlight is the fact that he, like Peirce and Welby later, would think of the relation 
of signs in terms of triads and that he turned to nature and natural signs in order to 
understand the origins and nature of language thus paving the way for the possibility 
of an analogical correspondence between the natural world and the cultural one. Yet, 
his assertion that animals do not have reason, despite his concession that they have 
                                                     
21 Ibid., p. 51. 
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rudimentary forms of thought, meant that man and animal were separated by the higher 
capacity of human beings to use arbitrary signs in the form of language and speech. In 
the nineteenth century this view was challenged by both comparative philology which, 
in turn, informed Darwin’s evolutionary theory. 
John Wyon Burrow22 notes that the development of comparative philology in 
England was closely linked to the central doctrines of German Romanticism, 
specifically in its understanding of language as something not made, but natural and 
thus growing and evolving. Two central figures who contributed to the German re-
conceptualisation of language as natural were the philosopher Johan Georg Hamann 
(1730-1788) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) a clergymen who studied with 
Kant and had and intellectual influence on Goethe while the latter was in Strasbourg. 
Both broke with the Enlightenment tradition that viewed language as a product of 
reason. As Andrew Bowie points out, the Enlightenment conceived language as either 
the result of consciousness coming to make animal cries into meaningful signs, as we 
have seen was proposed by Condillac, or as the result of the social nature of humankind 
that lead to the establishment of social conventions which gave agreed meanings to 
certain signs.23 Hamann broke that tradition by seeing language as a creative force 
which was capable of revealing new aspects of existence that are usually associated 
with the role of art. A similar view had been expressed by Immanuel Kant and by 
Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, who pondered on the role of metaphor in language and 
its potential to reveal new possibilities and meanings. A metaphor constitutes a bridge 
whereby that which is unknown enters the sphere of the known through a process 
which is based on non-conscious inference. In this sense, Wendy Wheeler suggests 
                                                     
22 J. W. Burrow. “The Uses of Philology in Victorian England.” Ideas and Institutions of Victorian 
England. Essays in Honour of George Kitson Clark. Ed. Robert Robson. London: G. Bells and Sons, 
Ltd. (1967):180-240, p. 189. 
23 A. Bowie. Introduction to German Philosophy: Form Kant to Habermas. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003.   
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that Schelling’s theory of the creative agency of metaphor constitutes a significant 
biosemiotic insight as it prefigures the Peircean notion of abduction.24 
Hamann believed that our primary contact with the world is in terms of feeling 
or sensation and not in terms of ideas as advocated by the Enlightenment. For Hamann, 
‘human beings have a fundamental conviction of the reality of things which are prior 
to any abstract philosophical attempt to establish the nature of that reality.’25 Such 
belief is supported not by reason but by the immediate, or non-inferential, thinking. In 
other words, the world is revealed as something that is always already intelligible due 
to the fact that the intelligibility of language and things are inseparable, because they 
are created by God’s word. While it is God’s word that brings utterances concretely 
into existence, it is human language which reveals how what God had said can be 
translated into new forms.  
Hamann’s insights are important for two main reasons. The first is that the 
connection he posited between the creativity of language and art prefigured 
developments in early Romantic thought which emphasised the shift from a 
mechanistic to an organic model of the natural world. This, in turn, afforded the 
possibility to explore the spiritual, psychological and ethical implications of nature 
which represents a constitutive aspect Eliot’s understandings of continuity as well as 
Welby’s and Newman’s concept of language. The second is that the introduction of a 
historical dimension of language helped the institutionalisation of philology and 
anthropology as it implied that language changes and evolves over time. Philology 
held that the meaning of words is not fixed and immutable, but rather grows and 
changes in history and in cultural context. This particular aspect was taken up in the 
                                                     
24 W. Wheeler. “Introduction to Biosemiotics: Nature/Culture/Science/Semiosis”. Ed. W. Wheeler. 
Living Books about Life. January 2012. Web. 23 Nov. 2015. 
25Ibid., p. 46. 
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nineteenth century by Newman and Welby who applied it to their study of biblical 
exegesis. Newman, for instance, addressed this issue his Essay on Development of 
Christian Doctrine (1844, revised 1878), where he came to the conclusion that any 
statement can be interpreted in multiple ways and that meaning cannot be fixed and 
severed from intention. Similarly, in Links and Clues (1881) Lady Welby identified 
issues which were to become central to her later work such as the essential ambiguity 
of signs and the concept of textual interpretation. 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) also understood language as natural and 
as having a historical dimension. By asserting that language works in the manner of 
nature he equated the development of language to the various stages of the 
development of man. For instance, in the childhood stage the language is determined 
by affective reaction to the environment, and it is based on feeling and instinct. In the 
next stage, when human beings move to a more developed stage of thought, language 
becomes more able to deal with abstract concepts, until it reaches its youth or the poetic 
stage when a direct link is visible between man and nature. In the final, mature phase, 
language reaches what he termed the era of prose and philosophy where language 
‘loses the pure poetry of nature.’26 Herder’s equation of the development of language 
to the various phases of human evolution prefigures concepts developed by Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory and is akin to the views developed by Welby.   
One of the most enduring insights of the Romantics was that separating what 
either the mind or the world contribute to knowledge is an impossible task. Perception 
is always in a way mediated by language which they perceived as the creative and 
interpretive medium of the human sensuous experience of the world. Language thus 
conceived could not be understood, as the Enlightenment advocated, as the symbolic 
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medium originating in God in which a pre-existent order of things is reflected, but 
rather as a constitutive agent in the human capacity for world modelling or rather for 
any act of knowledge creation.  
 The idea that language extends beyond the human plays an important role in 
German Romantic thought, specifically in its formulation as natural language or 
Natursprache.27 This is already present in both Hamann’s and Herder’s considerations 
on language specifically in their theological inquiries which focused on the 
relationship between God and creation.  For both Hamann and Herder, language was 
still to be understood as something inherent in human beings and God-given, yet for 
later philosophers such as Schelling, Natursprache was also to be understood in its 
poetic form, or rather, as the relationship between poetic language and natural 
symbols. Kate Rigby argues that during the Romantic period ‘the primary deployment 
of the Natursprache topos was to construe the natural world as a hieroglyphic script, 
comprising a network of symbolic associations which can only be disclosed in the 
noninstrumentalizing language of poetry.’28 An important implication of this view is 
that the symbolic meaning that emerges from the aesthetic contemplation of nature is 
no longer fixed. Meaning, rather than being arbitrary, is open to potentially endless 
interpretations since it arises from the hidden interconnections among natural 
phenomena, and nature more broadly, as well as human beings on the non-conscious 
level, or as Peirce would say through abduction. The German Romantics held that 
nature could be understood only when it was viewed as subjects in their own right, an 
aspect which finds its voice later in von Uexküll’s view of nature, and only to those 
who were ready to see themselves as being part of nature. Seen in this light, 
Natursprache endorsed a non-mechanistic, non-dualistic and non-instrumentalist view 
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of language which also influenced the way language was conceived in comparative 
philology, that is, as a living medium which grows and changes in time.  
The rise of comparative philology in England 
The historical-comparative study of language in England sprang from the 
work of Sir William Jones who in 1789, delivered his famous lecture ‘On the 
Hindus’ to the Asiatic Society of Calcutta which was a part of his wider contribution 
called The Sanskrit Language,29 in which he offered his famous conclusion about 
the relationship between Greek, Latin and Sanskrit : 
The Sanskrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful 
structure; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and 
more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a 
stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, 
than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, 
that no philologer could examine them all three, without believing them 
to have sprung from some common source, which, perhaps no longer 
exists […]30 
 
While many other Europeans had previously noted similarities between 
Greek, Latin and Sanskrit, Jones was able to see a different type of relationship: 
descent.31 Alter points out that this finding laid the foundation for Darwin’s later 
analogy of the common derivation of widely different phenomena from a single 
extinct progenitor.32 Jones’ influence became widespread throughout Europe. 
Among the most influential philologists who adhered to his ideas were Franz Bopp 
(1791-1867) and Jacob Grimm (1785-1863).  Bopp was the first who gave a more 
scientific treatment of language which would ‘trace the natural-historical laws’ 
according to which language developed and was the first real practitioner of 
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comparative philology. Grimm’s Deutsche Grammatik published between1819-
1837, on the other hand, used phonetic correspondences to reveal consistent trends 
that bound together Greco-Latin and Germanic languages.  
By the end of the 1830s, the British Scientific elite became thoroughly 
exposed to the cross-disciplinary analogic relations between philology and natural 
history mostly through the work of Heinsleigh Wedgwood (1803-1891), Charles 
Darwin cousin, who later helped establish the Philological Society of London.33 
Darwin referred to Wedgwood in the Descent of Man (1871) and indirectly 
acknowledged his indebtedness to Grimm as a source for ideas about the 
evolutionary descent of languages. However, one of the strongest influences on 
Darwin is represented by August Schleicher, (1821-1868) who held that 
contemporary languages had gone through a process in which simpler languages or 
Ursprachen had given rise to descendant languages. In his Darwinsche Theorie und 
die Sprachwissenschaft (1863), Schleicher maintained that this fact was perfectly 
in line with Darwin’s theory and that the linguistic model was a repeated analogue 
for the biological one.  
This historical philology of genealogical descent, which originated in the 
Romantic conception of nature and language, became a model for different kinds of 
inquiry into the remote past. Moreover, the emphasis that German Romanticism put 
on symbolic meaning which was no longer to be seen as fixed or arbitrary, but rather, 
was open to potentially endless interpretations, became two of the most enduring 
concepts in nineteenth-century discourses on language and interpretation as well as 
evolution.  It was the attempt to trace phenomena in an unbroken line to a remote past, 
which appealed to nineteenth-century scholars working along these lines in geology 
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and biology. Charles Lyell and Charles Darwin, for instance, both found in 
comparative philology a consonant analogue to discuss evolutionary process. 
  Linda Dowling notes that many Victorians seemed to be mistrustful and 
harboured doubts about the new philology, because of the anxiety it raised in relation 
to religious dogma and the literal interpretation of the Bible and the Genesis more 
specifically.34  In the next section I will address this issue by looking at the way in 
which religious certainties were challenged by the new philology and focus on 
Newman’s response to these. 
 
Comparative Philology and biblical exegesis: a challenge to Victorian Faith 
In the nineteenth century, the threat to religious accounts was caused not only 
by scientific advancements, but also by comparative philology and geology which, 
drawing on each other’s metaphors, cast doubts on fundamental religious orthodoxy 
during the period. For instance, Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1830) 
undermined the account of the Book of Genesis by asserting that the mineralized 
remains of dead organisms preserved in the layers of the stratified rock formations told 
of a universe vastly older than the one in the Bible.  
Comparative philology also undermined the account in Genesis of the common 
origin of mankind with the description of distinctive Indo-European and Semitic 
families which suggested a chronology of human speech that was far older than the one 
advocated by the Church. Possibly one of the best examples of such an exchange of 
metaphors is represented by Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural History 
Creation (1844), which was published anonymously. His argument of the development 
hypothesis was mainly drawn from sciences such as geology and astronomy, as well 
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as Lamarck’s evolutionary theory and he turned to ethnographical philology when 
discussing the history of mankind. He introduced the doctrine that the original state of 
humankind was barbarous rather than civilized, that animals possessed a kind of sign 
language and gestures on which speech was merely a refinement typical of man, and, 
most importantly, that language was not of divine origin, but had a material source in 
man’s constitution, both mental and physical.35  
Chambers’s argument produced uproar in Victorian orthodoxy and it is not 
difficult to understand why exponents of natural theology such as Adam Sedgwick 
(1785-1873) and William Whewell (1794-1866) condemned it. Whewell’s response to 
the Vestiges was elaborated in his Indications of the Creator (1845), which was based 
on the theological argument that the origin of language was not material, so neither 
onomatopoeic nor developed from animal cries and that material science cannot grasp 
those aspects which are beyond the domain of matter. Chambers attacked the 
fundamental conception of Christian humanity and the argument from design which 
was advocated by William Paley’s Natural Theology in 1802, and upon which Cardinal 
John Henry Newman commented in a Sermon in 1839, that the argument for design 
would only convince those with a pre-existing faith. Later, in a letter to Mr Brownlow 
dated 13 April 1870 Newman would reinforce this statement by writing that:  
I have not insisted on the argument from design, because I’m writing for 
the nineteenth century, by which, as represented by its philosophers, is 
not admitted as proved. And to tell the truth, though I shall not wish to 
preach on the subject, for 40 years I have been unable to see the logical 
force of the argument myself. I believe in design because I believe in 
God; not in God because I see design.36 
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Newman believed that one of Paley’s fundamental mistakes was to couple 
religion with natural theology because by doing so, he would leave religion at the 
mercy of the changing views in scientific discoveries. 
 If, however, for many Victorians of faith the insights from geology and 
comparative philology posed a threat as they undermined the certainty of their central 
doctrines, it is also true that many used the new-found knowledge to argue in favour 
of biblical accounts, specifically of the Babylonian confusion. A good example is 
represented by the Cardinal Nicholas Wisemen who, in 1835, when still a student, 
delivered a series of twelve lectures, known as Twelve Lectures on the Connexion 
between Science and Revealed Religion, where the first two lectures where devoted to 
comparative philology and which he argued would help in seeing ‘the Mosaic account 
of the dispersion of mankind most pleasingly confirmed.’37 In a similar fashion, 
Reverend W. B. Winning’s Manual of Comparative Philology, in which the Affinity of 
the Indo-European Languages is Illustrated, and Applied to the Primeval History of 
Europe, Italy, and Rome (1838) argued, as the title of his work suggests, that 
comparative philology gave proof of the divine origin of language and the biblical 
account of the Babylonian confusion.38   
Yet, the biggest threat to the Victorian orthodoxy possibly came from within 
the Church itself and as a consequence of biblical textual studies which, as geology, 
evolutionary theory and comparative philology before it, cast doubts on the historical 
truthfulness of the Genesis and dismissed a literal interpretation of it. 
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At the heart of the debate between the opposing views was the highly 
controversial Essays and Reviews (1860). This was a collection of writings by six 
Anglican liberal clergymen, which caused, as Philip Davis explains ‘more immediate 
controversy than Darwin’s Origin of Species.39 Central to the essays was the idea that 
the Bible was a historical document and the aim was to educate the public into a more 
truly historical understanding of Scripture. In his On the Interpretation of Scripture, 
Benjamin Jowett, Anglican clergyman and classical and textual scholar, maintained 
that the Scripture is like any other book and that it has ‘one meaning, the meaning 
which it had to the mind of the prophet or evangelist who first uttered or wrote, to the 
hearers who first received it.’40 Differently from his fellow essayists, Jowett was less 
interested in offering a specific praxis for scriptural interpretation, but to develop what 
Anger calls an ‘intentionalist account of meaning.’41 Only by placing the text in its 
historical context, he maintained, one can understand the author’s intentions which in 
turn gives the possibility of discarding all possible false meaning that had accumulated 
through centuries.42 By arguing that ecclesiastical interpretation should be disregarded, 
Jowett wished for a rewriting of the history of theological interpretation.  
Such a study could show that church dogma was a victim of its own biases as 
it reflected the interpretation of its own time. Jowett insisted that interpretations are not 
creative, because they should not create new meaning, but retrieve the original one.43 
The logical consequence of this view is that meaning and words are fixed and they can 
be reconstructed through historical and philological criticism. These views, however, 
were perceived to be highly damaging to biblical authority since they reduced religion 
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to the terms of a progressively enlightened human reason, hence the Archbishop of 
Canterbury sought to make the stance of the Anglican Church clear by issuing an 
encyclical against the incriminated essays.44 In the same wake, Bishop Samuel 
Wilberforce wrote a harsh review of Essays and Reviews in the Quarterly Review 
(1861), highlighting that their aim to offer a middling way between opposite views in 
the Church of England resulted more in their not knowing on which side to stand.  
In contrast to Jowett and the Broad Church, John Henry Newman’s Oxford 
Movement, also known as the Tractarian Movement, demanded a new reformation 
which could restore the necessity for both dogma and the Church’s authority on 
exegetical questions.  In his famous Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, 
(1844, revised 1878), which appeared almost at the same time as Chamber’s Vestiges 
and well before Essays and Reviews, Newman declared that the ‘Bible is written on the 
principle of development.’45 In other words, Newman argued that meaning is not fixed, 
but that it changes over time. This view clearly shows Newman’s indebtedness to the 
Romantic thought.  
Unlike Jowett, Newman did not believe that an interpreter should overcome 
historical differences in understanding a text, but instead a text should be understood 
in the light of one’s historical moment. The fact that the Church provided many 
interpretations of the Sacred Scripture does not mean, as Jowett maintained, that those 
were corruptions of the original, but were in fact important aspects of what was already 
there and what may look like a new meaning is, in fact, an apprehension of other aspects 
of the total meaning and this process will continue indefinitely. He stated that:  
Revelation is [...] a process of development ...the earlier prophecies are 
pregnant texts out of which the succeeding announcements grow; they 
                                                     
44 P. Davis, op. cit., 2002, pp. 103-115. 
45 J. H. Newman. Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. London: Blanchard and Son, 1846, 
p. 93. 
 80 
 
are types. It is not that first one truth is told, then another; but the whole 
truth or large portions of it are told at once, yet only in their rudiments, 
or in miniature, and they are expanded and finished in their parts, as the 
course of revelation proceeds.46  
 Newman also argued against an ‘individualistic’ interpretation of the Scripture and 
maintained the need for authority because, as he observed: 
it is abundantly evident to anyone, who mixes ever so little with the 
world, that, if things are left to themselves, every individual will 
have his own view of them, and take his own course; that two or 
three will agree today to part company tomorrow; that Scripture 
will be read in contrary ways, and history, according to the 
apologue, will have to different comers its silver shield and its 
golden; that philosophy, taste, prejudice, passion, party, caprice, 
will find no common measure, unless there be some supreme power 
to control the mind and to compel agreement.47 
 
In other words, Newman feared that without sanctioned interpretations, scriptural 
exegesis is subjected to endless interpretations making agreement impossible. Yet he 
conceded that sanctioned interpretations change for different reasons, most importantly 
because they are subjected to social and cultural changes which make new 
interpretation necessary.  
Newman’s essay needs to be understood in the light of his theory of language. 
This is going to be explored in more detail in Chapter three of this thesis. Here it is 
important to highlight that since interpretation relies on an understanding of words, and 
for Newman words are not like mathematical symbols which denote a specific value 
that cannot be interpreted in any other possible way but are, on the contrary, open to 
interpretation, it becomes impossible to determine a correct interpretation and meaning 
of a text. The idea that a single word or text can generate multiple interpretations was 
also important to Welby who devised her theory of signs and meaning, Significs, in 
order to study the interrelation between sign, meaning and value not only at the level 
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of verbal language, but throughout the universe to show continuity between the natural 
and cultural world.  
Newman’s and Welby’s concept of interpretation and meaning is founded on 
the Romantic conception of language. As discussed in the previous section, the idea of 
language as organic, evolving, and more than human combined with the aesthetic 
apprehension of nature were important themes in the Naturphilosophie’s concept of 
life. These intellectual ideas also informed Charles Darwin in his early writings on 
transmutation and natural selection and on the evolutionary emergence of humankind 
in The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871).  Contrary to yielding 
beliefs that Darwin saw natural selection as a mechanistic force, as argued by Michael 
Ruse for instance, Darwin never overtly wrote about it in mechanistic terms.48 
According to Hajo Greif, David Steffes and Robert Richards, nature to which natural 
selection gave rise, was understood by Darwin as part of the self-organising nature of 
organisms and as such was not mechanistic.49 In the following section I will explore 
these ideas in more detail and discuss the influence of Naturphilosophie on Darwin’s 
elaboration of evolutionary theory and in his concept of the evolutionary emergence of 
man and language and their inter-relations in the Descent of Man. 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory, the Descent of Man, and Selection in relation to Sex 
(1871) and the Linguistic Rubicon 
 
At the heart of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, proposed in The Origin of Species 
(1859), stood two fundamental principles: the tree of life, where he postulated that any 
group of similar species is descended in irregularly branching divergences from a 
single, common ancestral species, and Natural Selection, which he suggested has been 
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the main cause or agency responsible for all this divergent, adaptive and progressive 
change from ancestral to descendent species.50 
In advancing the principle of the tree of life, Darwin challenged the view that 
species were immutable which placed him in opposition to two sets of beliefs. The first 
set concerned the idea of acquired properties as inheritable, whereas the second set 
concerned the well-established phenomena of adaptation. As far as the idea of 
heritability was concerned Kenneth Waters argues, similarly to the biologist and 
biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer, that at the time not much was understood about it, 
or as Hoffmeyer puts it: ‘nobody at the time had the faintest idea about the existence 
of genes, and there was, therefore, no good reason to distinguish so sharply between 
biologically innate and biologically acquired properties.’51 Biologists believed that the 
range of variation within a given species was fixed. In other words, they thought that 
the form of any given species could not change beyond fixed limits.  
On the other hand, works in natural history indicated that species were perfectly 
adapted to their environment and the question became how species could change and 
still remain so well-adapted to their environment. Darwin answered the question with 
the idea of natural selection. According to this idea, evolutionary change was produced 
by selection of individuals who presented variations that enabled them to have a better 
chance of survival and, at the same time, of producing better descendants. Their 
descendants were likely to inherit these traits or variations hence these generations 
would shift to the forms of the fittest parents. Darwin held that when the process of 
variation, selection and inheritance repeats itself over thousands of years, the 
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descendants will have features that will be markedly different from their distant 
ancestors.52  
Although Darwin’s natural selection is today understood within a conceptual 
framework which emphasises the belief that nature is primarily an arms race among 
selfish survival machines, Darwin never really conceived of natural selection as a 
mechanism.53 On the contrary, much under the influence of Naturphilosophie, he 
perceived nature, to which selection gave rise in its part and in the whole as a 
harmonious, teleologically self-organising structure.54 Greif notes that Darwin showed 
a deep sympathy for a wave of ideas from Germany which were mainly embodied in 
Goethe’s work and in the work of the romantic naturalist-geographer Alexander von 
Humboldt. Darwin referred to Goethe’s morphology, which he came to know via 
Richard Owen’s view of embryonic development, in his early formulations of the 
theory of transmutation.55 Although Darwin accepted Goethe’s theory, he devised a 
significant modification; for Darwin the archetype was simply the ancestor, rather than 
being an ideal form of concrete phenomena as seen by Goethe.56 Closely related to this 
view, and informing Darwin’s theory was the recapitulationist embryology, another 
important aspect of Naturphilosophical thinking and central to debates in nineteenth 
century; for Darwin embryonic development recapitulates phylogenetic history.57  
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In the morphological and recapitulationist thinking, to which Darwin related, it 
was presupposed that nature is an inherently teleologically and harmoniously ordered 
whole. Steffes notes that in composing the Origin of Species, Darwin adhered to this 
deeper understanding of nature via his reading of Alexander von Humboldt’s Relation 
Historique du Voyage aux Région équinoxiales du Nouveau Continent (1825) while on 
his voyage on the Beagle. Humboldt provided a holistic concept of nature where his 
description started from the Naturphilosophie’s assumption of an intrinsically lawful, 
all-encompassing order of nature that manifests itself in manifold local phenomena. 
Humboldt’s mode of inquiry into natural phenomena emphasised the view that ‘any 
comprehensive representation of nature should be guided by aesthetic intuition under 
which the properties detected in nature where arranged in such a way as to enable 
apprehension, through all the details, of its structuring features.’58 Darwin followed 
Humboldt’s mode of inquiry and portrayed nature, as Steffes argues, as a positive force 
or set of forces in creation, preservation and advancement of diversity of life.59 Nature’s 
diversity rather than being the result of a stable balance in nature, was the product of a 
dynamic environment in which natural selection played a central role. Seen in this 
context, it becomes clearer how Darwin could conceive natural selection in a non-
mechanistic way.  
In the Origin of Species, for instance, Darwin compared the way nature 
practices selection and the way man does it and he noted that: 
Man can only act on external and visible characters: nature cares nothing 
for appearances, except insofar as they may be useful to any being. She 
can act on any internal organ, on every shade of constitutional 
difference, on the whole machinery of life. ... It may be said that natural 
selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world every 
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variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and 
adding up all that is good.60 
It must be pointed out that although the word machinery appears in this extract it is 
clear from the context, Richards observes, that ‘it has no semantically significant 
role.’61 This passage, which describes nature as looking into the intricate web of life, 
selecting altruistically, bears no signs of a machine-like operation. In an earlier essay, 
Darwin also presented natural selection more as god-like rather than machine-like:  
Let us now suppose a Being with penetration sufficient to perceive 
differences in the outer and innermost organization quite imperceptible 
to man, and with forethought extending over future centuries to watch 
with unerring care and select for any object the offspring of an organism 
produced under the foregoing circumstances; I can see no conceivable 
reason why he should not form a new race (...) adapted to new ends. As 
we assume his discrimination, and his forethought, and his steadiness of 
object, to be incomparably greater than those qualities in man, so we 
may suppose the beauty and complications of the adaptations of the new 
races and their differences from the original stock to be greater than in 
the domestic races produced by man’s agency.62 
 
What both passages suggest is that natural selection works through penetrating to the 
very core of organic life, working aesthetically and teleologically and as such is very 
different to man’s production and bears no true resemblance to the machine-like 
operation which is usually described as.  
As already noted in this chapter, in the period leading to his elaboration of the 
theory of species transmutation, Darwin became increasingly interested in the 
workings of language. As Alter points out, Darwin began to speculate on the 
evolutionary emergence of man and the linguistic emergence of speech at the time he 
was thinking about the evolutionary change.63 In fact, as early as 1839, Darwin had 
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been fascinated by Lord Henry Brougham’s Dissertations of Subjects of Science 
Connected with Natural Theology which insisted that both animals and humans shared 
the capacity for abstraction because they could understand signs. Beer notes that what 
Darwin did not understand about this work is that Brougham thought, and, I suggest, 
much as Condillac before him, that signs are to be understood as arbitrary, in a view 
later developed by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) in the Course 
in General Linguistics (1916). 64  Brougham argued that the relation between signifier 
and signified (to use Saussure’s terminology) is as arbitrary in animal communication 
as it is in human language and states: 
[...] Have not animals some kind of language? At all events they 
understood ours. A horse knows the encouraging or chiding voice or 
whip, and moves and stops accordingly. [...] But they seem to have 
some knowledge of conversational signs. If I am to teach a dog or a pig 
to do certain things on a given signal, the process I take to be this. I 
connect his obedience with reward, his disobedience with punishment. 
But this only gives him the motive to obey, the fear of disobeying. It in 
no way can give him the means of connecting the act with the sign. Now 
connecting the two together (action and sign), whatever be the manner 
in which the sign is made, is Abstraction; but it is more, it is the very 
kind of abstraction in which all language has its origin – the connecting 
the sign with the thing signified; for the sign is purely arbitrary in this 
case as much as in human language.65 
 
Although Darwin could have used Brougham’s suggestion of the common origins 
between man and animal and animal intelligence, it was the move from the idea of 
abstraction to that of language which Darwin found difficult to grasp as he found no 
evidence for it in Brougham’s work. In a passage in the Descent of Man, Darwin 
questions the claim that animals do not have the power of abstraction or that of forming 
general concepts and he states that ‘[...] when a dog sees another dog at a distance, it is 
often clear that he perceives that it is a dog in the abstract; for when he gets nearer his 
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whole manner suddenly changes if the other dog be a friend.’66 Yet Beer suggests that 
Darwin’s concern was the result of his preoccupation at the time with ideas of 
continuity and connections and that the idea of semiotic arbitrariness as the prototype 
of abstraction would have undermined Darwin’s primary concerns.67 Beer here makes 
a valid point since it is known from Darwin’s very early theorising in his notebooks M 
and N and from the Descent of Man that he believed in the non-arbitrary understanding 
of the relation between words and things at the origin of language. Darwin came to 
believe that there was a necessary connection between ‘things and voice’ or rather he 
believed in the musical basis of language which implied either a mimetic or an abstract 
relation between thing and voice. In the Descent of Man, in fact, Darwin states that: 
With respect to the origin of articulate language, after having read on 
the one side the highly interesting works of Mr. Hensleigh Wedgwood, 
the Rev. F. Farrar, and Prof. Schleicher, and the celebrated lectures of 
Prof. Max Müller on the other side, I cannot doubt that language owes 
its origin to the imitation and modification of various natural sounds, 
the voices of other animals, and man’s own instinctive cries, aided by 
signs and gestures. It is, therefore, probable that the imitation of musical 
cries by articulate sounds may have given rise to words expressive of 
various complex emotions. The strong tendency in our nearest allies, 
the monkeys, and in the barbarous races of mankind, to imitate 
whatever they heard deserves notice, as bearing on the subject of 
imitation. [...] This would have been a first step in the formation of a 
language. As the voice was used more and more, the vocal organs 
would have been strengthened and perfected through the principle of 
the inherited effects of use; and this would have reacted on the power 
of speech.68  
 
In other words, Darwin thought that it was through natural selection that the 
primitive vocal efforts of animals and human beings had evolved into a vast array 
of songs, sounds and cries and ultimately into speech. In his notebook N, some thirty 
                                                     
66 C. Darwin. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. Reprinted in facsimile. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 64. 
67 G. Beer, op.cit., 1996. 
68 C. Darwin, op.cit., 1981,  p. 68. 
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years before the publication of the Descent of Man, as Richards notes,69 Darwin 
already supposed that our aboriginal ancestors began imitating the sounds of nature 
and that language developed from these simple beginnings.  
The correspondence between animal language and human language and its 
origins postulated by Darwin in the Descent of Man encountered severe criticism. An 
early criticism of the implications of Darwin’s theory of natural selection is to be found 
in M. Müller’s Lectures on the Science of Language (1861) where he argued that the 
use of language implied the ability to form concepts and, since animals cannot do that, 
there must be an impassable barrier between the two. Müller’s point of view emerged 
from his conviction that language and thought coincide and, as Dowling argues, since 
Müller believed there is an exact coincidence between the two, ‘all language becomes 
meaningful, with reason transpiercing its apparent opacities and formal elements from 
within.’70 Given the inherent meaningfulness of words, Müller also believed that 
language could never arise conventionally as a system of external signs and as Saussure 
would later assert of arbitrary signs, because he held that humans would have needed 
words to hold the convention. Instead he portrayed it as internal and expressive in 
origin. Also, given the fact that Müller argued for a perfect identity between thought 
and language, he retorted that language stood in opposition to the evolutionary view 
proposed by Darwin. In fact he declared that:  
One of the great barriers between the brute and man is Language. 
Man speaks and no brute had ever uttered a word. Language is our 
Rubicon and no brute will dare to cross it. [...] It admits of no 
cavilling, and no process of natural selection will ever distil 
significant words out of the notes of birds and the cries of beasts.71 
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Although there are differences between Darwin’s and Müller’s views, the fact that they 
both believe in the non-arbitrariness of language is an important element which they 
concur. As John Deely points out, Saussure’s definition of a sign rests on the notion 
that a sign is linguistic in essence and dyadic in character, and is arbitrary in the sense 
that it rests upon a stipulation.72 In other words, Saussure postulates the relationship 
between form and meaning, arbitrarily restricting signs to the human sphere thus 
‘severing their connection with the motivating history of the sign users as embodied 
in their language.’73 The severing of this connection also serves to separate human 
beings from animals, contrary to Darwin’s view. In this respect, Darwin’s view on 
language is closer to Peirce’s doctrine of sign and sign relations where iconic and 
indexical signs (non-arbitrary signs) are shared between the human species and 
animals. 
Darwin’s attempt to show continuity between the animal and human species 
also encompassed a discussion in the Descent of Man on the similarities between 
human and higher mammals and their faculties, including rationality. Darwin believed 
that human intellectual activity was a modification of instinct. Human intelligence was 
not opposed to animal instinct, but grew out of it in the course of ages. As Richards 
maintains, ‘in finding the antecedents of human rationality in animal instinct Darwin 
didn’t open any new epistemological ground,’74 since ideas that mind and matter run 
together through nature were already  advocated by Naturphilosophen such as  
Schelling, Strauss and Carl Gustav Carus, Goethe’s disciple and Schleicher,  who 
stated that: 
Thought in the contemporary period runs unmistakably in the direction 
of monism. The dualism, which one conceives as the opposition of mind 
and nature, content and form, being and appearance, or however one 
wishes to indicate it - this dualism is for the natural scientific 
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perspective of our day a completely unacceptable position. For the 
natural scientific perspective there is no matter without mind [Geist] 
(that is, without that necessary power determining matter), nor any 
mind without matter. Rather there is neither mind nor matter in the usual 
sense. There is only one thing that is both simultaneously.75  
 
Darwin’s indebtedness to Schleicher is here visible in his postulation of a fundamental 
continuity of human with animal mental life. With the reference not only to instinct, 
but also higher-mental activities76 such as reason, Davis suggests that ‘Darwin 
subverted any concept of the subject as a rational self and suggested that human mind 
is shaped by many of the same formative influences as exists in animals.’77 This aspect 
of Darwin’s theory had been formalized by George J. Romanes (1848-1894), with 
whom Darwin entertained an epistolary friendship and to whom he made available 
various short papers and materials on animal instinct which he published as an 
appendix in his Mental Evolution in Animals (1883).78 It was, however, in his later 
work, Mental Evolution in Man (1888) that Romanes endeavoured to show that there 
is an essential similarity between the reasoning processes of higher animals and human 
beings and based it on his discussion of language and philology in chapters V, XII and 
XIII. It was this particular aspect that attracted Welby and prompted her to address this 
issue from her unique language theory perspective and to propose a correspondence 
between animal and human thought processes based on her understanding of the 
different levels in sign activity. 
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Welby’s and Darwin’s view that mind and matter run together through nature owe 
much to the conceptual heritage of Naturphilosophie, which not only informed their 
epistemologies, as argued here, but also contributed to the shift from a philosophical 
to a biological realm in the study of  mind in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
In the last section of this chapter I will consider the impact of Naturphilosophie’s view 
on the continuity between mind and matter and the importance of imagination as a 
non-inferential tool in understanding this continuity.  
On mind, matter and continuity in the second half of the nineteenth century  
Rick Rylance, in accordance with Robert M. Young and Philip Davis, notes 
that the study of mind in the second half of the nineteenth-century was divided between 
two schools of thought, one philosophical and the other scientific. These schools 
offered opposite conceptual models in their consideration of what is to be understood 
as mind and its relation to human knowing.79 The scientific school of thought was 
represented by associationism, a physical and passive theory of mind which developed 
from Locke and Hume by David Hartley in the eighteenth century.80  Associationism 
held that mind’s structure, organisation and development depended on environment; 
or differently put, mind was created in experience and that therefore the role of innate 
ideas was negligible. Human nature, it asserted, was not a given, but it was a product 
of the various forces active in the environment. 
The opposing view to associationism was represented by faculty psychology. 
This argued that the faculties of human mind were innate. This view was in part the 
legacy of Kant’s postulation of innate ideas such as time and space, as well as the work 
of the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Reid who was committed to prove 
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the sovereignty of higher mental functions compatible with the premises of revealed 
religion. However, it was another aspect of Kant’s philosophy, namely his critical 
insight that all human knowledge was in a way determined by subjective principle that 
prompted a shift in the understanding of human knowing. This shift was included into 
a larger and subtler debate on knowing which was initiated by Goethe with his study 
of natural forms and continued by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. This influence 
prompted a shift in the study of psychological theory in the nineteenth century. 
Although each of these thinkers gave his own distinct emphasis to this 
perspective, one thing that was ‘common to all,’ as Richard Tarnas points out, ‘was a 
fundamental conviction that the relation of the human mind to the world was ultimately 
not dualistic, but participatory.’81 What this view entailed was that human thought does 
not or cannot mirror a ready-made objective truth, but rather that nature’s reality 
emerged only with the active participation of human mind which was inherent in 
nature’s order. In such knowledge, the human mind ‘lives into the creative activity of 
nature’82 and the faculty of imagination, as Schelling and Coleridge proposed, was the 
method for understanding and interpreting nature.  
In System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) for instance, Schelling establishes 
the following parallel between mind and nature: he defines nature as the absolute 
producing subject whose predicates are synthesized objects in the natural world and he 
sees the spontaneous thinking subject as the condition for the syntheses required to 
produce objectivity which is dependent upon judgement. As Bowie explains, the issue 
that this parallelism opens is to understand how these two subjects and their related 
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predicates relate to each other. The fact is that Schelling wants to make nature 
independent of thought. At the same time he wonders how nature, which he postulates 
as being productive, produces the subject that makes our knowledge possible. He 
believes that the reason why nature presents resistance to our knowledge is because 
most of its productivity is non-conscious.83 From this it follows that reality is 
constituted by the interplay of conscious and unconscious, an aspect which is going to 
be important in Lewes’s epistemology, and Schelling believes that in order to 
understand the unconscious working, philosophy should not seek to explain it via 
conceptual and rule based terms, or by geometry to use Coleridge’s term, but via art or 
rather via aesthetic imagination. A work of art, Schelling maintains, cannot be created 
by applying strict technical rules, but it is created by the unconscious faculty. In other 
words, it is through aesthetic imagination that we gain access to the otherwise 
intelligible realm and therefore art points to a more inclusive understanding of reason. 
Schelling’s articulation of the link between mind and nature and the concept of 
aesthetic imagination is echoed, as already pointed out in the introduction, by S.T. 
Coleridge who distinguishes between primary imagination and secondary imagination. 
In Biographia Literaria he explains the distinction between the two thus: 
The Imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The 
primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all 
human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I 
consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, 
yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and 
differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation.84 
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The influence of German idealism is clearly visible in Coleridge’s definition of 
primary imagination and his rather cryptic phrase of ‘the infinite I AM’. However what 
is also important to note is that Coleridge saw imagination as the active force behind 
the constructive formation of new ideas, and, as Rylance suggests, of ‘problem 
solving.’85 And it is precisely the idea of imagination as an intuitive-inferential process 
that will become the defining force in both Newman’s argument for the common 
grammar between faith and reason, and also in Eliot’s argument for the common 
enterprise of the scientist, novelist and ethicist whose willingness to explore the 
significance of that which cannot be registered by instruments and unaided senses is 
based on the same process of imagination. It is this type of scientific imagination that 
Welby states ‘points us beyond the sense of things, beyond even the meaning of things, 
to their significance, their highest value for us.’86 
Schelling’s and Coleridge’s understanding of imagination will bear important 
consequences in the intellectual discourse of science in Victorian England since a 
number of theorists, among them George H. Lewes, William B. Carpenter (1813-1885) 
and Karl Pearson (1857-1936), recognised that humans have limited access to the 
reality that lies outside, or rather beyond human consciousness and language. All three 
came to believe that science involves creative imagination and interpretation. Lewes 
believed that interpretation and subjectivity were the conditions of any understanding. 
In Problems of Life and Mind (1879), he argued that the methods of understanding 
mental processes cannot be subjected to the standard methods of investigation since 
those would not shed any light on its processes. Instead he suggests that the only 
observation possible for mental processes is interpretation, or as he put it: 
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We have no microscope, no balance, and reagent, to see what is too 
minute for the unassisted eye, to measure what is quantitative, to test 
what is compound in mental processes: our closest ‘observation’ is 
interpretation. [...] Nay, even the observations of external data have all 
to be interpreted, and their value lies wholly in interpretation.87 
Lewes’s allusion to the fact that even external data, which depend on sense experience, 
needs to be interpreted implies that scientific work is active rather than passive, and 
that it necessarily goes beyond the observable. This is because, Lewes states, ‘Science 
is no transcript of Reality, but an ideal construction framed out of the analysis of the 
complex phenomena given synthetically in Feeling, and expressed in abstractions.’88 
In other words, what we perceive is not immediate experience but a re-elaboration of 
it through the medium of language, and as such is subjected to interpretation and it is, 
therefore, provisional and relative. This is why Lewes argued that although human 
beings feel they perceive things, in reality they only apprehend signs from which they 
need to infer meaning, or why Henry Holland (1788-1873) Charles Darwin’s cousin, 
perceptively recognized that what is sometimes perceived as progress in knowledge 
can simply be the effect of a performance in language.89 What these views implied is 
that reality is inscribed in symbol. As David Amigoni points out, scientists, such as 
John Tyndall (1820-1893), asserted that ‘consciousness of the external world is 
inscribed in symbolic form.’90 Likewise, Herbert Spencer held that our perceptions are 
‘merely symbols’ and that we conceive as external objects what in fact ‘are only signs 
of objects.’91  
There is, however a key distinction to be made between the position Herbert 
Spencer and George H. Lewes advocated and the distinction is to be traced in their 
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conception of language and mind. Although both drew on evolutionary theory in their 
concept of mind, Spencer’s view of language was in line with the Associationist and 
Utilitarian tradition which, based on an empirical account, emphasized its indicative 
and nominal function derived from mathematics and chemistry, to the detriment of its 
creative usage.92 On the other hand, Lewes emphasized the organic and creative aspect 
of language and its use, which is akin to the theories of language proposed by Herder 
and Hamann, where language is not merely a means of representing the world, but is a 
form of social action which enables things to be manifest in the world and in ourselves. 
It is the latter view that is going to have a lasting impact on Newman’s, Eliot’s and 
Welby’s conceptual frames of mind. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I presented a historical and contextual overview of the role both 
language theory and evolutionary theory played in the Victorian frame of mind. In 
particular, I highlighted how these theories are indebted to the core principles of 
Naturphilosophie, namely that nature is a self-organising, living whole and that 
language is a living, organic medium that changes and adapts over a period of time. 
These concepts, which emphasised ideas of continuity and relatedness and introduced 
the notion of historicity, became of central importance in the debates in religion, 
science and mind, since they challenged and questioned the very notion of man’s place 
in nature. In discussing the importance of Naturphilosophie, I pointed out how it helped 
inform Darwin’s evolutionary theory and his concept of natural selection, which he 
thought of, in its preliminary stages, in a non-mechanistic way. I also argued how 
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Naturphilosophie furnished important metaphors that Newman, Eliot and Welby drew 
upon in their respective view of language as a living organism.
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CHAPTER 3 
John Henry Newman and the Illative Sense as Abduction: the Challenge to the 
Epistemology of the Enlightenment 
 
Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem1 
This chapter is concerned with the exploration of John Henry Newman’s 
philosophy and epistemology. In particular it considers his view that all significant 
believing, including scientific and religious, is deeply anchored on and mediated 
through imagination understood as a non-conscious inferential process. In doing so I 
wish to show the importance of Newman’s contribution to nineteenth-century 
epistemological debates on the question of religious knowing as well as emphasise his 
originality in recognising there is a common grammar, a relationship, between religion 
and science in their reliance on natural forms of logic. These I argue prefigure Peirce’s 
and Bateson’s views on the relation between faith and the logic of abduction as creative 
processes based on metaphor rather than on conscious formal logic. 
Newman, much like S. T. Coleridge before him, believed that religious 
knowing was ‘a problem of the rational character of faith and the faithful character of 
true reason.’2 For both religious knowing and belief originated in imagination which 
they conceived as a holistic activity encompassing emotions, intellect and will and as 
such was contrasted to pure intellect. For Newman, there was no dichotomy between 
faith and reason as they both stemmed from the same inferential process he called 
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‘logic of imagination’3 and in his later work called illative sense which could be 
evaluated as epistemologically legitimate. 
Newman had a remarkable impact on his age, both as a theologian, a term he 
never used to describe himself,4 and a philosopher. He was, as many of his 
contemporaries were, deeply influenced by the intellectual debates of his time 
concerning the relationship between science and theology as well as understanding the 
nature of human mind and therefore human knowledge. This is reflected in his works 
as a theologian, specifically in his An Essay to the Development of Doctrine (1845) 
where he presented a creative dialectic between church authority and individual 
intellect, and in his works as a philosopher. Newman’s theology and philosophy were 
conceived, as Gerard Magill explains, in terms of ‘the intellectual and spiritual needs 
both of the age that was passing and the one dawning.’5 What Newman realised was 
that scientific advancement and thought had shaken people’s beliefs to the point where 
by the 1840s what was at issue was no longer the validity of Anglican orders, but of 
Christianity itself. He was increasingly aware that on various fronts, ranging from 
intellectual to social assumptions, a new age of widespread atheism and agnosticism 
was becoming possible for the first time in human history.6 For Newman empirical 
reason almost always tends to atheism because, in his view, such reason has been 
truncated or uprooted from its true home of religious consciousness. He was convinced 
that religious ‘given’ was intelligible and ‘pertained to an order of experience which 
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nineteenth-century scientific thought deemed inadmissible as an object of critical 
reflection.’7  
 Newman’s criticism was at first directed towards the ‘Enlightened’ conception 
of reason and scientific experience, and secondly to the identification of such sciences 
with liberalism and the consequent scepticism towards faith it aroused. He felt this 
would only encourage a superficial view of human nature. Newman spent his entire 
life trying to reconcile empirical reason with metaphysical truth, first as an Anglican 
and then as a Roman Catholic after his conversion in 1845. What is most distinctive in 
his way of trying to supersede this problem, and what separates him from other 
thinkers and theologians of his time, is his belief in the use of reason precisely to argue 
against the certainty of reason and its subordinate relation to faith. He opposed the 
rationalist theory of knowledge, by ascertaining that religious truth and faith are 
discovered and transmitted not merely in reason as the empiricist tradition following 
Locke and Hume would hold, but in ways of which mankind is sometimes hardly 
conscious. It is through what he called implicit reason in his University Sermons (1826-
1840) or illative sense or imagination in his Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent 
(1870) that man comes to faith. Both implicit reason and the illative sense are in fact 
a type of natural inference or reasoning which, as I shall discuss in this chapter, present 
an important similarity with what Charles Sanders Peirce called ‘abductive’ logic. 
What Newman calls illative sense and Peirce calls abduction is what I argue is in fact 
biosemiotic imagination. According to Newman, and similarly to Peirce, faith is not 
founded on investigation, argument and proof, but it is the result of our ‘abductive 
reasoning or creativity’ or imagination which uses natural forms of logic. 
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At the basis of Newman’s belief lay the conviction that science only gives facts 
and not their meaning. In his Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, Newman laments 
the fact that empirical science, based on deductive logic, offers a model of thought in 
which ‘first comes knowledge, then a view, then reasoning and then belief.’8 Religion, 
on the contrary, involves a whole different order of thought, which cannot simply start 
from knowledge, because he asserts that nothing can. He insists that human beings 
always start from a belief and that this belief is no different whether in science or 
religion. This view was inspired by both, the bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) and 
Samuel T. Coleridge. For both belief was not a matter of deductive logic, evidence and 
proof, but rather as the product of a creative act of what Coleridge called imagination 
and Butler identified as antecedent or non-conscious probabilities.9  
In his reading of Butler’s most influential philosophical work - Analogy of 
Religion (1729) - Newman found two ideas which were to be of lasting importance; 
first the principle of analogy which taught him that there are similarities between the 
works of God in nature and in divine revelation and second the affirmation of non-
scientific reasoning through a convergence of antecedent probabilities that is the basis 
of our practical decisions.10 This kind of reasoning, according to Butler, both 
illuminates our faith explicitly and is contained implicitly in the apprehensions of 
religious imagination. Butler’s ideas are echoed in Coleridge’s view of the imaginative 
life of man which he sees as being linked to the life of God through the experience of 
nature. In his view, as already pointed out in previous chapters, Coleridge relates 
creation, God, the self and nature through the creative act of imagination. In Newman, 
this organic unity is to be found in his understanding of the interplay between implicit 
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and explicit reason which are part of the process we need in order to come to religious 
belief. By emphasising the interplay between implicit and explicit reason, Newman 
was trying to show the ever increasing number of sceptics that religious faith is rational 
and that it is reasonable to believe.   
These ideas were first developed in what Newman scholars have called his 
‘Anglican years’ which coincide with the period that is historically known as the 
Oxford Movement or Tractarianism (1830-1843).11 However, Newman addressed 
these issues more systematically in what is considered to be his most accomplished 
work on matters of faith, science and language, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of 
Assent which was published in 1870, almost thirty years after his conversion to Roman 
Catholicism. Contrary to the University Sermons and many other important writings 
such as An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine and The Idea of a 
University (1852 and 1858), which were triggered by a particular occasion or in 
response to cultural shifts, the Grammar of Assent was written in response to 
Newman’s lifelong search for an understanding of the relation between faith and 
reason.  In this chapter I shall analyse these writings in more detail in order to trace 
the development of Newman’s thought and to highlight the importance of his insights 
as contributing to a proto-biosemiotic interpretive framework. In particular I’m 
interested to show how his argument of the illative sense echoes Peirce’s view of 
abduction and prefigures Bateson’s view that forms of the sacred expressed through 
natural forms of reasoning are also found in forms of abduction in nature.  
 
                                                     
11 For a detailed discussion on Tractarianism see S. Gilley. Newman and His Age. 4th edition, London: 
Darton and Todd, 2002 especially chapters 2 and 3; P. Davis, op. cit., 2002, chapter 3.  
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On Faith, Religion and Science in the ‘Fifteen Sermons Preached at the 
University of Oxford’ (1826-1840)12 
 
In the opening sentence of his first University sermon, entitled ‘The Philosophical 
Temper, First Enjoined by the Gospel’ (1826), Newman voiced a concern over the 
credibility of religion, which was already very deep in him, thus: ‘Few charges have 
been more frequently urged by unbelievers against Revealed Religion, than that it is 
hostile to the advance of philosophy and science.’13 Newman was fully aware that the 
credibility of religion has suffered a serious decline in the eyes of the leading 
intellectuals of his day. He saw that this perceived opposition between the dominant 
rationality and the truth of faith constituted an historically new challenge for the 
Christian tradition. It was precisely this challenge he set out to address in his 
University Sermons. 
Yet, contrary to what many would have expected, Newman did not condemn the 
philosophy and science of his time. Rather, he underlined the importance for 
Christianity of being open or well disposed towards this type of philosophy and 
science, which had, after all, formed in Christian people those rare positive qualities 
of mind and character which are necessary to those men committed to the search for 
the truth.14 Indeed, according to Newman the first scientists were Christians.   
[...][T]he greatest Philosophers of modern times—the founders of the 
new school of discovery, and those who have most extended the 
boundaries of our knowledge—have been forced to submit their reason 
to the Gospel; a circumstance which, independent of the argument for 
the strength of the Christian Evidence which the conviction of such men 
affords, at least shows that Revealed Religion cannot be very 
unfavourable to scientific inquiries, when those who sincerely 
                                                     
12 J. H. Newman. Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford. Between A.D. 1826 and 
1843. London: Longman, Green and Co, 1909. 
13 J. H. Newman. “Sermon 1: The Philosophical Temper First Enjoyed by the Gospel.” Fifteen Sermons 
Preached Before the University of Oxford. Between A.D. 1826 and 1843. London: Longman, Green and 
Co, 1909, p. 1.  
14 J. H. Newman. Quoted in E. Sillem. Ed. The Philosophical Notebooks of John Henry Newman. 2 
Vols.; vol. 2. Nauwelaerts, 1970, p. 41. 
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acknowledge the former still distinguish themselves above others in the 
latter.15 
 
 It is important to mention here that Newman’s inclination towards maths and science 
stemmed from his years as an undergraduate student at Oxford and the influence 
exerted on him by Dr. Richard Whatley, whom he helped write the book Elements of 
Logic (1826) and the Noetics philosophy.16 Whatley did not only have an impact on 
Newman, but also on Peirce who read his Elements of Logic as a child. In fact, 
according to Cornelis de Waal, it is possible to find some early seeds of Peirce’s 
semiotics precisely in Whatley’s refutation of ‘abstract ideas’, and his proposal that 
we think in signs.17Although Newman never specifically stated that we think in signs, 
he certainly drew on Whatley’s logic when discussing the differences between implicit 
and explicit reason and in his postulation of implicit reason as a non-conscious logical 
inference which is not based on words, but on inferences that go beyond words.  
    Although Newman was interested in scientific developments of the time, as Gillian 
Evans observes, ‘it could not be said he kept up assiduously with the latest 
developments’; in fact ‘it would be fair to say that his interest reflected the influence 
contemporary scientific developments had on educated readers.’18 From his studies in 
mathematics and geology, however, Newman drew two things of lasting importance; 
                                                     
15 J. H. Newman. “Sermon 1.”op.cit., 1909, p. 5. 
16 Whatley described the philosophy of Noetics: ‘all reasoning, on whatever subject, is one and the same 
process which may be clearly exhibited in the form of syllogism’ (qtd. in E. Sillem op.cit., p. 164). The 
Noetic school was regarded as having a liberal outlook which led some Anglicans to embrace a form of 
anti-dogmatic liberalism, which meant that doctrine should be validated by reason. Such a liberal 
outlook in the Anglican Church was a direct consequence of the pressure sciences were exerting in those 
days, when the Scripture could not be read simply as the word of God but it had to be proved as a 
rational and empirical fact, thus giving an ever more distorted interpretation of the Bible. Newman 
highly disagreed with this liberal outlook and attacked it in his University Sermons and his Essay in the 
development of Christian Doctrine. The University Sermons, in particular, were written to prepare the 
Church against what he called the ‘usurpation of the reason’ and to defend Christian faith. His battle 
against theological liberalism culminated in his Tract 90 in 1841 where he unravelled his enterprise of 
catholicising Anglicanism by interpreting the 39 articles in a literal sense.  (S. Gilley “Life and 
Writings.” The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman. Eds. I. Kerr, T. Merrigan. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 1-29.) 
17 C. De Waal, op.cit., 2013, p. 5. 
18 G. Evans. “Science and Mathematics in Newman’s Thought.” The Downside Review Vol. 96 (1978): 
247-266, p. 247. 
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first, the general attitude of approval towards the secular, particularly natural science 
and second, the body of technical knowledge which was substantial and which he used 
in his debates against empirical science.  Newman was particularly fond of Newton, 
and he regarded him as having discovered absolute laws which, he felt, provided a 
point of reference on the scientific side, against which the certainties of Christian 
doctrine and revelation could be set.  In fact in paragraph six of his Sermon One he 
writes that: 
Much might be said on the coincidence which exists between the general 
principles which the evidence for Revelation presupposes, and those on 
which inquiries into nature proceed. Science and Revelation agree in 
supposing that nature is governed by uniform and settled laws. [...] The 
supposition, then, of a system of established laws, on which all 
philosophical investigation is conducted, is also the very foundation on 
which the evidence for Revealed Religion rests.19 
 
The ‘faith’ that a scientist has in physical laws and mathematical equations, is for 
Newman the same type of belief a religious man has in Revelation. In another passage 
of the same sermon he writes: 
we shall find that some of those habits of mind which are throughout the 
Bible represented as alone pleasing in the sight of God, are the very 
habits which are necessary for success in scientific investigation, and 
without which it is quite impossible to extend the sphere of our 
knowledge.20 
 
Newman did not specify, at this stage, what he intended by habits of mind; however, 
he implied that they underpin any investigation, be it scientific or religious and, most 
importantly, that these habits of mind are not separated acts, but they are part of the 
same reasoning process. The next section is going to explore Newman’s view on habits 
of mind in relation to belief and highlight the similarities between his and Peirce’s 
understanding of belief as a habit of mind which is produced by non-conscious, 
abductive inferential processes. 
                                                     
19 J.H. Newman. “Sermon 1.” op.cit., 1909, p. 6. 
20 Ibid., p.7. 
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Faith and Reason contrasted as Habits of Mind 
 
A fuller account and discussion about what reason and faith are is to be found in his 
Sermon 10 entitled ‘Faith and Reason, contrasted as Habits of Mind’ (1839) where he 
fundamentally rejected faith as a purely moral quality dependent on reason and, 
instead,  advocated it to be a process of reasoning (natural logic) in its own right. In the 
opening paragraphs of the Sermon, Newman defines faith as ‘the substance of things 
hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.’21 He believes, much like Peirce, that faith 
is an instrument of knowledge; however, it is not used in the same way as reason would 
be in order to acquire evidence. Moreover, he doesn’t believe faith to be separated from 
reason. Although he concedes that their matter of inquiry is different, he asserts that:   
On the other hand, however, it may be urged, that it is plainly impossible 
that Faith should be independent of Reason, and a new mode of arriving 
at truth; that the Gospel does not alter the constitution of our nature, and 
does but elevate it and add to it; that Sight is our initial, and Reason is 
our ultimate informant concerning all knowledge.22  
In a later paragraph he continues: 
Such is the question which presents itself to readers of Scripture, as to 
the relation of Faith to Reason: and it is usual at this day to settle it in 
disparagement of Faith,—to say that Faith is but a moral quality, 
dependent upon Reason,—that Reason judges both of the evidence on 
which Scripture is to be received, and the meaning of Scripture; and then 
Faith follows or not, according to the state of the heart; that we make up 
our minds by Reason without Faith, and then we proceed to adore and 
to obey by Faith apart from Reason; that, though Faith rests on 
testimony, not on reasonings, yet that testimony, in its turn, depends on 
Reason for the proof of its pretensions, so that Reason is an 
indispensable preliminary.23 
In other words, reason was commonly seen as the only ‘fair’ judge in matters of science 
and religion. Following the empirical tradition, it was believed that truth can only be 
obtained by providing some hard evidence and only when evidence was provided and 
                                                     
21 J. H. Newman. “Sermon 10.” op.cit., 1909, p. 176. 
22 Ibid., p. 181. 
23 Ibid., p. 182. 
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accepted then belief would follow according to a person’s disposition. Although 
Newman concedes that Reason is important as an inferential tool, this doesn’t mean 
that faith stems from reason. To quote from Newman again: 
In attempting to investigate what are the distinct offices of Faith and 
Reason in religious matters, and the relation of the one to the other, I 
observe, first, that undeniable though it be, that Reason has a power of 
analysis and criticism in all opinion and conduct, and that nothing is true 
or right but what may be justified, and, in a certain sense, proved by it, 
and undeniable, in consequence, that, unless the doctrines received by 
Faith are approvable by Reason, they have no claim to be regarded as 
true, it does not therefore follow that Faith is actually grounded on 
Reason in the believing mind itself.24 
Although faith falls short of the standards of clarity and precision demanded by formal 
reasoning, Newman argues that this doesn’t necessarily mean that other types of 
reasoning are to be labelled as ‘unscientific’ and therefore unreliable. A particular point 
Newman examines is the controversial issue of miracles (which called into question 
the divine origin of earth as well as men), which became the cardinal point on which 
criticisms towards the Church were moved. Newman explains that according to the 
Utilitarian School,25 what the Church proclaimed as miracles, for instance the parting 
of the sea, should be subjected to objective tests, acceptable to reason. That, however, 
Newman felt would be to imply that faith accepts inaccurate proofs which he refutes 
by stating that  both reason and faith share a common ground; 
The founder of the recent Utilitarian School insists, that all evidence for 
miracles, before it can be received, should be brought into a court of 
law, and subjected to its searching forms:—this too is to imply that 
Reason demands exact proofs, but that Faith accepts inaccurate ones. 
The same thing is implied in the notion which men of the world 
                                                     
24 Ibid., p. 183. 
25 The principle of utility - or Utilitarianism - is a moral test for the rightness of actions, based on how 
much pleasure or pain they produce. The most well-known and developed versions of it are found in 
the work of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). However, the 'principle 
of utility' is also found in the work of David Hume (1711-1776). Bentham and Mill wanted to find a 
secure, irrefutable and objective basis for morality. They were deeply suspicious of moral theories 
which did not do this, especially when it seemed they were arbitrary and subjective as they felt faith-
based moralities were. In his late essay Utility of Religion (1874) Mill argued that it was ‘perfectly 
conceivable that religion may be morally useful without being intellectually sustainable.’ Quoted in P. 
Davis, op.cit., 2002, p. 144.  
 108 
 
entertain, that Faith is but credulity, superstition, or fanaticism; these 
principles being notoriously such as are contented with insufficient 
evidence concerning their objects. On the other hand, scepticism, which 
shows itself in a dissatisfaction with evidence of whatever kind, is often 
called by the name of Reason. What Faith, then, and Reason are, when 
compared together, may be determined from their counterfeits,—from 
the mutual relation of credulity and scepticism, which no one can doubt 
about. [...]When, then, Reason and Faith are contrasted together, Faith 
means easiness, Reason, difficulty of conviction. Reason is called either 
strong sense or scepticism, according to the bias of the speaker; and 
Faith, either teachableness or credulity. 26 
 Gillian Evans points out that contrary to sceptics Newman’s habit was to remain open-
minded in the face of mysteries and paradoxes, to hold on in faith, until they were 
resolved, rather than dismiss the whole area of study which generated them as 
unworthy of discussion. In her article, ‘Science and Mathematics in Newman’s 
Thought’, she argues that what for the sceptic is a reason not to remain open minded 
to the truth of faith is exactly what for Newman represents a source of considerable 
intellectual reassurance.27 Where sceptics, she states, find mathematical principles and 
scientific laws acceptable because they do not involve them in committing themselves 
to a creed, Newman finds them refreshing, because they provide him with dispassionate 
points of reference for his arguments, with principles against which he can test the 
principles of Christian Doctrine in the confidence that scientific laws can only confirm 
and strengthen the case for the orthodox Christian view.  
       Newman was well aware that the whole framework of scientific rationality was 
inimical to the depth of commitment and the unconditional assent so essential to the 
act of faith and he was therefore forced, as Terrence Merrigan puts it, to ‘fight on two 
fronts: 1) to vindicate the claim of properly religious experience to legitimacy; 2) to 
establish the essentially rational character of the act of faith.’28 He insisted that faith is 
                                                     
26 J. H. Newman, “Sermon 10.”op.cit., 1909, p. 186. 
27 G. Evans. “Science and Mathematics in Newman’s Thought.” The Downside Review. Vol. 96 (1978): 
247-266. 
28 T. Merrigan. op.cit., 1990a, p. 4.  
 109 
 
a different kind of reasoning which doesn’t need empirical proof, but it relies on what 
he calls ‘antecedent probabilities.’ These antecedent probabilities, a concept he drew 
from Butler’s Analogy of Religion (1729), are also Newman’s case against scepticism. 
His concern is to show we give unconditional assent to a variety of fundamental truths 
and certainties and that these, although lacking justification, provide unquestioned 
starting points for inferring other propositions which are psychologically and logically 
apprehended: 
Faith, then, as I have said, does not demand evidence so strong as is 
necessary for what is commonly considered a rational conviction, or 
belief on the ground of Reason; and why? For this reason, because it is 
mainly swayed by antecedent considerations. [...]Faith is a moral 
principle. It is created in the mind, not so much by facts, as by 
probabilities; and since probabilities have no definite ascertained value, 
and are reducible to no scientific standard, what are such to each 
individual, depends on his moral temperament.29  
In this passage Newman stresses again the significance of faith as a certain moral 
disposition of a person searching for meaning which stems from a habit of mind. This 
idea was also advocated by Charles S. Peirce in the paper ‘The Fixation of Belief’ 
published in 1877 where he pondered on the ability of men to draw inferences which 
are in his view linked to proper habits of mind. Newman’s purpose in discussing 
antecedent probabilities or what he later called first principles (an unproved 
assumption that we hold as true) is to show that religious belief is no different to any 
other belief as it is being formed less by actual arguments than by what we think or are 
inclined to believe as true on the basis of our already existing attitudes and 
assumptions. These in turn, affect our arguments for and against this or that, and make 
us decide that formal arguments are compelling even though they fall short of any 
positive proof. Newman insists that belief cannot be subsumed under the laws of 
rationality and is certainly not the product of a rational analysis. He derives his view 
                                                     
29 J. H. Newman. “Sermon 10.” op.cit.,1909, p. 187. 
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from a particular aspect of Hume’s philosophy where he rejects rational refutation. In 
The Treatise of Human Nature (1739) David Hume states that: ‘reason is, and ought 
to be, the slave of the passions’30 which echoes Newman’s belief that mind should not 
be guided by the laws of formal logic, but by informal logic, grounded in instinct or 
imagination. Both Hume and Newman state that fundamental and necessary beliefs 
come from unknowable sources - unknowable in their origins, not their effects since 
we can see that people act in certain ways according to their ‘belief’ or what they hold 
as true.  In another passage Hume also states that ‘all reasoning concerning causes and 
effects are derived from nothing but customs; and that belief is more properly an act 
of the sensitive, than of the cognitive parts of our natures.’31 What Hume describes as 
customs is what both Peirce and Newman see as habits of mind. For Peirce, as much 
as for Newman, a habit is an acquired propensity to act in a regular way in familiar 
circumstances. For both, habitual responses are, however, made involuntarily without 
reflection or conscious decision-making. According to Peirce and Newman, beliefs are 
habits of action produced by inferential processes which are non-conscious and are, as 
discussed in Chapter One, grounded in natural forms of logic. These are for Peirce 
identified as semiosis (sign activity).   
The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason: the Empirical tradition 
Although Newman derived some of his insights from Hume, scholars seem to 
be divided on the role the empiricist tradition played in the development of his thought. 
On the one hand Jamie Ferreira asserts in Scepticism and Reasonable doubt – The 
British Naturalist Tradition (1986)32 not only that Newman refuted scepticism, but 
also that he held Locke and Hume as his explicit targets. On the other hand, Terence 
                                                     
30 D. Hume. Quoted in I. Williams. “Faith and Scepticism: Newman and the Naturalist Tradition.”  
Philosophical Investigations. Vol. 15 n. 1 (1992): 151-166, p. 156. 
31 D. Hume. Treatise of Human Nature. 2nd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 183. 
32 J. M. Ferreira. Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt: The British Naturalist Tradition in Wilkins, Hume, 
Reid and Newman. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
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Merrigan and Ieuan Williams draw attention to Newman’s debt to empirical tradition 
and more specifically to aspects of Hume’s philosophy. Others brand Newman as an 
empiricist although it is not certain when and how assiduously he read Locke.33 As 
Newman would argue, a probable ‘via media’34 is where the truth lies. What is 
undeniable is the fact that Newman dwelt on notions about how much of what we 
know is something we learned through experience and how much of what we know is 
something we could have reasoned out without the benefit of particular experience.  
Newman distinguished two sorts of conscious experience (although this 
distinction was only on paper as they are to be understood as being part of one another); 
one external to oneself and the other internal and represented by the world of mental 
impressions. The way we apprehend a world external to ourselves is through senses, 
but it is through conscious experience that we acknowledge it. In biosemiotic terms 
we could say that it is through signs, which function as mediators between the external 
world of objects and the internal world of ideas that we come to apprehend the world. 
Peirce argued that for each of us, there is an internal world consisting of private sign 
systems or imagination, and an outer world of action and habits.  
For Newman, echoing Coleridge, the experience of conscience is a mental act, 
based on imagination, and is where one apprehends oneself in his relation to God. In 
Sermon 11, Newman frames some of these aspects which he will address at length in 
his Grammar of Assent (1871): 
We are surrounded by beings which exist quite independently of us,—
exist whether we exist, or cease to exist, whether we have cognizance 
of them or no. These we commonly separate into two great divisions, 
material and immaterial. Of the material we have direct knowledge 
                                                     
33 J. Hochschild. “The Re-Imagined Aristotelianism of John Henry Newman.” Modern Age. Fall (2003): 
333-342, p. 334. 
34 Via media is a Latin phrase meaning middle way. Newman used it in Tracts 39 and 41 where he tried 
to define a new Anglican ecclesiology and mediate between the Roman Catholic Creed and the Church 
of England on matters of the Church’s teaching on justification.  
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through the senses; we are sensible of the existence of persons and 
things, of their properties and modes, of their relations towards each 
other, and the courses of action which they carry on. [...] As to 
immaterial beings, that we have faculties analogous to sense by which 
we have direct knowledge of their presence, does not appear, except 
indeed as regards our own soul and its acts. But so far is certain at least, 
that we are not conscious of possessing them; and we account it, and 
rightly, to be enthusiasm to profess such consciousness. At times, 
indeed, that consciousness has been imparted, as in some of the 
appearances of God to man contained in Scripture: but, in the ordinary 
course of things, whatever direct intercourse goes on between the soul 
and immaterial beings, whether we perceive them or not, and are 
influenced by them or not, certainly we have no consciousness of that 
perception or influence, such as our senses convey to us in the 
perception of things material. The senses, then, are the only instruments 
which we know to be granted to us for direct and immediate 
acquaintance with things external to us. Moreover, it is obvious that 
even our senses convey us but a little way out of ourselves, and 
introduce us to the external world only under circumstances, under 
conditions of time and place, and of certain media through which they 
act.35 
Newman here draws on the empiricist notion that all the knowledge human 
beings possess derive from sense data. This tradition dates back to Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626), whom Newman read and whom he regarded as being a distant 
precursor of Newtonian physics and pioneer in the need for the study of material 
phenomena.36 Newman agreed with Newton that physics, as a science, treats the 
connections observable between phenomena. He also agreed with Bacon on his 
assertion that the Final Cause belongs to the sphere of natural theology and it should 
be used not as a proof for the existence of God, but as an explanation of His 
existence. A radical departure from the empiricist tradition, and more precisely 
from Hume’s view on the way we apprehend reality, is that, for Newman, reality 
consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human 
consciousness and not as anything independent of it, as Hume would hold. In his 
conception of mind, Newman sees that man thinks spontaneously in a way that 
                                                     
35 J. H. Newman. “Sermon 11.”op.cit., 1909, p. 205. 
36 E. Sillem. op.cit., 1970, pp. 185-192. 
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accords with the logical structure of thought, which is not necessarily formal logic, 
but most likely natural logic or implicit reason.  
It is important to highlight here that Newman, following Coleridge and the 
Naturphilosophen tradition, compares natural logic or reasoning to true poetry and 
states that it is ‘a spontaneous outpouring of thought’ and as such a gift to all minds. 
In biosemiotics terms this implies that poetic meaning does not obey a linear logic, but 
rather, ‘it emerges from a recursive growth of pattern and metaphor.’37 This contrasts 
with an empirical understanding of the workings of human mind where knowing is 
decided in accordance with predetermined laws of reason. Newman, however, is well 
aware that such knowledge does not take into account antecedent forms of knowledge, 
or what Peirce also called abduction or ‘play of musement’ which is that disposition 
in human beings that subtends all intellectual power and that contributes to the 
formation of new and alternative habits or hypotheses.  The next section will focus on 
Newman’s discussion of inferential process and show how implicit reason, or 
abduction subtends all intellectual power and how this is based on what Bateson later 
terms syllogism in grass.   
Formal Logic or Higher Logic of Facts versus Natural Logic: On Implicit and 
Explicit Reason 
 
It was in his Sermon 13, entitled ‘Implicit and Explicit Reason’ (1840) that 
Newman first addressed in more detail the workings of human mind and postulated the 
difference between formal and informal logic in relation to his discussion of faith and 
reason which he then developed in his Grammar of Assent.  In the opening paragraphs 
of his sermon he states that ‘reasoning is a living and spontaneous energy within us, 
not an art.’38 What Newman intended by energy was a spontaneous flow very similar 
                                                     
37 W. Wheeler, op. cit., 2014. Web. 02. February. 2016. 
38 J. H. Newman. “Sermon 13.”op.cit., 1909,  p. 257. 
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to what S. T. Coleridge identified as imagination. It should not and cannot be 
interpreted in terms of Newtonian physics. He also defines reason as 
The faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception, or of 
ascertaining one thing by means of another. In this way it is able, from 
small beginnings, to create to itself a world of ideas, which do or do not 
correspond to the things themselves for which they stand, or are true or 
not, according as it is exercised soundly or otherwise.[...] The mind 
ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a 
quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility 
which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one 
by some indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of an 
association; then falling back on some received law; next seizing on 
testimony; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some 
inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it makes progress 
not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, 
and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself; by personal 
endowments and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind 
him, and unable to teach another. And such mainly is the way in which 
all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason,— not by rule, but by an 
inward faculty.’ [my italics]39  
 
True reasoning doesn’t rely on sense data, which enables us to create a world of images 
or phenomena. On the contrary, true reasoning stems from an inward capacity for 
which we cannot account and which we cannot teach, yet we all possess. Newman 
maintains that in order to understand how reasoning by inward faculty operates we 
cannot apply the same rules as we would when investigating any reasoning process by 
way of syllogism as Aristotle taught.  
The boldest, simplest, and most comprehensive theory which has been 
invented for the analysis of the reasoning process, is the well-known 
science for which we are indebted to Aristotle, and which is framed 
upon the principle that every act of reasoning is exercised upon neither 
more nor less than three terms.40 
 
Syllogism is a deductive argument pertaining to formal logic and as such, according to 
Newman, is unable to legislate for all the mental processes of reasoning. He defines 
formal logic as a scientific form of verbal reasoning where words do not necessarily 
                                                     
39 Ibid., p. 257. 
40 Ibid., p. 258.  
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correspond to, or are not adequate, to thoughts. He makes a further distinction, to 
characterise formal logic in chapter eight of his Grammar of Assent where he states 
that formal logic is not concerned with words or language, but is concerned with 
symbols.  
What is true of Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry, is true also of 
Aristotelic argumentation in its typical modes and figures. It compares 
two given words separately with a third, and then determines how they 
stand towards each other, in a bonâ fide identity of sense. In 
consequence, its formal process is best conducted by means of symbols, 
A, B, and C. While it keeps to these, it is safe; it has the cogency of 
mathematical reasoning, and draws its conclusions by a rule as unerring 
as it is blind.41 
Here the term symbol is used by Newman as a synonym for a special sign used in 
mathematics. It is worth recalling here that in a semiotic discourse, more specifically 
in typology of signs described by C. S. Peirce, a symbol is a consequence of a particular 
habit of mind which can include a natural disposition. For Newman, the issue starts 
when symbols, in his case mathematical, are later substituted with words, because 
differently from mathematical symbols words are polysemic and therefore they can be 
interpreted in various ways: 
Symbolical notation, then, being the perfection of the syllogistic 
method, it follows that, when words are substituted for symbols, it will 
be its aim to circumscribe and stint their import as much as possible, lest 
perchance A should not always exactly mean A, and B mean B; and to 
make them, as much as possible, the calculi of notions, which are in our 
absolute power, as meaning just what we choose them to mean, and as 
little as possible the tokens of real things, which are outside of us, and 
which mean we do not know how much, but so much certainly as, (in 
proportion as we enter into them,) may run away with us beyond the 
range of scientific management. The concrete matter of propositions is 
a constant source of trouble to syllogistic reasoning, as marring the 
simplicity and perfection of its process. Words, which denote things, 
have innumerable implications; but in inferential exercises it is the very 
triumph of that clearness and hardness of head, which is the 
characteristic talent for the art, to have stripped them of all these 
connatural senses, to have drained them of that depth and breadth of 
associations which constitute their poetry, their rhetoric, and their 
                                                     
41 J. H. Newman, op.cit., 1903, p. 266. 
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historical life, to have starved each term down till it has become the 
ghost of itself, and everywhere one and the same ghost, "omnibus umbra 
locis," so that it may stand for just one unreal aspect of the concrete 
thing to which it properly belongs, for a relation, a generalization, or 
other abstraction, for a notion neatly turned out of the laboratory of the 
mind, and sufficiently tame and subdued, because existing only in a 
definition.42 
Where mathematical symbols denote a specific value which cannot be interpreted in any 
other possible way, words, on the contrary, are open to interpretation. He laments the 
fact that it is through the act of syllogism that words are stripped of their meaning and 
become some kind of linguistic tag devoid of all their possible relations, or grammar. 
This concept is very similar to Lady Victoria Welby’s concept of the ‘plasticity’ of 
verbal language which she developed in accordance with analogies from the organic 
world as she was deeply influenced by Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Language, she 
believed, cannot and must not ever provide us with canons and limitations of permanent 
value and meaning. On the contrary, language is ‘plastic’, or rather, flexible and 
endowed with the capacity of ‘expressive ambiguity’ which renders it capable of 
adaptation and renewal to ever new expressive situations.43  
Newman was not influenced by Darwin’s evolutionary theory;44 however, his 
organic understanding of language was the legacy of German Romanticism and 
Naturphilosophie, and more specifically of S. T. Coleridge’s notion of language and 
words which he defined in Aids to Reflection as being ‘more than mere counters of social 
intercourse, but they are living powers, by which the things of most importance are 
actuated, combined and humanized.’45 Language is for Coleridge a central tenet in the 
                                                     
42 Ibid., p. 267. 
43 S.Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 21. 
44 Although Newman was familiar with Darwin’s work and he professed sympathy for it, he never truly 
engaged with his ideas. However, as Suzy Anger notes, Newman’s Essay on Development of Christian 
Doctrine (1845) could be seen as a sort of counterpart to Darwin’s Origin of Species not so much 
because of its content, as Newman felt compelled to write it in order to win back the Church’s absolute 
authority in exegetical questions, but because of the notion of change and development of thought in 
human mind as well as language, and the interpretation of meaning. See S. Anger, op. cit., 2005, p.40. 
45 S.T. Coleridge. Quoted in J. Coulson. Religion and Imagination: In Aid of a Grammar of Assent. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 11.  
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cognitive process of understanding and experiencing reality. In line with Herder, he 
assigns an organic agency to language thus criticising the materialist’s view of matter as 
neglecting the role of Logos as an intelligent agency in the Universe.46  
Newman was well aware, as Coleridge and Welby were, that language was ‘but 
an artificial system adapted for particular purposes, which have been determined by our 
wants.’47  Yet a fundamental difference between Newman and Welby, as well as Peirce, 
is that Newman did not think in terms of signs and signs relations or semiosis - the 
process by which signs are exchanged and by which we generate meaning. Moreover, in 
line with Coleridge, Newman concentrated his efforts in the understanding of language 
primarily in terms of verbal signs and hermeneutics insofar as they were used in a 
theological discourse, whereas both Peirce and Welby extended the boundaries of signs, 
to non-verbal language and semiotics in a global discourse. For the latter, all things that 
exist, human and non-human, impose themselves on our attention as signs.  
Although Newman’s understanding of language was different to a certain 
extent to Peirce’s, his view surrounding the issues of reasoning, cognition and logic show 
important parallels to Peirce’s logic of abduction. As already discussed in Chapter One, 
Peirce sees abduction, or what he calls imagination ‘as the spontaneous conjecture of 
instinctive reason’ (CP 6.475) on which any inference is based. What Peirce calls 
abduction, is what Newman identifies as implicit reason.  
 In his ‘Sermon 13’, Newman differentiates between two distinct processes of 
reasoning: one is the original process of reasoning and the other is the process of 
                                                     
46 A. Esterhammer. The Romantic Performative. Language and Action in British and German 
Romanticism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, pp. 162-165. According to Angela 
Esterhammer, the Logos, was conceived of by Coleridge in two ways; as a moral and intelligent God, 
and as language of Scripture. The former provides a final refutation of materialist philosophy and the 
latter refutes a superficial reading of the Bible for factual truth since the Bible is written using 
metaphors. By providing a biblical account of language, Coleridge underlined the centrality of word as 
Logos by means of which we can have access to an immediate conception of reality. 
 47 Lady V. Welby. Quoted in S. Petrilli, op.cit. 2009, p. 22. 
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investigating our reasoning. Although all men have the faculty of reasoning, or of 
gaining truth from former truth, Newman believes that not all men reflect upon their own 
reasoning. These two exercises of mind are then defined as reasoning and arguing, or 
conscious and unconscious reasoning, or as implicit and explicit reasoning. 
[There] are two processes, distinct from each other,—the original 
process of reasoning, and next, the process of investigating our 
reasonings. All men reason, for to reason is nothing more than to gain 
truth from former truth, without the intervention of sense; to which 
brutes are limited; but all men do not reflect upon their own reasonings, 
much less reflect truly and accurately, so as to do justice to their own 
meaning; but only in proportion to their abilities and attainments. In 
other words, all men have a reason, but not all men can give a reason. 
We may denote, then, these two exercises of mind as reasoning and 
arguing, or as conscious and unconscious reasoning, or as Implicit 
Reason and Explicit Reason. And to the latter belong the words, science, 
method, development, analysis, criticism, proof, system, principles, 
rules, laws, and others of a like nature. 48 
If explicit reason is a form of a posteriori inference, implicit reason has to be 
antecedent or a priori, a form of phenomenological imagination which offers a 
language of creative discovery. It is precisely this type of inference on which, Newman 
demonstrates, faith is founded and which prefigures developments in Peirce’s 
abductive argument for the reality of God discussed in his article ‘A Neglected 
Argument for the Reality of God’ (1908). For Peirce the belief in God is a natural 
product of abduction, of the ‘rational instinct’ or educated guess of the scientist. He 
defends the appropriateness of making this sort of inference from playful musing 
speculation on such facts as the variety, interconnectedness, and beauty in the cosmos 
and, like Newman, he discards argumentative reason as a form of critical rather than 
creative power.49 For Newman, all significant believing, be it in science or religion, is 
deeply anchored in, and mediated through, implicit reason or imagination which is 
                                                     
48 J. H. Newman. “Sermon 13.” op. cit, 1909, p. 259. 
49 C. S. Peirce. “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.”  C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss Eds. 
Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce. Vol. VI. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1965.  
 119 
 
contrasted to pure intellect:  
Faith, then, though in all cases a reasonable process, is not necessarily 
founded on investigation, argument, or proof; these processes being but 
the explicit form which the reasoning takes in the case of particular 
minds.[...] Inquiry and argument may be employed, first, in ascertaining 
the divine origin of Religion, Natural and Revealed; next, in interpreting 
Scripture; and thirdly, in determining points of Faith and Morals; that 
is, in the Evidences, Biblical Exposition, and Dogmatic Theology. In all 
three departments there is, first of all, an exercise of implicit reason, 
which is in its degree common to all men.50 
When analysing the Gospel to ascertain its truth, Newman states, we should not try to 
read it as a scientific treatise looking for evidence, or Scripture proof of doctrine, but 
we have to engage actively and creatively with the text, via our implicit reason or 
imagination.  Such view is a clear legacy of the hermeneutic approach: 
It is hardly too much to say, that almost all reasons formally adduced in 
moral inquiries, are rather specimens and symbols of the real grounds, 
than those grounds themselves. They do but approximate to a 
representation of the general character of the proof which the writer 
wishes to convey to another's mind. They cannot, like mathematical 
proof, be passively followed with an attention confined to what is stated, 
and with the admission of nothing but what is urged. Rather, they are 
hints towards, and samples of, the true reasoning, and demand an active, 
ready, candid, and docile mind, which can throw itself into what is said, 
neglect verbal difficulties, and pursue and carry out principles. This is the 
true office of a writer, to excite and direct trains of thought; and this, on 
the other hand, is the too common practice of readers, to expect 
everything to be done for them,—to refuse to think,—to criticize the 
letter, instead of reaching forwards towards the sense,—and to account 
every argument as unsound which is illogically worded.51 
In other words, for Newman formal reasoning based on scientific deductive logic which 
is expressed in verbal language can only represent a partial reality, since to be able to 
account for natural logic we would need a different exercise of mind. According to 
Newman, echoing Coleridge’s thought, if we read words through a scientific lens, if 
we take them at face value as if they were fixed forms or tokens corresponding 
precisely to reality, we are unable to reach the depth of their true meaning. To be able 
to interpret the Gospel correctly, Newman notes, we should use another faculty, that of 
                                                     
50 Ibid., pp. 263-264. 
51 Ibid., p. 275. 
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implicit reason or biosemiotics imagination which is anchored in or draws upon an 
essentially poetic language which is in constant dialogue with or in relation to nature.  
This poetic language, I suggest, uses a different type of syllogism which is based on 
metaphor or on what in the second half of the twentieth century Gregory Bateson called 
‘syllogism in grass.’ As discussed in Chapter One, Bateson was a precursor of 
biosemiotics. Like Peirce and Newman, he relied on abduction, a term he used and 
borrowed directly from Peirce, as a valid form of real-world reasoning.52 In his book, 
Angels Fear (1987), Bateson examined the nature and origin of mankind’s sense of the 
sacred and he argued that intimations of the sacred, expressed in abductive inference 
in our religion are also found in forms of abduction in nature. Hence his statement that 
the religious sense arises from our recognition that we are part of nature, and that there 
is an underlying unity, a fundamental creative wholeness.  
In Angels Fear Bateson also argues that twentieth-century science discarded the 
importance of the sacred mainly because of the impossibility of defining what sacred 
is using the common methodological tools applied in different scientific fields. He 
introduces the difference in methodology by distinguishing what he calls truth of 
metaphors and truths of mathematicians. For Bateson, as previously observed, a 
metaphor is one of the most effective tools for representing and describing aspects of 
the world and it represents a primary aspect of communication. A ‘syllogism in grass’ 
or metaphor is for Bateson the dominant mode of communicating interconnections of 
ideas in pre-verbal realms whereas a ‘syllogism in Barbara’ a syllogism that 
mathematicians pursue is the type of inference based on verbal communication or, as 
Newman would argue, which is concerned with the comparison of propositions 
(statements) rather than propositions themselves.   
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Although Newman didn’t use the term ‘syllogism in grass’, he somewhat phrased 
this with his distinction between notional assent (syllogism in Barbara) and real or 
imaginative assent (syllogism in grass). Moreover, Newman identified an important 
concept, that of implicit reason, which he later called ‘illative sense’ and sometimes 
‘imagination’, as the basis of all reasoning and creativity and which is an important 
concept in today’s biosemiotics. Abduction, or Neman’s illative sense, becomes in 
biosemiotics the means by which human beings make links between their non-
conscious or tacit knowledge based on the interpretation of iconic, indexical and 
symbolic signs, and the possibility of new meanings. These non-conscious processes 
are based on natural forms of reasoning. 
Newman’s philosophical insights into natural forms of logic, are well described 
by Wilfrid Ward who noted that: 
Newman showed in these sermons that not formal logic but a man's 
spontaneous reasoning, which is largely 'implicit' or 'unconscious' of its 
own methods, is the process that does the important work in most of the 
practical convictions of this life. The subsequent attempt of the mind to 
analyse that process, to trace its steps in terms of formal logic and thus 
show their reliability, though not without value, fails to give anything 
like a complete account of it.53 
For Newman, spontaneous reasoning, which is largely based on non-conscious 
mode of reasoning, is at the centre of his argument for the common grammar between 
faith and reason. Both stem from the same kind of inferential processes which Newman 
tries to show, in his discussion of notional and real assent, are epistemologically 
legitimate. 
 
                                                     
53 W. Ward. The Last Lectures of Wilfrid Ward, Being the Lowell lectures 1914 and the third lecture 
delivered at the Royal Institution 1915 with an Introductory Study by Mrs. Wilfrid Ward. London: 
Longman, Green & Co., 1918, p. 78. 
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Notional (syllogism in Barbara) versus Real Assent (syllogism in grass) and 
Religious Certitude  
Newman’s elaboration of the difference between notional and real assent was 
the result of his preoccupation with the attainment of religious truth and his life-long 
quest to demonstrate the ‘reasonableness’ of religious thought. Between 1860 and 1865 
Newman was involved in deeply engaging correspondence with scientist and friend 
William Froude who challenged him to prove logically how mind is capable of arriving 
at certain conclusions without falling in to the trap of ‘doubts,’ or, as Newman put it, 
‘how can one believe what one doesn't understand and, can one believe what cannot be 
absolutely proved.’54 These questions were the ones he set out to answer in his Essay 
in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870).   
In his Oxford University Sermons Newman already indicated that no one can 
function under the logical purism which demanded that everything be doubted and then 
proven on a priori grounds.  If we assume that the assent of faith is impermissible until 
we have first successfully demonstrated it to be rationally adequate, we are, according 
to Newman, deeply mistaken. Having certitude, does not, as we have seen, result from 
strictly logical operations, by way of ‘syllogism in Barbara’, but it arises from another 
way of reasoning that reaches into areas beyond strictly logical operations. The way 
we can reach these areas is through what he termed ‘illative sense’ which is a concept 
Newman derived from his readings of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and the 
concept of ‘phronesis’.  
For Aristotle, phronesis is the virtue for guiding actions and it is a primarily an 
intellectual virtue or a perfection of thought which is likened to perception and 
judgement. Phronesis includes ‘nous’ or intuition/understanding, a virtue which is also 
                                                     
54  J. H. Newman. Preface to the second edition of An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Web. 12 
May 2012. 
 123 
 
part of what Aristotle calls ‘sophia’ or wisdom by which intellect is able to grasp 
indemonstrable truths.55 For Newman, the illative sense is a kind of faculty, or a power 
of discernment and judgement which is not linked to strict logical reasoning, and thus 
verbal language or to use Thomas Sebeok’s distinction of speech and language,56 but 
it represents that inward capacity of reasoning, or creative power of imagination on 
which assent is based and which outstrips language. In biosemiotic terms, this implies 
that it is through abduction, that non-conscious faculty whereby metaphoric links 
between signs generate new hypotheses that we are able to apprehend and give assent.  
A letter written in 1868 to his friend Henry Wilberforce on matters of religious belief 
is particularly revealing of Newman’s thought:  
I consider there is no such thing as a perfect logical demonstration; there 
is always a margin of objection even in Mathematics, except in the case 
of short proofs, as the propositions of Euclid. Yet on the other hand it is 
a paradox to say there is not such a state of mind as certitude. It is as 
well ascertained a state of mind, as doubt—to say that such a 
phenomenon in the human mind is a mere extravagance or weakness is 
a monstrous assertion which I cannot swallow. Of course there may be 
abuses and mistakes in particular cases of certitude, but that is another 
matter. It is a law of our nature, then, that we are certain on premises 
which do not reach demonstration. This seems to me undeniable. Then 
what is the faculty (since it is not the logical Dictum de omni et nullo) 
which enables us to be certain, to have the state of mind called certitude, 
though the syllogism before us is not according to the strict rules of 
Barbara? I think it is [phronesis] which tells when to discard the logical 
imperfection and to assent to the conclusion which ought to be drawn in 
order to demonstration but is not quite. No syllogism can prove to me 
that Nature is uniform.57 
                                                     
55 Quoted in J. Hochschild, op.cit., 2003, p. 337. 
56 It is worth recalling here that Thomas A. Sebeok distinguished between language and speech, where 
language is described following the Tartu-Moscow school, as a primary modelling system, as a capacity 
for producing and organizing world views which is common to all species. Sebeok called language 
natural language and it is to be understood as a pre-verbal faculty. Speech, on the other hand, is an 
adaptive derivation from natural language, specific to Homo Sapiens Sapiens and is used for 
communicative purposes. See S. Petrilli and A. Ponzio. Interpretive Routes through the Open Network 
of Signs. Toronto & London: University of Toronto Press, 2005. 
57 J. H. Newman. The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, Vol. XXIV, A Grammar of Assent, 
January 1868-1869. Ed. at the Birmingham Oratory by Charles Stephen Dessain. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973, p. 104. 
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The premises which Newman suggests in this letter are in fact those premises granted 
by the illative sense, or implicit reason which as he states is a law of our nature. What 
he means by law of our nature should not be understood in terms of always reliable 
repeatable scientific laws, but I suggest it should be read in the light of the Romantic 
philosophical tradition of Schelling, Hegel and later Coleridge, for whom nature’s 
reality only emerges with the active participation of human mind which is inherent in 
nature’s creative order. It is through Coleridge’s imagination, or Newman’s illative 
sense or biosemiotic natural forms of reasoning that we can tap into those non-
conscious aspects of knowledge on which, according to Newman, certitude in relation 
to faith originates.  
A similar consideration was made by J. Coulson in Religion and Imagination: 
In Aid of a Grammar of Assent where he highlights the fact that for Newman religious 
belief originates from imagination.58 What we hold in faith, Coulson states, is most 
frequently expressed in metaphor, symbol and story, and as such, prior to and as a 
condition of its verification requires an imaginative assent comparable to that we give 
to poems or novels. This is not to assert that belief and the practice of Christian religion 
is some kind of aesthetic activity, but it is to suggest or is an attempt to disclose the 
similarity between the way in which human beings respond to literature and the way 
in which they come to faith; the response to revelation and the response to faith it could 
be said share a common grammar.  
Coulson’s view here echoes Bateson’s, although their arguments are nested in 
two different domains. For instance, Coulson examines it from the standpoint of a 
Christian believer and in the wake of the humanistic tradition where the hermeneutics 
of literature and religion almost overlap. Bateson, on the other hand, discusses the 
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importance specifically in his Angels Fear (1987), from a standpoint of a philosopher 
concerned with explaining natural phenomena in the living world based on 
cybernetics. As I pointed out in Chapter One, for Bateson, as much as for Peirce, the 
living world is organised by minds, where mind is not narrowly identified as human 
mind, but as process relationship. For Bateson ‘the living world is a single 
intermeshing hierarchy of process relationships that are mental in kind: comparable to 
thought’59 where the mental activity he stresses is the activity involved in receiving 
and responding to information in gaining and using knowledge. The bulk of knowing 
is for Bateson, as much as we have seen for Newman, non-conscious knowledge; 
however, for Bateson this non-conscious knowledge is shared by organisms and living 
systems throughout the living world, with human beings being a part of it and not 
detached from it. Although Bateson does not define mind or mental processes as a 
function of semiosis as Peirce does, his ideas about the nature of mind run parallel. 
Importantly, they were both of the persuasion, much like Newman, that religious 
feelings are ingrained in the workings of the human mind through abduction and they 
both believed in the mind as an instantiation of a broader pattern that connects nature 
and culture.   
Fundamental to Peirce’s law of mind, as already mentioned, is the premise that 
the study of sign actions ‘offers an account of how the mind functions, develops and 
decays’ within a semiotic web.60 And it was precisely the way that mind functions in 
relation to holding religious truth and certitude that Newman set out to investigate in 
his Grammar of Assent where he drew a distinction between two modes of a particular 
operation of the mind that he called ‘assent.’ In his first chapter Newman describes the 
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60 D. Eicher-Catt. “Bateson, Peirce and the Signs of the Sacred.”  A Legacy of the Living Systems, 
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type of propositions we usually hold and from which assents derives. He distinguishes 
between three types of propositions: 1) categorical 2) conditional and 3) interrogative 
each of which has three corresponding acts of assent, inference and doubt. Newman is 
concerned only with assent and inference since, as he wrote in a letter to Aubrey de 
Vere soon after the publication of his Grammar, he excludes doubts: ‘because they are 
doubts; I don't see the need of excluding objections. The mind is very likely to be 
carried away to doubt without a basis of objections sufficient in the judgment of the 
[phronesis] to justify it. The imagination, not the reason, is appealed to.’61 In other 
words, Newman is interested in investigating those processes of mind which run 
unconsciously, and since doubt is a form of conscious reasoning he is less interested 
in looking into its workings since conscious reasoning has been dealt with in writings 
of logic.  
Newman continues by explaining that before we can assent to any proposition 
we should apprehend it; in other words apprehension, which doesn’t mean 
understanding, is ‘simply an acceptance of an idea or of the fact which a proposition 
enunciates’, and is a pre-condition for assent. He defines apprehension as ‘our 
imposition of a sense on the terms of which they are composed.’62 If these terms are 
‘common nouns, as standing for what is abstract, general, and non-existing,’63 then we 
are looking at a notional proposition; whereas if the terms are ‘composed of singular 
nouns, and of which the terms stand for things external to us, unit and individual,’64 
we are in the presence of a real proposition. The former involves notional 
apprehension, whereas the latter involves real apprehension. In other words, an 
apprehension is real if it is about a certain concrete thing, whether it exists or not and 
                                                     
61 Quoted in W. Ward. The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman; Based on his Private Journals and 
Correspondence. Vol. 2, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912, p. 253. 
62 J. H. Newman, op.cit., 1903, p. 9. 
63 Ibid., p. 9. 
64 Ibid., p. 10. 
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is expressed in language through singular nouns; it is notional if it bears upon an 
abstract thing and is expressed in language as common nouns, hence the possibility of 
generalization. Real assent, based on real apprehension, always rests upon a particular 
experience of a thinking subject, such as a perception and is therefore, according to 
Newman, stronger although assent would not admit of any degrees. Most importantly, 
Newman suggests that assent is unconditional, therefore does not need any proof since 
it is instinctive or spontaneous. Notional assent, on the contrary, bearing a relation to 
abstract and general entities, is less vivid, and hence weaker in the mind. Newman 
believed that notional assent could resemble inference due to the fact that it is based 
on notional apprehension and contrary to real assent, is conditional or based on 
evidence: 
Notional Assent seems like Inference, because the apprehension which 
accompanies acts of Inference is notional also,—because Inference is 
engaged for the most part on notional propositions, both premise and 
conclusion.65 
Newman admits that both assent and inference can be based on notional and real 
apprehension however the purest form of assent is based on real apprehension, whereas 
the purest form of inference is based on notional apprehension. What this means is that 
real assent is dependent upon imagination, (syllogism in grass), whereas notional is 
based on logical inference either of deduction or induction (syllogism in Barbara). 
Newman distinguishes five kinds of notional assents: 1. professions, where you 
assent to something which you do not fully understand; 2. credences, or assents gained 
by implicit reason; 3. opinion, which is explicit assent to a proposition we held 
implicitly; 4. presumption, an assent given to first principles underlying our reasoning 
and 5. speculations, the conscious acceptances of propositions explicitly held true. His 
purpose in drawing this distinction was not intended to highlight the difference 
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between two kinds of assent, but two modes of a single operation of the mind. 
Newman's purpose was to show how it is that the mind is able to have certainty about 
the truths of religion even when there is no obvious theological inference leading to 
the certainty of notional assent associated with some. In the chapter entitled 
‘Apprehension and Assent in the Matter of Religion’ Newman addresses the issue of 
dogma and he defines it as a proposition which 
Stands for a notion or for a thing; and to believe it is to give the assent 
of the mind to it, as it stands for the one or for the other. To give a real 
assent to it is an act of religion; to give a notional, is a theological act. It 
is discerned, rested in, and appropriated as a reality, by the religious 
imagination; it is held as a truth, by the theological intellect.66 
 
Newman sees that there is no real demarcation between the religious and theological 
assent since man commonly has both intellect and imagination, but what it is important 
to note is the fact that although knowledge derives from sense perception, and similarly 
a Christian would get his doctrine through abstraction and inference (intellect), belief 
stems from conscience. In other words, to give a real assent is an act of religion; to 
give a notional is a theological act. It is discerned, rested in, appropriated as a reality, 
by the religious imagination; it is held as a truth, by the theological intellect. Newman’s 
view is not dissimilar to Saint Thomas Aquinas with whom he was familiar even before 
his conversion and who was at the heart of scholastic theology of the Roman Catholic 
Church. In the Summa Theologica, specifically in the section on the discussion of 
whether sacred doctrine should be held as argument, Aquinas held that similarly to 
other sciences, theology starts from its first principles and from them argues to prove 
something else.  
As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue 
from their principles to demonstrate other truths, in these sciences; so 
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this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the 
articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else.67 
 
The first principles Aquinas refers to are held as true, though they cannot be 
proved as true by theology or reason; they are, rather, the fundamental articles of faith, 
the precepts of revealed religion. The first principle Newman refers to instead is 
conscience, since it is through conscience that we perceive God. The instinct of the 
mind which recognizes God is for Newman the same as the instinct other living 
organisms have thus implicitly saying that there is a sort of continuity between the 
natural and cultural world. This, shows Newman’s proto-biosemiotic view of nature 
and living organisms and the continuity with the cultural world. 
And let me here refer again to the fact, to which I have already drawn 
attention, that this instinct of the mind recognizing an external Master 
in the dictate of conscience, and imaging the thought of Him in the 
definite impressions which conscience creates, is parallel to that other 
law of, not only human, but of brute nature, by which the presence of 
unseen individual beings is discerned under the shifting shapes and 
colours of the visible world. Is it by sense, or by reason, that brutes 
understand the real unities, material and spiritual, which are signified by 
the lights and shadows, the brilliant ever-changing caleidoscope, as it 
may be called, which plays upon their retina? Not by reason, for they 
have not reason; not by sense, because they are transcending sense; 
therefore it is an instinct.68 
 
Newman’s attempt to illustrate mind process which human beings entertain in order to 
arrive at the doctrine for the belief in God rested upon the real assent which Newman 
also called imaginative assent.  
I have wished to trace the process by which the mind arrives, not only at 
a notional, but at an imaginative or real assent to the doctrine that there is 
One God, that is, an assent made with an apprehension, not only of what 
the words of the proposition mean, but of the object denoted by them. 
Without a proposition or thesis there can be no assent, no belief, at all; 
any more than there can be an inference without a conclusion. The 
proposition that there is One Personal and Present God may be held in 
either way; either as a theological truth, or as a religious fact or reality. 
The notion and the reality assented-to are represented by one and the same 
proposition, but serve as distinct interpretations of it. When the 
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proposition is apprehended for the purposes of proof, analysis, 
comparison, and the like intellectual exercises, it is used as the expression 
of a notion; when for the purposes of devotion, it is the image of a reality. 
Theology, properly and directly, deals with notional apprehension; 
religion with imaginative.69 
 
Coulson noted that the original distinction Newman made was between notional and 
imaginative assent and that he had changed it to ‘real assent’ in the course of preparing 
his manuscript, seemingly because of the danger of being misunderstood.70 Even so, 
there are still many parts in his Grammar of Assent where he uses the term ‘imaginative 
assent’ as an interchangeable term with ‘real assent’ thus emphasising the importance 
of implicit reasoning. With the distinction between apprehension and assent and 
between real or imaginative and notional assent Newman wanted to show that not only 
in religious matters, but in matters of everyday life people assent, or agree on 
propositions which they don’t specifically understand.  
 
Assent, Inference and the Illative Sense 
Newman’s distinction between assent and inference is best understood through 
his critique of Locke’s celebrated doctrine of degrees of assent which he explains in 
chapter six. He takes into consideration Locke’s idea on probabilities which holds that 
there are associated with each proposition, degrees of probability which are the 
measure of our assent, or confidence towards a proposition. On the basis of this 
principle, Locke formulates his simple rule about the ethics of belief: the degree of our 
assent to a proposition ought to be proportioned to the strength of the evidence for that 
proposition. Newman challenges both of Locke’s views - that that assent has degrees, 
and that it should be proportionate to the strength of our evidence. Against these he 
remarks that we may continue to assent to a proposition when we have forgotten the 
evidence for it, and that sometimes we have excellent grounds for a proposition, based 
                                                     
69 Ibid., p. 120. 
70 J. Coulson, op.cit., 1981, p. 60. 
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on good arguments, although we do not assent to it. Newman is concerned to show 
that reasoning in concrete matters never rises above probability, and consequently 
conditional assent varies in degree according to the strength of probability. On the 
contrary, unconditional assent merely satisfies logically necessary conclusions. What 
this means in practice is that there are many truths in concrete matters which no one 
can demonstrate, but all unconditionally accept, which is something even Locke 
admits despite his view of mind: 
The authors to whom I refer wish to maintain that there are degrees of 
assent, and that, as the reasons for a proposition are strong or weak, so 
is the assent. It follows from this that absolute assent has no legitimate 
exercise, except as ratifying acts of intuition or demonstration. What is 
thus brought home to us is indeed to be accepted unconditionally; but, 
as to reasonings in concrete matters, they are never more than 
probabilities, and the probability in each conclusion which we draw is 
the measure of our assent to that conclusion. Thus assent becomes a sort 
of necessary shadow, following upon inference, which is the substance; 
and is never without some alloy of doubt, because inference in the 
concrete never reaches more than probability.71 
Newman distinguishes between two types of assent, a simple one which is 
unconscious, and a complex or reflex one, which is conscious and deliberate. He also 
distinguishes between inquiry and investigation by stating that inquiry is inconsistent 
with assent, since an inquiry presupposes a doubt and we cannot doubt something we 
hold as true. Those who assent to a doctrine, Newman holds, may investigate its 
consistency, but they could never inquire about its truth: 
I have been speaking of investigation, not of inquiry; it is quite true that 
inquiry is inconsistent with assent, but inquiry is something more than 
the mere exercise of inference. He who inquires has not found; he is in 
doubt where the truth lies, and wishes his present profession either 
proved or disproved. We cannot without absurdity call ourselves at once 
believers and inquirers also. [...] Inquiry implies doubt, and that 
investigation does not imply it, and that those who assent to a doctrine 
or fact may without inconsistency investigate its credibility, though they 
cannot literally inquire about its truth.72 
                                                     
71 J. H. Newman, op.cit., 1871, p. 159. 
72 Ibid., p. 192. 
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As Newman stated many times, we can hold things as being true without 
having any explicit proof of their truthfulness. Such convictions, as in the case of 
Christian belief, may be seen as irrational, although the arguments supporting them are 
implicit and unstated. The question here arises how we can find certitude. Newman 
believes that certitude is only a ‘relation of the mind to the given propositions’73 and 
that mind may find certitude in conclusions from probable arguments which 
accumulate to reinforce one another. Newman shows that in obvious instances the 
minds of all men do reason and conclude with invincible confidence, even coming to 
a common conclusion and yet they cannot tell why they hold such certitude which is a 
case in point to show that they rely on their subconscious reasons, quite apart from all 
explicit logical justification of them. So, he concludes, certitude is based on 
imagination or illative sense as a power of instinctive and spontaneous reasoning and 
is the basis for unconditional assent. How about inference then? As noted before, 
Newman held that inference is the conditional acceptance of a proposition, where its 
object is truth-like or verisimilitude as opposed to assent’s object which is truth. He 
distinguishes between formal, informal and natural inference as three types of 
reasoning. He defines reasoning as an instinctive and spontaneous act of apprehending 
the antecedent and then the consequent without any explicit recognition of the 
connecting medium. In such cases, reasoning presents itself as a process; however, 
men are usually ignorant of such process and they concentrate only on the act of 
reasoning which is expressed through formal inference, that is, logic. Newman states 
that the first step in inferential method is 
to throw the question to be decided into the form of a proposition; then 
to throw the proof itself into propositions, the force of the proof lying in 
the comparison of these propositions with each other. When the analysis 
                                                     
73 Ibid., p. 228. 
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is carried out fully and put into form, it becomes the Aristotelic 
syllogism.74 
Newman finds that formal inference is concerned with the comparison of 
propositions, rather than proposition itself, as well as with the relation between their 
premises and conclusion. The perfection of logical reasoning consists in the fact that 
it relies on language, or rather words which have been stripped of their concrete 
meanings in order to make them comply with the notional and abstract.  
Logic then does not really prove; it enables us to join issue with others; 
it suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the lines of thought; 
it verifies negatively; it determines when differences of opinion are 
hopeless; and when and how far conclusions are probable; but for 
genuine proof in concrete matter we require an organon more delicate, 
versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation. 75 
Yet, as we have seen, notional propositions cannot produce proof in concrete matters 
as they are reliant on first principles. Since logic cannot prove the first principles it 
assumes, it becomes for Newman loose at both ends: ‘both the point from which the 
proof should start, and the points at which it should arrive, are beyond its reach; it 
comes short both of first principles and of concrete issues.’76 Newman concedes that 
the language of logic has its advantages in the pursuit of knowledge, but human 
thought is too personal to ‘admit the trammels of any language.’77  
If formal logic is inadequate to account for belief, so he finds, is informal logic 
which is akin to calculus and is based on the sum of multiple probabilities. He proposes 
natural reasoning which does not proceed from ‘propositions to propositions, but from 
things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes.’78 What natural 
reasoning does is to allow for a holistic perspective on life, it gives rise to what Bateson 
conceived as the pattern that connects nature and culture and what Peirce identified as 
                                                     
74 Ibid., p. 264. 
75 Ibid., p. 271. 
76 Ibid., p. 284. 
77 Ibid., p. 288. 
78 Ibid., p. 332. 
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semiosis or Coulson identified as imagination understood in Coleridgean terms. It is 
worth recalling here that Newman compares natural reasoning to true poetry and 
although in some people it may be biased, Newman insists that there is a method in it, 
even though implicit. And this implicit method which gives us certitude is what he 
calls illative sense. 
It is the mind that reasons, and that controls its own reasonings, not any 
technical apparatus of words and propositions. This power of judging 
and concluding, when in its perfection, I call the Illative Sense.79 
For Newman it is through the cultivation of the illative sense that we determine 
any investigation, without any words or any analysis. He applies this thinking to the 
realms of natural and revealed religion and demonstrates that faith is in fact reasoning 
faith.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter I argued that Newman’s postulation of the illative sense as the 
grounding principle on which both faith and science are based set him aside from his 
contemporaries. His argument that illative sense, or what I argued is biosemiotic 
imagination, is a kind of inferential process based on natural forms of reasoning which 
are non-conscious prefigures important developments in biosemiotics. In particular, 
his argument shares important similarities with Bateson’s view that intimations of the 
sacred, expressed in abductive inference that is syllogism in grass, in our religion are 
also found in forms of abduction in nature. Although, as I showed, Newman didn’t 
explicitly state that these forms of abductive logic are shared by humans and other 
organisms, he implicitly acknowledged this through  his equation of the instinct of the 
mind necessary for the recognition of God with the instinct other organisms possess. 
                                                     
79 Ibid., p. 354. 
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This instinct, I argued, is to be understood in relation to his broader view of natural 
forms of reasoning, or logic.  
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CHAPTER 4  
George Eliot and the ‘Semiotic’ Web: the Role of Imagination 
and Sympathy as the Underlying Aspects of Biosemiotic 
Realism 
Signs are small measurable things, but interpretations are 
illimitable. (Middlemarch, p.25) 
Nature has her language, and she is not unveracious; but we don't know all the 
intricacies of her syntax just yet, and in a hasty reading we may happen to extract the 
very opposite of her real meaning. (Adam Bede, p.178) 
Surely, surely the only one true knowledge of our fellow man is that which enables 
us to feel with him. (Scenes from Clerical Life, p.322) 
 
This chapter explores George Eliot’s philosophical reflections on epistemology. It 
focuses on discussing how her belief in the correspondence between nature’s creativity 
and human creativity in art and science is based on aesthetic imagination understood 
as a kind of inferential logic akin to abduction. This view, which stemmed from her 
adherence to the organicist understanding of nature proposed by Naturphilosophie, led 
her to see and understand human experience of reality as relational, or rather as a web 
of organic and social relations. Contrary to the great emphasis given in most critical 
studies to Eliot’s attachment to an empirical and positivist1 model of science which 
                                                     
1Although Eliot’s partial reading of Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive (1840) and the subsequent 
many references to his work in her early critical essays such as ‘The Progress of Intellect’ (1851) or in 
‘The Natural History of German Life’ (1856) have been highly documented, the extent to which she 
adhered to his Positivist philosophy or how much she was indebted to his thought is still under much 
scholarly debate. David Carroll, with whom I find myself in agreement, highlights the fact that although 
Eliot identified herself with a group of closely-linked thinkers who were all trying to create synthetic 
philosophies based on methods of physical science, she ultimately dissociates from such philosophies 
which turn theories into orthodoxies because she believes in the natural provision of any system. Avrom 
Fleishmann also points out that Eliot’s views diverged significantly from those of Comte and he argues 
that it would be forceful to claim she was a positivist. For the various debates and positions on Eliot’s 
adherence to Positivism see, David Carroll, George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations: A Reading 
of the Novels. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 15-21; Avrom Fleishman. George 
Eliot’s Intellectual Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; George Levine: “In Defence 
of Positivism.” Realism, Ethics and Secularisation. Essays on Victorian Literature and Science. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 136-164; T. R. Wright. “George Eliot and 
Positivism: a Reassessment.” Modern Language Review. Vol. 76 (1981): 257-27 and Martha S. Vogeler. 
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followed an ideal of objectivity and where the novelist and scientist alike were 
believed to record a pre-given world,2 Eliot was aware, as a post-Kantian, that 
knowledge was not an unmediated perception of things. Instead it stemmed, at least in 
her view, from the relational structures between the self/ mind and its surroundings, 
or, as she and Lewes both stated, between the ‘organism’ and its ‘medium’. This, I 
shall argue, is a proto-biosemiotic conception. Eliot’s view of human knowing is 
essentially semiotic and the relational structures she describes are, in biosemiotic 
terms, very close to those described by crypto-biosemiotician Jakob von Uexküll in 
terms of the relation between Umwelt and Innenwelt. Thus, I suggest Eliot’s realism is 
a biosemiotic realism. In other words, and to distinguish it from other materialist and 
nominalist conceptions, biosemiotic realism is based on the notion that reality as 
apprehended through the evolutionary sign relations, is supra-subjective, and as such 
is not dependent on the materiality or immateriality of its object.3 
 George Eliot was deeply immersed in the scientific, religious and philosophical 
debates of her time. She was particularly concerned with epistemological questions 
about the relationship between human knowledge and mind and consequently between 
language and the act of interpretation. She was acutely aware, as David Carroll puts it, 
‘of the crisis of interpretation which the Victorians were experiencing.’4 This was not 
only attributable, as discussed in chapter two, to the evolving nature of scientific 
thought with its discovery, through the systematic examination of nature, of ever more 
complex organic structures, but also to the historical criticism of the Bible which cast 
doubts on the reality of God and the interpretation of the Bible as a source of moral 
                                                     
“George Eliot and the Positivists.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction Vol. 35 n. 3. Spec. issue on George Eliot 
(1980): 406-431. 
2 S. Shuttleworth. George Eliot and Nineteenth Century Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984. 
3 J. Deely, op. cit, 2009.  
4 D. Carroll. op. cit., 2006, p.3. 
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authority.5 Both these developments contributed to the weakening of traditional forms 
of interpretation, and to the urgent need to re-create meaning and coherence on a firmer 
basis. This prompted Eliot, as Carroll suggests, to seek to ‘widen the terms of 
reference’6 in order to accommodate the whole spectrum of human existence and 
human faculties such as mind, emotion, faith, and moral awareness, and also to 
propose her own model of the way we make sense of the world we inhabit.  This in 
turn led, as Suzy Anger comments, ‘to the establishment of her broader views on 
knowledge, language and morals.’7 These views were embedded in her philosophical 
reflections on epistemology and ethics where one of Eliot’s central questions was the 
persistent problem of knowing the world and other minds which found expression in 
her novels, letters, poems and essays.  
Attending closely to the various threads that come together in Eliot’s views on 
knowledge, mind and language, this chapter will firstly look at her poem ‘I grant you 
Ample Leave’ where the complexity and range of Eliot’s thought and reflections on 
epistemology are well expressed and where her proto-biosemiotic view on realism is 
evident. Looking at the way in which human knowing could be understood as a 
semiotic relation, the chapter will consider the role aesthetic imagination, understood 
as an inferential tool that subtends growth and learning, plays in any act of creative 
discovery, be it in science or art. In this respect I will argue that the aesthetic 
imagination envisaged by Eliot is akin to Peirce’s logical category of abduction and, 
by inference, to the evolutionary biosemiotic view of semiotic scaffolding, whereby 
evolutionary development lays down the organic layers of meaning.8 Emphasising 
                                                     
5 It is significant to note that Eliot’s first major non fictional writings were translations of German works, 
for instance David Strauss’ Life of Jesus (1846) and Ludwig Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity (1854) 
which explored radically new ways of interpreting theological texts. 
6 D. Carroll, op. cit., 2006, p. 5. 
7 S. Anger, op. cit., 2005, p. 104. 
8 J. Hoffmeyer, op. cit., 2014. 
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metaphor, as a source of creativity and world disclosure, I will go on to explain how 
this is active in Middlemarch. I will argue that, as semiotic relations, metaphors are at 
the basis of Middlemarch’s characters interpretation and understanding of their own 
reality or Umwelt which is nested through recursive feedback loops into a wider web 
of semiotic relations which form Middlemarch. Finally, I will consider the role that 
sympathy, which is equally grounded in abductive logic, plays in Eliot’s postulation 
of an ethical life. 
Ways of knowing: towards biosemiotic realism 
One of the clearest reflections upon the issues that most preoccupied Eliot and 
that also reflects wider Victorian concerns in relation to what counts as a foundation 
of knowledge, perception and language is to be found in a considerably short, only 21-
lines long and, until 2005, unpublished poem Eliot wrote probably before or during 
April 1874 entitled ‘I Grant you Ample Leave.’9 The poem, which I here quote in its 
entirety, and which is going to function in this chapter as a sort of ‘Ariadne’s thread’, 
ponders on those issues which were to become the kernel of Eliot’s endeavour as a 
novelist and critic, namely the unravelling of the relation between mind, perception, 
language and observed reality, and consequently between self and other: 
I grant you ample leave 
To use the hoary formula 'I am' 
Naming the emptiness where thought is not; 
But fill the void with definition, 'I' 
Will be no more a datum than the words   5 
You link false inference with, the 'Since' & 'so' 
That, true or not, make up the atom-whirl. 
                                                     
9 This poem first appeared in Bernard J. Paris. “George Eliot’s Unpublished Poetry.” Studies in 
Philology. n. 56 (1959): 539-58. However, the copy I present and discuss here is from G. Eliot. The 
Complete Shorter Poetry of George Eliot. Ed. Antoine Gerard van Den Broek. Vol.2, London: Pickering 
& Chatto, 2005, p. 119. 
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Resolve your 'Ego', it is all one web 
With vibrant ether clotted into worlds:    
Your subject, self, or self-assertive 'I'    10 
Turns nought but object, melts to molecules, 
Is stripped from naked Being with the rest 
Of those rag-garments named the Universe. 
Or if, in strife to keep your 'Ego' strong 
You make it weaver of the etherial light,   15 
Space, motion, solids & the dream of Time — 
Why, still 'tis Being looking from the dark, 
The core, the centre of your consciousness, 
That notes your bubble-world: sense, pleasure, pain, 
What are they but a shifting otherness,   20 
Phantasmal flux of moments? — 
Right from the outset Eliot ironically concedes that there may be different ways 
of understanding the nature of consciousness or as she defines it, ‘the emptiness where 
thought is not.’ However, she believes that to try and define it by using what she terms 
‘the hoary formula’ (line 2) or rather, scientific language, would only mean to equate 
consciousness with a datum. As noted in Chapters One and Two Eliot, in line with the 
German Romantic conception, thought of language in evolutionary terms as an 
evolving organism or rather a process that constantly changes. She therefore found the 
concept of a mathematical precision in language untenable and consequently 
inadequate to describe consciousness, which she saw as a process as well. She points 
out that where words such as ‘Since’ & ‘so’ refer to logical inferences are traditionally  
used in scientific methodology in order to apprehend the physical world, they are, 
according to Eliot, ‘false inferences’. This is because she believed that the ideal of 
science as detached and impersonal knowledge was unattainable due to the selective 
character of the inquirer. What she meant is that inquiry can never eliminate the 
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personal or subjective element of knowledge and she felt that the logic of science is 
derivative, being a consequence rather than a starting point. As will be discussed in the 
next section, Eliot believed that true knowledge doesn’t stem from inductive or 
deductive logic, which encourage linear hypothesis building, rather, and anticipating 
both Peirce and Bateson, she found that imagination (Peirce’s abduction) is at the basis 
of any inquiry that leads to a more encompassing understanding of the world and 
consequently of the self. 
She therefore urges her listener in line 8 to ‘resolve your Ego’ or rather, to 
change the conscious-thinking subject in order to understand the ‘one web’ of relations 
which are bathed into the ether (the substance believed to be the medium through which 
light moved) and that produce a plurality of worlds. As Hannah Brooks Motl points 
out, it is significant to note here that Eliot uses the plural noun ‘worlds’ rather than 
singular noun ‘world’. This highlights her awareness that subjectivity depends on a 
limited set of sense perceptions – one and the same occurring in the environment gives 
rise to different interpretations, as we shall see in Middlemarch – hence the plurality of 
worlds, which are all part of a wider web of semiotic and social relations.10   
Eliot developed this view in relation to the thought of G. H. Lewes. As Peter 
Garratt argues, Eliot and Lewes were among those Victorian intellectuals who were 
aware that knowledge of the external world was not apprehended through senses 
understood as an objective reflection of what was ‘out there’, to use George Levine’s 
term.11 On the contrary, Garratt suggests that their view was based on the sort of 
empiricism, understood as a theory of mind, which put the notion of subjectivity as its 
                                                     
10 H. Brooks-Motl. I Grant you Ample Leave: A poet’s poem from a novelist-poet. March 2012. Web. 
February 2013. 
11 G. Levine. “George Eliot’s Hypothesis of Reality.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction. Vol. 35 n. 1 June 
(1980): 1-28. 
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main tenet.12 He insists that because the central issue in the tradition of British 
empiricism, understood as a theory of mind, was placed on the perceiving self, the 
outlook that followed was that truth about the world was relative. In other words, he 
argues that the inescapability of the perceiving subject in constructing reality meant 
that the relation between the knower and the known, or between the observer and 
observed, was unstable. Rather than envisioning a way of knowing that could 
‘neutralize the contingencies of spectatorship’13 by adjusting perception using 
scientific tools such as microscopes, an image both Eliot and Lewes used in their 
writings, they realised that knowledge sprang from the relation between perceiving self 
and sense experience. Eliot, as much as Lewes, believed in the self as a product of a 
set of relations based on the interaction between self and its surroundings, or as they 
put it in biological terms, between ‘organism’ and its ‘medium’ or in biosemiotic terms, 
between Innenwelt and Umwelt where each is shaped by the other and where they are 
part of a more intricate web of experiences and relations which constitute reality. In 
fact, in the poem Eliot observes that to gain an accurate understanding of the observed 
world, one needs to turn the ‘subject, self or self-assertive I’ into an ‘object’ and to let 
it ‘melt to molecules’. So, she implicitly argues for a unity between the subject and 
object, self and other, and she recognizes that much of what we think of as the 
‘Universe’ is simply named, or as she says, reality is covered in ‘the rag-garments’ 
possibly of language where language becomes, in biosemiotic terms, a way of 
modelling the world in human cognition.  
                                                     
12 It is important to highlight that Garratt’s argument is based on empiricism as a theory of mind, rather 
than scientific methodology, and he suggests that Victorians were not dominated by an unshakeable 
faith in the knowing mind’s capacity to dominate the material world, but rather that they had to think 
through the consequence of an empirical philosophy which put problems of perception at the heart of 
its debates. In P. Garratt. Victorian Empiricism: Self, Knowledge and Reality in Ruskin, Bain, Lewes, 
Spencer and George Eliot. Madison: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2010. 
13 Ibid., p. 18. 
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In Chapter One I discussed the biosemiotic modelling of reality described by von 
Uexküll, Deely and Sebeok and I argued that the experiential worlds of all living 
organisms, human animals included, is based on their ability to receive and interpret 
signs and thus create semiotically and evolutionarily successful models of reality. 
Signs, as I argued, are not material things, or rather, are not anything that we may 
either point or see as such, but are suprasubjective relations which are meaningful 
regardless of whether what is signified is material or imagined. By positing sign 
relations, rather than physical objects and ideas as the means of apprehending the 
world and by recognizing that human embeddedness in nature does not amount to a 
one to one relation of human perception and the world, biosemiotics realism breaks 
with both a materialist and nominalist conception of reality.  
This type of realism is seen, for instance, in Middlemarch where characters not 
only ‘conjure up internal models of outer reality’14 via their ability to receive and 
interpret signs according to their specific Innenwelts, which form the foundation for a 
relation to the semiotic objective world that is their Umwelt, but characters are also 
seen as ‘a cluster of signs’ (Middlemarch, p.142)15 to be interpreted or misinterpreted 
by others in a ceaseless semiotic loop which is at the basis of the novel’s structure. In 
this way characters are represented as both: an active centre of the semiotic web and 
at the same time they are part of their environment as semiotic subjects. We see an 
indication of this, for instance, in the way the narrator describes the characters’ 
different opinions about the medical profession. Seen as a semiotic object, the medical 
profession represents for Tertius Lydgate, the young and progressive doctor, ‘the 
grandest profession in the world’ (Middlemarch, p.144) and ‘the most perfect 
interchange between science and art, offering the most direct alliance between 
                                                     
14 J. Hoffmeyer, op. cit., 2008, p. 174. 
15 G. Eliot. Middlemarch. Ed. and introduction notes by Rosemary Ashton. London: Penguin Books, 
1994. Quotations from this edition will be given in brackets directly in the text. 
 144 
 
intellectual conquest and the social good’ (Middlemarch, p.145), whereas for 
Rosamond, his young spouse, it represents rather the opposite as she finds it ‘not a nice 
profession’ (Middlemarch, p.458). The juxtaposition of these views points to the 
difference in Lydgate’s and Rosamond’s inherent nature or Innenwelts. Where, for 
instance, he is a mixture of the characteristics needed for his profession, as he is moved 
by intellect (science) and imagination (art) and is an altruist, Rosamond is quite the 
opposite. She is self-centered and an egotist who has little inner vision and is therefore 
less concerned with the moral and intellectual aspect of life in general, and the 
profession in particular, and more with outward appearances and material aspects, in 
this case with the lifestyle this profession could provide. Their different Innenwelts, 
therefore, give rise to and sustain their Umwelts and each Umwelt in turn gives rise to 
an indefinite number of possibilities for both communication and misunderstanding. 
In fact, while Lydgate behaves according to his own Innenwelt and therefore his 
understanding of the profession, each of his initiatives - the New Hospital and the 
Chaplaincy, the non-dispensing of drugs or his advanced practices – and consequently 
his behavior get progressively misinterpreted by other characters who are keen to see 
how Lydgate ‘might be wrought into their purposes, contented with very vague 
knowledge as to the way in which life had been shaping him for that instrumentality’ 
(Middlemarch, pp.152-153).  
In describing the web of relations that form Middlemarch, Eliot was aware that it 
was the correlation between self (organism) and its surroundings (medium), or in 
biosemiotics terms  Innenwelt and Umwelt, that constitutes the way in which one 
models one’s experiential world or what she calls in the poem ‘bubble world.’16 Unlike 
                                                     
16J. Deely, op.cit., 2000, p. 19. It is worth recalling here that Von Uexküll also compared each Umwelt 
to a bubble world within which each species live. Von Uexküll, however, believes that Umwelt, or the 
bubble world is invisible to an organism precisely because it consists of relations, whereas Deely argues 
that the bubble world is not invisible, because human beings are able to discern between relations and 
related thing. 
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Sebeok and other twentieth-century semioticians, however, she didn’t distinguish 
between language and speech, even though she was aware that language helped in 
modelling and in her case also communicating the world perceived.  
Eliot’s view of language as a distinctive feature which separates humans from 
animals and her consequent belief in the correspondence between the organic and the 
cultural world was elaborated in relation to Lewes’s theory of the psychological 
workings of language which, in line with the evolutionary model proposed by Darwin, 
was presented in volume III of Problems of Life and Mind. Following Comte’s 
threefold distinction between the ‘Logic of Feeling’, progressing into the ‘Logic of 
Image’s’ and ending with the ‘Logic of Signs’,17 Lewes explains that the term logic is 
employed as meaning an organic psychological process, either of judgement or 
reasoning and as such involves:  
that which is common to Reasoning and to all other modes of 
combination belonging to mental states. This common process is Co-
ordination, or Grouping of neural elements. (PLM, Vol. III, p.224) 
According to Lewes, each act of judgement or reasoning goes through three stages, the 
first of which entails Animal Logic. This stage is based on feeling and is ‘never critical, 
but always intuitive’ (PLM, vol. III, p.228). Under this category he groups ‘those 
mental processes in which the elements of the judgement of the act are of sensation, 
perceptions, images, appetites, instincts, or emotions’ (PLM, vol. III, p.238). In other 
words, the logic of feeling is the immediate sensory experience of the world. In order 
for this intuitive experience, which represents primitive mental states or the organism’s 
sensory ‘perception’, to become intelligible and acquire meaning thus becoming an 
                                                     
17In the final note of the section ‘Sphere of Sense and Logic of Feeling’ in Vol. III, p. 239, Lewes 
acknowledges his debt to Comte in borrowing those terms; however, he also highlights the fact that his 
use of them is different to that of Comte’s which, he admits, he doesn’t fully comprehend. 
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abstract conception, it needs to be refined through the intermediate state of the logic 
of images.  He writes: 
It is in imagination that must be sought the first impulse towards 
Explanation; and therefore all primitive explanations are so markedly 
imaginative. Images being the ideal forms of Sensation, the Logic of 
Images is the first stage of intellectual activity...The first attempts to 
explain a phenomenon must be to combine the images of the past, with 
the sensations now felt, so as to form a series. (PLM, Vol. III, p.169) 
The image is the first step by which the mind begins to organise (rather than 
passively receive) the initial raw material offered by the senses. In Lewes’s view, 
images present the first step towards the fully conscious, rational mind. It is, however, 
in the last stage, the logic of signs, that the intuitive knowledge becomes ‘intellectual’ 
and as such is associated with the ability of human beings to encode or represent such 
experience by either language or mathematics. In a famous passage of Problems of Life 
and Mind, Lewes asserts that  
The Logic of Signs is to the Logic of Feeling very much what Algebra is 
to Arithmetic. Algebra is only Arithmetic under another and more 
generalised form, which operates  on general  symbols instead of 
particular numbers, substituting relations for values; in like manner. [...] 
The leading characteristic of Algebra is that of operation on relations. 
This also is the leading characteristic of Thought. Algebra cannot exist 
without values, nor Thought without Feelings. The operations are so 
many blank forms until the values are assigned. Words are vacant sounds, 
ideas are blank forms, unless they symbolise images and sensations, 
which are their values. (PLM, Vol. III, pp.468-470) 
Particularly important in this respect, is Lewes’s discussion concerning the similarities 
between human and animal thinking. He argues that both animals and humans think in 
sensation and images; however, the difference is that animals are unable to think in and 
use verbal symbols. He writes: 
That animals think, that is remember, imagine, judge, and reason, as 
men do, may nowadays be considered to be beyond discussion. But they 
are incapable of one supremely important mode of thinking—the 
formation of conceptions, and the combinations of series of feelings by 
means of verbal symbols. This, to which the name of Ideation may 
specially be given, is the distinguishing attribute of man, and is due to 
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his possessing Speech, which we shall presently see is a social not a 
physiological product. Language in its widest sense cannot be denied to 
animals as a function of expression of feelings—the language of 
gestures and cries is even made by them a rudimentary function of 
communication. But this function never becomes a faculty, and above 
all never rises to the expression of ideas, the communication of 
knowledge. (PLM, Vol. III, pp.484-485) 
Lewes’s view on the human and animal capacity for using language and speech 
presents parallels to the biosemiotic view that what is distinctive about human species 
is the capacity for symbolic reference - speech and that we share the semiotic capacity 
as such (indexical and iconic) with all life forms. As discussed in Chapter One, Jesper 
Hoffmeyer argues that human beings operate on very complex chains or webs of signs 
of all kinds, most of the world’s other species are predominantly guided by iconic or 
indexical signs (based on likeness and physical relatedness, respectively).18 It is, 
however, important to highlight here that there is a difference between Hoffmeyer’s 
and Lewes’s understanding of how thought operates; Hoffmeyer takes up Peirce’s 
view that thought operates in signs, whereas Lewes believes that thought operates in 
concepts and ideas which are categories of human mind. However, it is fair to say that, 
for Peirce, every act of reasoning consists of the interpretation of signs where signs 
function as mediators between the external world of objects and the internal world of 
ideas. Thinking and ideas belong to all living organisms, not only to human beings, 
and in a way this aspect shows parallels between Peirce’s theory and Lewes’s 
understanding. Although Hoffmeyer and Lewes present a different understanding of 
how thought operates they share the view that human life depends only marginally on 
processes of conscious interpretation; most of it is based on the tacit, subconscious 
interpretation of cues.19  Lewes expresses this view thus:  
                                                     
18 J. Hoffmeyer, op.cit., 2010, p. 372.  
19 My use of the term tacit is indebted to Michael Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge whereby it is 
asserted that most knowledge derives not from objects we have direct experience of, but of clues 
provided by things which we have subsidiary experience of.  See M. Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension. 
New York: Anchor Books, 1967.  
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Many of our actions, like those of the animals, are erroneously 
interpreted as due to the Logic of Signs (i.e., the distinct consciousness 
of the significance for knowledge of certain appearances) when they are 
really due to the Logic of Feeling. (PLM, Vol. III, p.237) 
Both Lewes and Eliot believed in the significance of feeling as the basis of any 
knowledge which was attained not through conscious elaboration of sense perceptions, 
but through that kind of tacit elaboration of relations between sense and perception, or 
as Lewes puts it, 
Knowledge is simply virtual Feeling, it is a vision of the unapparent 
relations which will be apparent when the objects are presented to Sense. 
(PLM, Vol. II, p.23) 
For Lewes and Eliot, the way into these unapparent relations, which corresponds 
to what Peirce calls semiosis, is through imagination, which contributes to the 
formation of workable hypotheses. Imagination becomes for both a medium to 
understand and disclose reality since it has the power, as Levine states ‘to fuse together 
what the analytic mind has necessarily, but arbitrarily separated.’20 As I shall argue in 
the following part of this chapter, for Eliot it is through imagination, understood as a 
creative and aesthetic act, akin to Peirce’s abduction, that we come to a more inclusive 
understanding of reality. 
Aesthetic and Scientific Imagination as Biosemiotic imagination: Form and 
Hypothesis 
In his discussion of George Eliot, Michael Davis points out that, as a novelist, 
Eliot aims not only to represent the observed world, but also to engage 
imaginatively with its inhabitants, to analyse and express the thoughts, 
emotions and motivations of individual subjects which, in their 
infinitely complex actions and interactions, compose the social world.21  
As seen from the previous discussion, Eliot’s view of an intertwined natural and social 
reality was largely based on her understanding of the various and intermeshing web of 
                                                     
20 G. Levine. The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein to Lady Chatterley. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, p. 265. 
21 P. Davis, op.cit., 2006, p. 1. 
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semiotic relations that compose it and this understanding is reflected in her views of 
realism in art. In her critical writings she expressed her belief in the duty of literature 
to engage directly and consistently with the complexities of human experience which 
result in a commitment to literary realism.  In her essay ‘The Natural History of German 
Life’ (1856), she writes that ‘art is the nearest thing to life,’22 meaning that forms of 
European art, developed up until her own time, were bound to strict rules of 
representation and that these are insufficient to represent the complexities of human 
experience and thought adequately. These complexities can only be explored through 
an organic understanding of a work of art and its development. By acknowledging that 
there is not a simple representative relation between life and fiction, Eliot’s realism 
departs from a merely ‘mimetic’ method. Her narrator in Adam Bede, for instance, aims 
at such representation of life although she acknowledges that this can never be so, 
because it is mediated through the narrator’s mind, or rather it stems from the author’s 
imagination. Therefore she states that ‘The mirror is doubtless defective [my italics]; 
the outlines will sometimes be disturbed, the reflection faint or confused’.23 
Eliot’s view of art was influenced by her acquaintance with Kant’s philosophy. 
In his Critique of Pure Judgement (1790), as already discussed in chapter two for 
instance, Kant observed that the forms assumed by living organisms were of a different 
order from those of mechanical entities.24 Not least they seemed to show nature as 
functioning in terms of purposes. Kant explained that: ‘An organised product of nature 
is that in which everything is an end and on the other hand also a means. Nothing in it 
                                                     
22 G. Eliot.“The Natural History of German Life.” Selected Critical Writings. Ed. Rosemary Ashton. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992, p. 264.  Eliot’s assertion echoes both Goethe’s view that “art 
is the imitation of nature” and Lady Welby’s view that “Art if it is worthy of the name, it must be 
immersed in life just as true life must be imbued with art.” Quoted in S. Petrilli. op.cit., 2009, p. 175. 
See Goethe’s Maxim and Reflections of Goethe. Transl. Bailey Saunders. London: Macmillan 1906.  
23 G. Eliot. Adam Bede. London: Penguin, 2004, p. 221. 
24 I. Kant [1790] Critique of Judgement. Transl. by James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. See for instance Part II, Div. I and Div. II. 
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is in vain, pointless or to be attributed to a blind mechanism of nature.’25 For Kant the 
perceived self-organisation, the internal unity, the inherent purposiveness26 of 
individual organisms, and of nature as a whole, were the construct of human mind and 
as such could not be proven empirically. In other words, Kant sees subjective 
consciousness as having the primary role in the construction of the knowable world or 
of phenomena, as, it is worth recalling here, that Kant believes we have no access to 
noumena or things that exist independently of our thinking of them.  
Kant’s thought then is that we need to understand how the capacity of the mind 
of organising phenomena into coherent systematic forms is linked to the fact that nature 
is capable of organising itself in ways which are not merely the results of particular 
laws.27 He turns to aesthetics to answer this question and he claims that the self-
organisation and coherence we see in organisms resembles that of the creation of a 
form of art. He states that one cannot produce art by simply making something in terms 
of the rules of a particular form since art involves moving beyond existing rules. The 
source of new rules must be another kind of spontaneity which seems to come from 
nature itself. As Goodwin comments, ‘Kant saw that the creation of a form of art which 
has its inner coherence expressed in the dynamic unity of its emergent parts is similar 
to the creation, through its developmental processes of an organism.’28  
                                                     
25 Quoted in A. Bowie, op.cit. 2003, p. 36. 
26 As Goodwin points out, the term purposiveness, needs to be understood in its eighteenth century use, 
as individual creation which displays a unified form in itself and its structure. A purposive creation, he 
explains, has its centre of gravity in itself; on that is goal-oriented has its centre of gravity external to 
itself; the worth of one resides in its being, whereas the other in its results. See B. Goodwin. Nature’s 
due: Healing our Fragmented Nature. Edinburgh: Floris Books, 2007. 
27 Bowie notes that in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetics’, the first part of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant is 
concerned with the conditions under which perception takes place and he claims that the conditions of 
perception are functions of the human mind and that our thinking is the very principle of the universe’s 
intelligibility. By stating this he merges the empirical tradition which believes that everything we know 
has contingency in it and the rationalist tradition which believes in the pre-existing structure of things. 
See A. Bowie. op. cit., 2003, p. 14. 
28 B. Goodwin, op.cit., 2007, p. 146. 
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The influence of Kant’s Critique of Pure Judgement (1790) is particularly 
evident in Eliot’s essay ‘Notes on Form in Art’ (1868) where she defines literary form 
as ‘wholes composed of parts more and more multiplied and highly differenced, yet 
more and more absolutely bound together by various conditions of dependence.’29 In 
other words, form is not dictated by the ‘boundary and outline’ which is in Eliot’s terms 
only ‘a metaphorical presence’,30 but it is constituted by the relations among the 
different parts that constitute the whole. For instance, Eliot believed that if she were to 
describe a flower, she could not only provide a visual description of what it looks like, 
as that would not constitute its form. Instead, she felt she would be bound to describe 
the flower in relation to the soil and the soil in relation to the grass and so on.31 In this 
respect, the literary form does not depend simply on the outward appearance or the 
description of things, but it depends on its inward relations. It is through these 
relationships that artworks can grow in complexity, thus producing a more satisfying 
form of art.  The highest example of form would thus be ‘the highest organism, that is 
to say, the most varied group of relations bound together in a wholeness, which has the 
most varied relations (my italics) with all other phenomena.’32 Thus, for Eliot, the 
novel as a form of art is organic; its complexity does not lie in the number of characters 
present, but in the complexity and variety of their relations. And as will become evident 
in Middlemarch, these relations which are at the basis of her art form, evolve or rather, 
grow in complexity through semiotic scaffolding of meaning or through what Eliot 
identifies as the ‘alternating processes of distinction and combination, seeing smaller 
and smaller unlikeness and grouping or associating these under a common likeness.’33 
                                                     
29 G. Eliot. “Notes on Form in Art.” Ed. Rosemary Ashton. op. cit., 1992, p. 356. It is worth pointing 
out here, that Herbert Spencer held a similar aesthetic view  when he stated that ‘the highest form of 
art will be not a series of like part simply placed in juxtaposition, but one whole made of unlike parts 
that are mutually dependent.’ Quoted in S. Shuttleworth, op.cit.,1984,  p. 149. 
30 G. Eliot. [1868] op.cit., 1992,  p. 356. 
31 A similar example has been used by Darrel Mansell Jr. in his “George Eliot’s conception of Form.” 
Studies in English Literature 1500-1900. Nineteenth Century. Vol. 5 n. 4 (1965): 651-662. 
32 Ibid., p. 356. 
33 G. Eliot. [1868] op.cit., 1992, p. 356. 
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This form of interpretation, Eliot stresses in her essay, is the only way knowledge and 
understanding can be achieved. 
Although Kant’s philosophy was and remains a powerful reflection on 
scientific knowledge and its relation to aesthetic judgement, there is a fundamental 
difference between Kant’s and Eliot’s understandings of our relation to nature (of 
which we are, of course, part). As stated earlier, Kant’s position rested on the notion 
that we can never know nature directly through our experience, by means of non-
inferential or intuitive knowledge, and that all we can know about nature rests in the 
form of our ideas about it. His idealism took the form of believing that we do not have 
such a capacity to directly know the world and that this is mediated by rational or 
logical inference. For Eliot, however, it is precisely by means of a non-conscious 
inferential logic, or imagination akin to that employed in art, that we come to know the 
world. This idea is much closer to Goethe’s and Schelling’s understanding of organic 
nature and art than it is to Kant’s. Both Goethe and Schelling read Kant’s Critique of 
Judgement. However, in Goethe’s case it was after reading Baruch Spinoza, whom 
Eliot read and translated, that he came to share Spinoza’s belief in a ‘scientia intuitiva’, 
which implied the idea that a disciplined imagination is a route to the direct knowledge 
of the essence of things through a cultivated intuition.34 Following Spinoza, Goethe 
came to believe that the hidden aspects of nature could be discovered through 
imagination and he reasoned that art is the imitation of nature. This idea is also seen in 
Schelling who postulated imagination or what he called ‘intellectual intuition’ as a 
means of overcoming Kant’s idealism.  
Schelling, much as Kant, held in Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797) that 
the whole of nature is to be seen as an organism. However, he refused to see the 
                                                     
34 R. Richards, op.cit., 2002. 
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thinking subject as opposed to nature as a world of objects, because the subject is in 
itself part of nature. By stating that mind and nature are one, mind being the product of 
nature, Schelling implies that nature and human mind are built upon the same 
principles, which is what gives us assurance that our ideas coincide with reality and 
which is what makes science ultimately possible. He subsumes this view in his famous 
phrase ‘nature should be mind made visible; mind the invisible nature.’35 Schelling’s 
view on the continuity between mind and nature echoes Peirce’s evolutionary view of 
mind as semiosis. Both see that mind cannot be narrowly identified with human mind, 
but is part of nature, and as such evolves and grows. In fact, as Andrew Bowie observes, 
Schelling sees that in the same way that thoughts spontaneously organise themselves 
in our mind from past thoughts, so does nature continually reform itself from its 
elements.36  In biosemiotic terms, this parallel development is understood as semiotic 
scaffolding whereby evolutionary layers of meaning in nature are antecedent and 
repeated with greater degree of complexity in culture.  
On the basis of his arguments on continuity, Schelling moved towards a 
hermeneutic conception of nature - his Naturphilosophie - which, as Andrew Bowie 
explains, ‘doesn’t rely on an objectifying pre-understanding of what nature and science 
is, but it keeps open our relationship to the nature of which we are a part and which we 
therefore understand.’37  However, the question he asks and that he tries to resolve in 
his most influential writing System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) is how do we 
understand our status as self-conscious natural beings without falling into the 
materialist or idealist trap? He postulates imagination as the key to grasp what he calls 
the Absolute, the ultimate ground of reality. He suggests that science and art are both 
                                                     
35 R. Jarvis. The Romantic Period: The Intellectual and Cultural Context of English Literature 1789-
1830. Harlow: Pearson Education, 2004, p. 102. 
36 See A. Bowie, op.cit. 1993, p. 49. 
37 Ibid., p. 42. 
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means of disclosing the Absolute. Imagination, Schelling held, receives images of the 
object world which we can synthesise in cognitive judgements of understanding, 
making imagination an unconscious faculty and it can produce images in the absence 
of any object which makes it also, and in part, a conscious faculty. If art can show the 
identity of these two sides, this means, according to Schelling, that both art and science 
depend on the same activity, which is both conscious and unconscious. The 
imagination is geared towards a hermeneutic understanding of science and art as forms 
of world disclosure.38 This is how Schelling comes to declare that ‘aesthetic intuition 
is intellectual intuition which has become objective.’39  
The influence of Schelling’s thought on art and science is seen particularly in 
Eliot’s last novels Middlemarch (1870) and Daniel Deronda (1876), where the analogy 
between science and art, or scientist and novelist, rests on their shared need for 
imaginative construction and not on their common commitment to the objective record 
of an external fact. In the opening pages of Daniel Deronda, Eliot writes: 
Men can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning. Even 
Science, the strict measurer, is obliged to start with a make-believe unit, 
and must fix on a point in the stars' unceasing journey when his sidereal 
clock shall pretend that time is Nought. His less accurate grandmother 
Poetry [my italics] has always been understood to start in the middle; 
but on reflection it appears that her proceeding is not very different from 
his; since Science, too, reckons backward as well as forward, divides his 
unit into billions, and with his clock-finger at Nought really sets off in 
medias res.40 
In Eliot’s view, the way science and poetry - understood as including all literary 
production – proceed follows the same creative pattern. This is not based on the 
inductive and deductive logic of science, but on what she calls ‘the make believe unit’, 
or imagination and is based, as we shall see in the section on language, on the continual 
                                                     
38 Ibid., pp. 50-53.  
39 F. Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. Transl. Peter Heath, Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1978, p. 625.  
40 G. Eliot [1876] Daniel Deronda. London: Penguin Books, 1995, p. 3. 
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emergence of new metaphors. In this respect Eliot’s view on imagination echoes 
Peirce’s concept of abduction and Bateson’s natural metaphor, where recursive forms 
of natural and cultural scaffolding are interlinked through the recognition of patterns 
of similarity and difference in metaphor which allow a system to learn and grow. The 
importance of abduction/imagination as a recursive process is seen, for instance, in the 
way Ladislaw defines a poet’s activity as being based on feeling which provides the 
poet with new insights and knowledge each time it ‘flashes back as a new organ of 
knowledge’:  
To be a poet is to have a soul so quick to discern, that no shade of quality 
escapes it, so quick to feel that discernment is but a hand playing with 
finely ordered variety on the chords of emotion – a soul in which 
knowledge passes instantaneously into feeling and feeling flashes back 
as a new organ of knowledge. (Middlemarch, p.223) 
Eliot’s view on the centrality of imagination as a creative process in science and poetry 
is also found in Lewes’s The Principles of Success in Literature (1865) where he 
maintains that both the scientist and poet are ‘inventors.’ Although there are differences 
in their forms of selection and abstraction from experience, ‘imagination is active in 
both’, or, as he puts it:  
From known facts the philosopher infers the facts that are unapparent. 
He does so by effort of imagination (hypothesis) which has to be 
subjected to verification: he makes a mental picture of the unapparent 
fact, and then sets about to prove that his picture does in some way 
correspond with reality. The correctness of his hypothesis and 
verification must depend on the clearness of vision.41  
Ken Newton comments that Lewes’s conception of the scientist’s practice here 
explained corresponds closely to Lydgate’s scientific practice whereby he 
imaginatively devises his ideal construction or hypothesis and proceeds to test it.42 
Lydgate’s scientific practice reflects Peirce’s view that scientific discovery rests on the 
                                                     
41 G. Lewes. The Principles of Success in Literature. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1891, p. 169. 
42 K. M. Newton. George Eliot: Romantic Humanist. A Study of the Philosophical Structure of her 
Novels. London: MacMillan Press, 1981. 
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inferential logic of abduction, which is the only one that introduces newness, since 
induction, as previously stated, only confirms a hypothesis whereas deduction draws 
out further logical implications. In chapter XVII of Middlemarch for instance, we are 
presented with Lydgate who is described as  
combining and constructing with the clearest eye for probabilities and 
the fullest obedience to knowledge; and then, in yet more energetic 
alliance with impartial Nature, standing aloof to invent tests by which 
to try its own work. (p.169) 
It is significant to note that Eliot’s  and Lewes’ views on imagination outlined as 
Peirce’s abduction or what I identify as biosemiotic imagination was celebrated in 
Victorian England by what George Levine described as ‘every interesting writer about 
science.’43 John Tyndall, for instance, discussed the importance of imagination in his 
essay ‘Scientific use of the Imagination’ (1872)44 where he acknowledges the limits of 
human knowledge and intellect and where he wonders whether humans will ‘ever 
possess the intellectual elements which will enable us to grapple with the ultimate 
structural energies of nature.’45 Importantly, Tyndall was among those scientists - 
others included T. H. Huxley and William K. Clifford -  who at the time when Eliot 
was writing Middlemarch and her poem ‘I grant you Ample Leave’, had been 
describing the atomic structure of the universe although no one had ever seen it. What 
their discovery implied was that the ‘invisible world’ constituted far more of reality 
than the visible one. What Tyndall and Clifford argued in various ways was that to be 
able to verify such reality required a sort of scientific imagination. At the end of his 
Rede lecture, Tyndall observed that: 
It is thought by some that natural science has a deadening influence on 
the imagination...But the experience of the last hour must, I think, have 
convinced you that the study of natural sciences goes hand in hand with 
the culture of imagination. Throughout the greater part of this discourse 
                                                     
43 G. Levine. “George Eliot’s Hypothesis of Reality.”  Nineteenth-Century Fiction. Vol. 35, N. 1 Jun. 
(1980): 1-28. 
44 J. Tyndall. On the Scientific Use of Imagination. London: Longmans, Green and Comapny, 1872. 
45 Quoted in G. Levine, op.cit., 1980, p. 12. 
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we have been sustained by this faculty. We have been picturing atoms 
and molecules and vibrations and waves which eye has never seen nor 
ear heard, and which can only be discerned by the exercise of 
imagination.46 
Tyndall and Eliot both recognized that observational science can only provide a 
limited understanding of the physical reality, since the ‘invisible world’ constituted far 
more of the reality than previously thought. They saw in the various processes of 
imagination as the medium to explore the significance of all those underlying organic 
processes and the plurality of worlds and existences which cannot be registered solely 
by scientific instruments and senses. In Middlemarch, this view is seen in the young 
doctor Tertius Lydgate and his quest to find the ‘primitive tissue’ or what Tyndall terms 
the ‘structural energies of nature’, where he turns to that kind of inspiration or 
imagination which Schelling and Peirce recommended 
[imagination] reveals subtle actions inaccessible by any sort of lens, but 
tracked in that outer darkness through long pathways of necessary 
sequence by the inward light [my italics] which is the last refinement of 
Energy, capable of bathing even the ethereal atoms of its ideally 
illuminated space. He for his part tossed away all cheap inventions where 
ignorance finds itself able and at ease: he was enamoured of that arduous 
invention which is the very eye of research, provisionally framing its 
object and correcting it to more and more exactness of relation; he wanted 
to pierce the obscurity of those minute processes which prepare human 
misery and joy, those invisible thoroughfares which are the first lurking-
places of anguish, mania and crime, that dedicate poise and transition 
which determine the growth of happy or unhappy consciousness. 
(Middlemarch, pp.164-165) 
The inward light, by which Lydgate studies the universe makes the ‘invisible’, 
the extra sensuous, present to him as though it was a direct sensation. The way Lydgate 
practises science, however, is not the way he practices love. In fact, Eliot comments 
that ‘that distinction of mind which belonged to his intellectual ardour did not penetrate 
his feeling and judgement about furniture, or women’ (Middlemarch, p.150). While 
commenting on Lydgate’s relationship with Rosamond, she further notes how he 
                                                     
46 Quoted in G. Beer, op.cit., 2009, p. 141. 
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persists in ‘bringing a much more testing vision of details and relations into [his] 
pathological study than he had ever thought it necessary to apply to the complexities 
of love and marriage’ (Middlemarch, p. 164). This difference is evidenced by his utter 
misunderstanding of Rosamond’s physical appearance as being the expression of her 
virtue and by his consequent view of her as a perfect wife whom he sees as a decorative 
figure that can play the piano, sing and provide companionship. His inability to access 
those deeper layers of meaning through imagination, or abduction, prevents him from 
seeing or interpreting for instance that Rosamond’s blue eyes, which initially seduced 
him, are accompanied by selfishness and obstinacy. This leads to his turning from an 
ardent researcher to a fashionable doctor in London who dies at the age of 50 from the 
financial pressures exerted by his wife’s social ambitions.  
The importance of imagination as an inferential tool is reiterated by Eliot in the 
Impressions of Theophrastus Such (1878) where she writes that: 
Fine imagination is always based on a keen vision, a keen consciousness 
of what is, and carries the store of definite knowledge as material for the 
construction of its inward visions.47 
What all these passages suggest is the centrality of imagination in any act of creative 
discovery, be that in science or art, and point to Eliot’s advanced thinking on scientific 
study and epistemology. Her insights into the close relationship between the logics of 
aesthetics and the logic of scientific discovery as being based on imagination, as well 
as her awareness of the dialogic relationship between the internal/external modes of 
apprehension, or rather the correlation between organism and its medium as a way to 
understand reality clearly point to her proto-biosemiotic thinking. In a way, these 
insights also constitute her most evident departure from that form of positivism which 
refused to acknowledge possibilities beyond the present and apparent world. In fact, 
                                                     
47 G. Eliot. The Impressions of Theophrastus Such. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1879, p. 109. 
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in one of her most powerful comments on her own art and in response to Frederic 
Harrison’s proposal that she writes a novel to show Positivist relations of an ideal 
community, Eliot explained that she ‘has gone through again and again the severe 
effort of trying to make certain ideas thoroughly incarnate, as if they had revealed 
themselves to me first in spirit and then in flesh.’48As David Carroll observes, the two 
realms - flesh and spirit – are seen as separate, but the imaginative act brings them 
together in that aesthetic teaching which is for Eliot ‘the highest of all teaching because 
it deals with life in its highest complexity. But if it ceases to be purely aesthetic – if it 
lapses anywhere from the picture to the diagram – it becomes the most offensive of all 
teaching’.49 It is the imagination as hypothesis, or in Peirce’s terms abduction and in 
my terms biosemiotic imagination that brings about the aesthetic incarnation. Eliot 
sees in the defining powers of the mind, as not only sensory, but also emotional and 
imaginative, a living and acting force which shapes reality and which enables human 
beings to go beyond what is merely observable. A way into understanding Eliot’s 
views on mind is through the sustained account Lewes offers in his lifelong work, 
Problems of Life and Mind which I now turn to.50  
On mind: semiotic scaffolding and the evolutionary layers of meaning 
At the centre of Lewes’s psychology there were two fundamental and 
interrelated ideas: the first was the conviction that human beings exist both as physical 
organisms, part of whose anatomy is the brain, and as thinking subjects. Lewes argued 
that neither the mind nor the external world on their own can be the sole arbiter of 
knowledge; instead we can only know the world through continuity between mind and 
                                                     
48 The George Eliot Letters. Ed. Gordon Haight vol. IV. London: OUP, 1956, p. 300. Hereafter, this 
volume will be shortened as GEL, followed by volume and page. 
49 Ibid., p. 300. 
50 Eliot edited the last two volumes and, together they self-mockingly called it the ‘Key to all 
Psychologies’ D. Postlethwaite. “George Eliot and Science.” The Cambridge Companion to George 
Eliot. Ed. George Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2001): 98-118, p. 113. 
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body which is what grants knowledge. This idea, based on Lewes’s reading of 
Benedict Spinoza, was further sustained by Lewes’s application of Darwin’s 
evolutionary model to the study of mind. This implied, as discussed before, that human 
behaviour rests on biological substrata or layers. In the biosemiotic insight offered by 
Jesper Hoffmeyer, these layers allowing further growth are identified not simply as a 
material scaffolding allowing development, but as semiotic scaffolding. In 
Foundations of a Creed (1874), Lewes further discusses this matter of evolutionary 
layers and observes, with more than a hint of the much later semiotic insight, that  
The psychologist, accustomed to consider the Mind as something apart 
from the Organism, individual and collective, is peculiarly liable to this 
error of overlooking the fact that all mental life manifestations are 
simply the resultants of the conditions external and internal. ... [these 
external conditions] are the collective accumulations of centuries, 
condensed in knowledge, beliefs, prejudices, institutions and 
tendencies.51 
Lewes’s observation that all mental life manifestations are the resultant of the dialogic 
relationship between internal and external modes, present strong parallels with the 
biosemiotic view of interaction or correlation between the ‘internal and the external’ 
or between the Umwelt and Innenwelt through semiotic loops. These semiotic loops, 
whereby an organism or human animal perceives signs, acts upon them and 
communicates something to others in the environment, give rise to evolutionary layers 
of meaning or semiotic scaffolding. On a cultural level these semiotic interactions are 
seen in what Lewes here identifies as ‘the collective accumulations of centuries 
condensed in knowledge, beliefs, prejudices, institutions and tendencies’ as antecedent 
forms of knowledge which have been formed through the same semiotic processes 
whereby meaning or expression is changed by emergent or different contexts. Culture 
                                                     
51 G.H. Lewes. Quoted in S. Shuttleworth. “Middlemarch: An Experiment in Time.” The Nineteenth- 
Century Novel: A Critical Reader. Ed. Stephen Regan, London: Open University, (2001): 290-300, p. 
293. 
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can thus be understood as a recursive semiotic system where new insights (beliefs, 
institutions and even prejudices) are built upon antecedent articulations or on history.  
This mode of learning and growth doesn’t pertain to cultural evolution alone, 
but is seen in individuals as well. This is particularly true, or rather visible, in the way 
characters are presented in Middlemarch. One of the central preoccupations in the 
novel is to show how ‘individuals adapt to or resist change in their marriages, in their 
professions, in their family life and social intercourse’52 which Eliot explores through 
the characters’ ability to respond to and interpret signs in their Lebenswelts. Adhering 
to an organic and evolutionary view, Eliot’s describes her characters as a ‘process and 
an unfolding’53 and shows how a character’s process of learning and therefore growth 
could be hindered or facilitated by the way he or she is able to access those deeper 
layers of meaning which is only possible to reach through abductive processes. 
Characters can thus be seen, in biosemiotics terms, as recursive or learning systems, 
which are self-reflective and as such aware of their process of learning. It is worth 
recalling here that self-recursive knowledge, in terms of bio-cybernetics, flows 
between the organism and the environment in which both change through semiotic 
loops, or through the active exchange and interpretation of signs or sign relations.  
A fine example of this is, for instance, Dorothea Brooke who in her quest for 
knowledge mistakenly interprets Edward Casaubon and his Key to all Mythologies as 
being a sign of just that. Casaubon’s search for a comprehensive worldview brings him 
to look into the history of myth as a way into finding the origin of all life as he believed 
that ‘all mythical systems or erratic fragments in the world were corruptions of a 
tradition originally revealed’ (Middlemarch, p.24). This is why he is certain that 
                                                     
52 R. Ashton. ‘Introduction.’ Middlemarch. London: Penguin Books, 1994, p. ix. 
53 Introducing Tertius Lydgate in chapter 15 in Middlemarch, Eliot writes that ‘character too is a process 
and an unfolding’. Middlemarch, p. 149. 
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‘having once mastered the true position and taken a firm footing there, the vast field 
of mythical constructions [would] become intelligible, nay luminous with the reflected 
light of correspondences’ (Middlemarch, p.24). Casaubon’s interpretive enterprise, 
which is largely based on the constructions of the mind, is taken by Dorothea as a sign 
of objective knowledge which she initially longs for. Disillusioned by her religious 
faith, Dorothea feels that the marriage with Casaubon promises to open vast new areas 
of knowledge, which are different to ‘that toy-box history of the world adapted to 
young ladies which had made the chief part of her education’. (Middlemarch, p.86) 
Dorothea’s desire for knowledge doesn’t rise from her feeling for ‘mere 
accomplishment’, but rather: 
All her eagerness for acquirement lay within that full current of 
sympathetic motive in which her ideas and impulses were habitually 
swept along. She did not want to deck herself with knowledge—to wear 
it loose from the nerves and blood that fed her action. [...] But something 
she yearned for by which her life might be filled with action at once 
rational and ardent; and since the time was gone by for guiding visions 
and spiritual directors, since prayer heightened yearning but not 
instruction, what lamp was there but knowledge? Surely learned men 
kept the only oil; and who more learned than Mr Casaubon? 
(Middlemarch, pp.86-87) 
While Casaubon was in search of his binding theory, Dorothea was ‘looking 
forward to higher initiation of ideas, as she was looking forward to marriage, and 
blending her dim conceptions of both’ (Middlemarch, p.86). Dorothea’s faith in 
Casaubon is the reflection of her own need to find a binding theory and this is why ‘she 
filled up all the imperfections, interpreting him as she interpreted the works of 
Providence, and accounting for seeming discords by her own deafness to the higher 
harmonies’ (Middlemarch, p.75). It is only shortly after the marriage, when on the 
honeymoon in Rome, that Dorothea starts to realise her mistake and she sees that the 
gaps and discords which she so aptly filled up herself, do not point beyond themselves 
to higher harmonies, on the contrary, they find expression in the fragments and ruins 
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that she finds in Rome the ‘city of visible history.’ (Middlemarch, p.192) Despite 
Dorothea’s inability to see beyond the ruins, Rome could still be ‘the spiritual centre 
and the interpreter of the world’ only to those who have looked at the city with ‘a 
quickening power of knowledge which breathes a growing soul into all historic shapes, 
and traces out suppressed transitions which unite all contrasts’ (Middlemarch, p.193). 
What the narrator points to here is that it is only with that kind of imaginative 
knowledge that true understanding and learning is possible. Rome, a metaphor for 
imagination, becomes alive for Dorothea thanks to her acquaintance with Ladislaw, 
Casaubon’s cousin. In contrast to Casaubon’s ‘small taper of learned theory exploring 
the tossed ruins of the world’, Ladislaw to whom Rome ‘had given […] quite a new 
sense of history as a whole: the fragments stimulated his imagination and made him 
constructive (Middlemarch, p.212) is moved by ‘an attitude of receptivity to all sublime 
chances’ (Middlemarch, p.83).  
It is through the juxtaposition of these two characters and Dorothea’s 
interpretation of them as signs, that she comes to ‘conceive with that distinctiveness 
which is no longer reflection but feeling – an idea wrought back to the directness of 
sense, like the solidity of objects – that he [Casaubon] had an equivalent centre of self, 
whence the light and shadows must always fall with certain difference’ (Middlemarch, 
p.211). The narrator’s description of Dorothea’s change or ability to adapt to a new 
vision through semiotic feedback loops (an idea wrought back to the directness of sense 
through feeling is in a way a semiotic loop) where information or signs constantly loop 
between her Innenwelt (where imagination is) and her Umwelt give rise to new layers 
of meaning, all points to a biosemiotic understanding of character as a self-recursive 
semiotic system. Dorothea’s ability to interpret and respond to signs (Casaubon, 
Ladislaw and Rome being the semiotic objects of Dorothea’s sign relations) and act 
upon them via abductive processes which are recursive (her initial view of Casaubon 
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changes in relation to her discoveries while in Rome), means that she is able to learn 
and grow through the reading of her own unfolding. In contrast to Dorothea, Casaubon 
is unable of such growth as he is not able to access those deeper layers of meaning via 
abductive process since, as the narrator points out ‘such capacity of thought and feeling 
as had ever been stimulated in him by general life of mankind had long shrunk to a sort 
of dried preparation, a lifeless embalmment of knowledge’ (Middlemarch, p.196). In 
other words, Casaubon’s learning is based on a fixed premise, so that no dialogue 
between the present and the past can take place.  
Eliot’ view on the importance of imagination as an inferential tool, and her 
pointing to the disastrous consequences when this is not so, (for instance the marriages 
of Lydgate and Rosamond and Casaubon and Dorothea, or the ill fate of Bulstrode) is 
consistent with the holistic model of mind that Lewes proposes. Mind is for Lewes is 
‘an active co-operant’ (PLM, Vol. I, p.162) in perceiving the world and, as he states: 
[It] has not only its own laws of action, but brings with it that very 
elementary of Consciousness which most theorists attempt to derive ab 
extra. I mean that the sensitive mechanism is not a simple mechanism, 
and as such constant, but a variable mechanism, which has history...the 
sensitive subject is no tabula rasa: it is not a blank sheet of paper, but a 
palimpsest. (PLM, Vol. I, p.162) 
As a ‘sensitive mechanism’ mind does not only respond to present sensations, but 
changes through lived experiences. This extract is particularly significant, because it 
points to an understanding of self and consciousness based on past history which is 
constructed through the evolutionary layers of meaning. This idea is reiterated by Eliot 
in Middlemarch, where she comments on Bulstrode’s mental processes in relation to 
his shame about his past life. She tells us that of Bulstrode: 
The terror of being judged sharpens the memory: it sends an inevitable 
glare over that long-unvisited past which has been habitually recalled 
only in general phrases. Even without memory, the life is bound into 
one by a zone of dependence in growth and decay; but intense memory 
forces a man to own his blameworthy past. With memory set smarting 
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like a reopened wound, a man’s past is not simply a dead history, an 
outworn preparation for the present: it is not a repented error shaken 
loose from the life: it is a still quivering part of himself, bringing 
shudders and bitter flavours and the tingling of a merited shame. 
(Middlemarch, p.651) 
Eliot here suggests that there is a vital interdependence in history between the 
individual and culture as well as the organic response. Memory here plays a double 
role; on the one hand it is individual memory of the past events, and on the other, it is 
the organic response of the body which she captures with such terms as tingling and 
shudders. Sally Shuttleworth comments that Eliot’s view on the decay and growth of 
life captures Lewes’s view of mind as ‘an organic process of composition and 
decomposition in interaction with the environment.’54 For Lewes, however mind is 
also an expression of the organic and social conditions, and he emphasizes the 
importance of the social medium that is language in shaping it.  
The second important interrelated aspect of Lewes’ psychology, which I 
previously discussed, regards his view of language, or what he terms the ‘Logic of 
Signs’ as the primary connecting medium between sensation and knowledge .For 
Lewes, as Sally Shuttleworth observes, a ‘redistribution of matter and motion could 
not give full insight into mental evolution since human development and interaction 
are primarily determined by the linguistic social medium.’55 Thus, language 
determines both individual and cultural development and offers a symbolic system 
which functions, much like scientific construction, as a way to reveal connections and 
relations not evident to sense.56 It is important to remember here, that what usually 
starts as a biosemiotic scaffolding of the cellular level and subsequent biological level, 
is similarly responsible for the evolution of semiotic phenomena in language, 
knowledge and belief. However, where, for Lewes, language is one of the actors that 
                                                     
54 S. Shuttleworth, op.cit, 2001, p. 299. 
55 S. Shuttleworth. op.cit.,1984,  p. 163. 
56 Ibid., p. 164. 
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shapes consciousness, for Eliot, it is the interplay of verbal and non-verbal language 
that plays a fundamental expressive and formative role in the subject. I now turn to a 
discussion of this. 
Language, Metaphor and Interpretation 
Long before Lewes gave his explanation of the psychological workings in the ‘Logic 
of Signs’, Eliot began her essay ‘The Natural History of German Life’ (1856) thus:  
It is an interesting branch of psychological observation to note that 
images that are habitually associated with abstract or collective terms – 
what may be called the picture-writing of the mind, which it carries on 
concurrently with the more subtle symbolism of language. Perhaps the 
fixity or variety of these associated images would furnish a tolerably fair 
test of the amount of concrete knowledge and experience which a given 
word represents, in the minds of two persons who use it with equal 
familiarity.57  
Here Eliot approached a psychologically-based philosophy by describing the Logic of 
Images - the picture writing of the mind - and the Logic of Signs, the subtle symbolism 
of mind. In true evolutionary fashion, Eliot reasoned that if knowledge is tied to 
language, and language is tied to our specific organic being and to its means of 
articulation, than language cannot be fixed. She recognized that language is not a 
scientific instrument and saw that for that reason, understanding is always a potential 
problem. She critiqued, much like Newman and Welby, the fixity of meaning, and 
consequently the idea of the possibility of language coinciding with a static and pre-
constituted order of external facts, by arguing that ‘language can be a perfect medium 
of expression to science, but it could never express life, which is a great deal more than 
science’.58 In her essay ‘Notes on the Form in Art’ she characterises language as ‘the 
least imitative, and...in the most complex relation with what it expresses.59 She saw, 
                                                     
57 G. Eliot [1868] op. cit., 1994, p. 260. 
58 Ibid., p. 282. 
59 G. Eliot. “Notes on the form of Art.” George Eliot: Selected Essays, Poems and other Writings. A. 
S. Byatt and Nicholas Warren Eds. London: Penguin Classics, 2005, p. 435. 
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like Lady Victoria Welby, in the figurative dimension of meaning, that is, in the 
capacity for establishing associations, comparisons, and parallels between different 
fields of experience an important aid to interpretation and understanding.60 For Eliot 
this was also the possibility of both world disclosure, in the way Schelling advocated 
in the System of Transcendental Idealism, and of misunderstanding. In the Mill on the 
Floss she comments on figurative language thus: 
‘O Aristotle! If you had the advantage of being the ‘freshest modern’ 
instead of the greatest ancient, would you not have mingled your praise 
of metaphorical speech, as sign of high intelligence, with a lamentation 
that intelligence so rarely shows itself in speech without metaphor, that 
we can so seldom declare what a thing is, except saying it is something 
else?61 
The perception of analogies, connections, affinities and the relation of two 
separate objects or ideas, which is the definition of a metaphor, is at the centre of 
Eliot’s art and is the underlying structural principle of Middlemarch. The novel is a 
web of interlinked metaphors which are constantly developing and modifying each 
other. The novel is about discovering the underneath relations, the non-visible, which 
as Eliot advocated, is only possible through imagination or through Peirce’s abductive 
processes; and metaphors, on which characters act upon rather unknowingly or 
mistakenly, do just that. Thus Eliot comments that ‘we all of us, grave or light, get our 
thoughts entangled in metaphors, and act fatally on the strength of them’ 
(Middlemarch, p.85). Casaubon’s Key to all Mythologies and Lydgate’s search for the 
‘primitive tissue’ are metaphors of finding or disclosing the underlying relation, the 
non-visible. While Casaubon hopes to reveal the underlying order of history through 
the external correspondence of myths, Lydgate,  following the scientific theory of the 
French physiologist Bichat, is engaged in a quest to find the ‘primitive tissue from 
which all others derived’ (Middlemarch, p.148). Bichat held that living organisms had 
                                                     
60 S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 321. 
61 G. Eliot. The Mill on the Floss. London: Penguin, 1996, p. 40. 
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to be regarded ‘as consisting of certain primary webs or tissues’ (Middlemarch, p.148) 
which, translated into the realm of human living, means that humans, and in this case 
the characters, who stand in as signs of them, cannot be viewed in isolation; individuals 
are caught up in semiotic webs of relationships, which both determine them and open 
new possibilities of interpretation.  
This view is not unlike Lewes’s description between the organism and its 
medium which he wrote in 1871 ‘out of the general web of Existence certain threads 
may be detached and rewoven into a special group – the Subject – and this sentient 
group will in so far be different from the larger group – the Object; but whatever 
different arrangement the threads take on, they are not different threads.’62 From a 
biosemiotics perspective, these different threads are in fact semiotic relations which, 
as Vincent Colapietro argues, points to the realisation that ‘we are always already in 
the midst of others as well as meanings: indeed otherness and meaning are given 
together in our experience of ourselves as being embedded in the “semiotic web.”’63 
An example of such semiotic web of relations is evidenced in the in the pier glass 
metaphor in chapter 27 of Middlemarch:  
An eminent philosopher among my friends, who can dignify even your 
ugly furniture by lifting it into the serene light of science, has shown me 
this pregnant little fact. Your pier-glass or extensive surface of polished 
steel made to be rubbed by a housemaid, will be minutely and 
multitudinously scratched in all directions; but place now against it a 
lighted candle as a centre of illumination, and lo! the scratches will seem 
to arrange themselves in a fine series of concentric circles round that 
little sun. It is demonstrable that the scratches are going everywhere 
impartially and it is only your candle which produces the flattering 
illusion of a concentric arrangement, its light falling with an exclusive 
optical selection. These things are a parable. The scratches are events, 
and the candle is the egoism of any person now absent— of Miss Vincy, 
for example. Rosamond had a Providence of her own who had kindly 
made her more charming than other girls, and who seemed to have 
                                                     
62 G.H. Lewes. Quoted in D. Carroll, op. cit., 1992, p .238. 
63 V. Colapietro. Peirce’s Approach to the Self: A Semiotic perspective on Human Subjectivity.  New 
York: State of NYUP, 1989, pp. 27-28. 
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arranged Fred’s illness and Mr. Wrench’s mistake in order to bring her 
and Lydgate within effective proximity. (p. 264) 
We are told of a scientific experiment where a lighted candle will make the random 
scratches on the pier glass appear to be regular concentric circles or patterns. Yet this 
effect is an illusion, created by the ‘exclusive optical selection.’64 Seeing, however, is 
for Eliot never merely optical, rather it presupposes interpretation or semiosis, since 
what is seen, as Hillis Miller highlights, is always taken as a sign, as standing for 
something else and in fact this experiment is then translated into terms of human 
understanding and applied to Rosamond’s own interpretation of Lydgate’s behaviour 
which she takes as a sign of his gallantry.65 The candle is here understood as 
Rosamond’s self or egotism, which is the lens through which she interprets life and 
which prevents her from learning and growing since egotism, as a semiotic system, is 
antithetical to change and development due to its inability to recognise self-recursive 
knowledge.  
On a different level this metaphor alerts the reader that each character has 
his/her own centre through which he/she interprets other characters while at the same 
time he becomes a sign for others to interpret. It is this semiotic activity that forms the 
web of relations which Jakob von Uexküll’s compared in A Stroll through the Worlds 
of Animal and Men to a spider and his web and explained that ‘as a spider spins its 
threads, every subject spins his relations to certain characters of the things around him, 
and weaves them into a firm web which carries his existence.’66 Each character spins 
his web of relations according to his own Innenwelt which links the character with 
                                                     
64It is interesting to note here that Eliot’s discussion on light and perception resembles Goethe’s 
discoveries on colour. In his Zür Farbenlehre (1810) (Theory of Colours) he  argued that the 
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66 J. von Uexküll. “A Stroll through the Worlds of Animal and Men.” Instinctive Behavior: The 
Development of a Modern Concept. Ed. Claire H Schiller and D. J. Kuenen. New York: International 
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what is other than himself, that is, to the signs in his surroundings which will be 
interpreted in a particular way. This is seen for instance in the way Rosamond imagines 
her future with Tertius Lydgate and is certain about their impending marriage based 
on her registration and interpretation of his behaviour. In fact she has scrutinized  
every look and word, and estimate[d] them as the opening incidents of 
a preconceived romance—incidents which gather value from the 
foreseen development and climax. In Rosamond’s romance it was not 
necessary to imagine much about the inward life of the hero, or of his 
serious business in the world: of course, he had a profession and was 
clever, as well as sufficiently handsome; but the piquant fact about 
Lydgate was his good birth. (Middlemarch, p.166) 
Rosamond’s inability to see Lydgate’s ‘inward life’ as much as Lydgate’s belief that 
Rosamond’s beauty expresses her virtue leads Eliot to comment thus on their different 
interpretations: ‘between him and her indeed there was the total missing of each other’s 
mental track, which is too evidently possible even between persons who are continually 
thinking of each other’ (Middlemarch, p. 450). In an earlier passage she comments: 
‘Poor Lydgate! Or shall I say poor Rosamond! Each lived in a world of which the other 
knew nothing’ (Middlemarch, p.165). Yet both engage in weaving their lovemaking 
web:  
Young love-making—that gossamer web! Even the points it clings to—
the things whence its subtle interlacings are swung— are scarcely 
perceptible: momentary touches of fingertips, meetings of rays from 
blue and dark orbs, unfinished phrases, lightest changes of cheek and 
lip, faintest tremors. The web itself is made of spontaneous beliefs and 
indefinable joys, yearnings of one life towards another, visions of 
completeness, indefinite trust. And Lydgate fell to spinning that web 
from his inward self with wonderful rapidity [...] As for Rosamond, she 
was in the water-lily’s expanding wonderment at its own fuller life, and 
she too was spinning industriously at the mutual web. (Middlemarch, 
p.346) 
Rosamond’s self-centredness and inability to see Lydgate’s inward life are similar to 
Casaubon’s perception of being the centre of his own world which prompts him to 
believe that ‘others were providentially made for him, and especially to consider them 
in the light of their fitness for the author of Key to all Mythologies (Middlemarch, 
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p.84), which is how he perceives and considers Dorothea. He looks at her ‘in relation 
to his authorship’ and so ‘he leaned on her young trust and veneration, he liked to draw 
forth her fresh interest in listening, as a means of encouragement to himself’ 
(Middlemarch, p.85), making him completely oblivious as to why Dorothea is so eager 
to listen to him.  
While metaphors are at the basis of characters’ interpretations, they also 
represent the semiotic link between the narrator, the character and reader. This is so, 
because interpretation allows the reader to position himself in relation to the characters 
as signs and make telling connections. Through the reader’s participation in a common 
process of interpretation while reading the text, meaning grows since it is built in a 
recursive process, ‘whereby not only are the meanings of subsequent sign relations a 
development on the basis of what has gone before, but antecedent formulations may 
be reflexively altered by subsequent ones.’67 This is seen, for instance, in another 
prominent metaphor that recurs in the book, that of the labyrinth. This metaphor 
suggests the maze of confusing and conflicting impressions and expectations that form 
a larger part of human experience and knowledge. Characters such as Casaubon and 
Lydgate, engaged with issues of knowledge hope to find a thread that lead them 
through the labyrinth, which they subsequently find out would lead them nowhere. In 
chapter 3, the narrator remarks of Dorothea, that after having looked ‘into the 
ungauged reservoir of Mr Casaubon’s mind, seeing reflected there in vague 
labyrinthine extension every quality she herself brought’ (Middlemarch, p.24) thinks 
that because Casaubon reminds her of Milton, Bousset and Pascal he must be the 
equivalent of those geniuses. Although the property of a labyrinth, as A.S. Byatt 
comments, ‘is to be extensive, promising and capable of opening up possibilities, it 
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can also be confining and full of dead ends’.68 In fact, rather than finding ‘large vistas 
and wide fresh air which she had dreamed of finding in her husband’s mind’, Dorothea 
realises that those were ‘replaced by the anterooms and winding passages which 
seemed to lead nowither’ (Middlemarch, p.195). So Dorothea, as much as Casaubon, 
Lydgate and the reader, are linked in their common interpretation of the metaphor and 
are led to believe that the metaphor would help bring new meaning and possibilities. 
However, while the narration unfolds the initial expectations are changed in relation 
to new information. 
Levine also observes that metaphors show the complexity of the reality present 
in Middlemarch and comments that reality is so ‘tenuous that common sense can reveal 
only fragments.’69 To see reality, to perceive it or to interpret it, Levine argues, 
‘depends on the patient attentiveness to the promptings of experience, to the voices of 
others and to the movements of nature.’70 It is in this way that Eliot understands 
sympathy: as a necessary semiotic process grounded in ‘Feeling’ which enables human 
beings to enter imaginatively and morally into the perspective of others by reading and 
interpreting signs.  
Sympathy, Ethics and Semiotic Freedom 
At the heart of Eliot’s view of sympathy, as she wrote in a letter to Sara Sophia 
Hennell in 1843, was the belief in ‘the truth of feeling as the only universal bond of 
union.’71 The capacity for sympathy which she defined in the essay ‘The Natural 
History of German Life’ as ‘a mode of amplifying experience and extending our 
contact with our fellow men beyond the bounds of our personal lot’,72 is also 
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inextricably connected with morality which, Eliot believes, grows from the ability to 
imagine another’s state of mind. 
My own experience and development deepen every day my conviction 
that our moral progress may be measured by the degree in which we 
sympathize with the individual suffering and individual joy.73 
The concept of sympathy, that is, the ability to enter imaginatively or abductively into 
other people’s minds, implies the ability of real feeling towards another individual 
which enables an assessment of their actions and aspirations. Yet she is aware that 
human beings are ‘wadded in stupidity’ and therefore sympathy must be used carefully; 
If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would 
be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we 
should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. As it is, 
the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity. 
(Middlemarch, p.194) 
 As we have seen, in Middlemarch most characters are initially unable to acknowledge 
other ways of seeing, because they hold onto a self-centred perspective and therefore 
operate without the proper sympathy, which Eliot demonstrates is the main cause for 
their moral failings. It is only through sympathetic understanding that the individual is 
able to access other ways of seeing and is therefore able to make moral judgements. 
For instance Dorothea is led from her initial ‘moral stupidity’ (Middlemarch, p.198) to 
a position where ‘she was no longer struggling against the perceptions of fact, but 
adjusting herself to the clearest perception’ (Middlemarch, p.343).  In other words, it 
is by opening up to the other, by reading signs and leaving her self-centred 
understanding of the world and having the courage to face something like facts that she 
can finally see more clearly.  
 Eliot’s insight into the importance of being receptive to the ‘other’ through 
sympathy bears significant parallels with Peirce’s reflections on subjectivity and 
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sympathy.74 Peirce’s idea of subjectivity is based on his understanding that a subject is 
an extremely complex sign, made of verbal and non-verbal material or semiosis.   
There is no element whatever of man’s consciousness which has not 
something corresponding to it in the word ...  It is that the word or sign 
which man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that every thought 
is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, 
proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an external sign, 
proves that man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the 
external sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words homo 
and man are identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for 
the man is the thought. (CP 5.314)  
As a sign, Susan Petrilli comments, the subject emerges as a relational being thus open 
and in relation to other signs or subjects.75 As previously pointed out, for Peirce every 
thought is a sign, meaning that every thought connects the three elements in the sign 
relation: a representamen, an object, and an interpretant. The implication of seeing 
thought as sign action is that it is no longer possible to understand it as private, residing 
in individual minds, but it should be understood as residing in the public sign structure 
by which we communicate.76  Peirce also adds: 
When I communicate my thought and my sentiments to a friend with 
whom I am in full sympathy, so that my feelings pass into him and I am 
conscious of what he feels, do I not live in his brain as well as in my 
own – most literally? True, my animal life is not there but my soul, my 
feeling thought attention are. [...] Each man has an identity which far 
transcends the mere animal; – an essence, a meaning subtle as it may be. 
He cannot know his own essential significance; of his eye it is eyebeam. 
But that he truly has this outreaching identity – such as a word has – is 
the true and exact expression of the fact of sympathy, fellow feeling – 
together with all unselfish interests – and all that makes us feel that he 
has an absolute worth. (CP 7.591)  
 
                                                     
74 For an insightful comment on Peirce’s subjectivity see Vincent Colapietro. Peirce’s Approach to the 
Self: A Semiotic perspective on Human Subjectivity.  New York: State of NYUP, 1989 as well as 
Peirce’s paper “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties for Man and Some Consequences for our 
Incapacities.” The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings. Vol.2. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992-98. 
75  See S. Petrilli and A. Ponzio. Semiotics Unbounded. Interpretive Routes through the Open Network 
of Signs. Duxford: Icon Books, 2001. 
76 C. de Wall, op.cit., 2001, pp. 81-85. 
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Peirce’s idea of the outreaching identity and fellow feeling and unselfish interests 
are embodied, for example, in the letter Philip Wakem writes to Maggie Tulliver in The 
Mill on the Floss. There, Eliot’s writing of Philip explains that it is through his love for 
Maggie that he was able to transcend his own self and feel sympathy: 
The new life I have found in caring for your joy and sorrow more than 
for what is directly my own, has transformed the spirit of rebellious 
murmuring into that willing endurance which is the birth of strong 
sympathy. I think nothing but such complete and intense love could have 
initiated me into that enlarged life which grows and grows by 
appropriating the life of others; for before, I was always dragged back 
from it by ever-present painful self-consciousness.77 
The similarity of Peirce’s and Eliot’s conceptions of sympathy as embodied feeling are 
here evident and they are important as they point towards an understanding of the 
relatedness between the organic and the social or cultural world through sign relations. 
Sympathy is seen by Eliot as a method for the adequate interpretation of the varied 
relations and psychological complexities of human beings. 
Much contemporary criticism, however, tends to see Eliot’s concept of 
sympathy and its link to morality as either imaginary, a mere form of representation, 
based on Adam Smith’s model which replaces persons with mental pictures thus 
implying that sympathy is fictional, or as a hidden manifestation of self-interest.78 
Indeed, some critics have even identified such sympathy with sadism as for instance, 
Ann Cvetkovich or Marc Redfield do.79 It is fair to say that all these different readings 
shed, in various ways, some light on Eliot’s thought. However in their process of 
isolating the concept for their analysis, they seem to miss, or rather, to fall short of 
grasping the sheer complexity of Eliot’s thought in relation to sympathy, morality and 
                                                     
77 G. Eliot, op. cit., 1996, p. 634. 
78 See for instance Jeffrey J. Franklin. Serious Play. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1999, p. 123 or Audre Jaffe. Scenes of Sympathy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, pp. 7-11. 
79 See for instance A. Cvetkovich. Mixed Feelings, Feminism, Mass Culture and Victorian 
Sensationalism. New Brunswick: NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994 and M. Redfield. Phantom 
Formations: Aesthetic Ideology and Bildungsroman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. 
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knowledge. Cvetkovich’s and Redfield’s readings of Eliot’s sympathy, for instance, 
are based on the psychology of motivational response. As Lauren Wispé argues in The 
Psychology of Sympathy the structure of the motivation of sympathy is different 
because ‘the orientation of sympathetic behaviour is not the welfare of the person who 
is sympathetically motivated, but that of the person who is the object of that 
sympathy.’80 So any readings which see sympathy as a hidden self-interest, it may be 
argued, misunderstand the psychological principle on which sympathy rests. 
In more recent criticism, Rosemary Ashton, Suzy Anger and George Levine81 
have all argued in various ways that Eliot’s concept of sympathy is an innate quality 
and that is based either on the philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach or on the concept of 
altruism proposed by Auguste Comte. Although Feuerbach was certainly a key 
influence on Eliot’s thinking about religious faith, and he and Eliot, in common with 
Comte, attempted to reconcile the divine with the human, it is also true that her organic 
understanding of sympathy and its importance as a model for interpreting the 
complexity of various visible and non-visible semiotic relations is in large measure 
attributable to her re-conceptualisation of Lewes’s work in psychology. Eliot’s view 
on sympathy was also influenced by Darwin’s study of relations between animal and 
human thinking.  
In The Descent of Man (1871), for instance, Darwin defined sympathy as social 
instinct directed towards others and as such presented a way to explain moral 
behaviour. Or to put it in another way, sympathy, for Darwin, is the appropriate 
capacity to respond to the emotional and communicative expressions of co-species and 
as such carries a moral agency. He argues that although sympathy as social instinct 
                                                     
80 L. Wispé. The Psychology of Sympathy. New York and London: Plenum Press, 1991, p. 57. 
81 See Rosemary Ashton.  The German Idea: Four English Writers and Reception of German Thought 
1800-1860. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp.155-166, S. Anger, “George Eliot and 
Philosophy.” The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot. Ed. G. Levine, 2001, pp. 76-79. 
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may be present in all animals, it is morality that distinguishes lower animals from 
higher animals, such as human beings. Eliot expresses a similar view in relation to 
ethics; in fact she states that ‘amiable impulses without intellect, man may have in 
common with dogs and horses, but morality, which is specifically human, is dependent 
on the regulation between feeling and intellect’.82  
For Lewes and Eliot, following Darwin, human beings represent the highest 
organism which is both the most complexly differentiated from its rudimentary origins 
and the most integrated with other organisms. Biosemiotics tells us that semiotic 
freedom, the complexity and depth of meaning communicated and interpreted by all 
living organisms,83 is where the differentiation lies given the postulate that all living 
organisms, from the simplest to the most complex, are sign making and sign receptive 
creatures. For Darwin, sympathy is the ability to respond to the communicative 
expressions of co-species. Where in lower animals sympathy is instinctual, or in 
biosemiotic terms is based on the iconic and indexical referencing, in human beings it 
is the result of the conjunction between instinct, reason and conscience which is 
expressed in language, or in biosemiotic terms as expressed in iconic, indexical and 
symbolic references.  
Sympathy is for Eliot the condition or mode for possible knowledge not only 
of the outer world, which she sees in accordance with Lewes as a complex web of 
relations but also of the inner, psychological worlds that human beings inhabit and 
which is communicated via symbolic reference. Eliot’s fiction is fundamentally based 
on the importance of extending our sympathies, or rather, on the importance of making 
                                                     
82 Quoted in R. De Sailly. “George Eliot, George Henry Lewes and the Logic of Signs.” The Sydney 
Society of Literature and Aesthetics. Vo.7 (1997):115-125, p. 116. 
83 J. Hoffmeyer, op.cit. 2010, p. 377. 
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us think about extending our semiotic freedom, by reading the signs of each other more 
carefully, and thus ethically as a possible result.84 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to explore Eliot’s philosophical reflections on epistemology and 
her view of reality. I argued that her adherence to an organic and evolutionary view of 
culture prompted her to understand reality in a proto-biosemiotic way, that is, as a web 
of semiotic relations where reality is always partial since it is based on the semiotic 
feedback loop between an individual’s Umwelt and Innenwelt. In this respect I 
emphasised the role imagination, which she understood through her reading of 
Schelling and the Naturphilosophen, and which |I argued is akin to Peirce’s abductive 
logic, has in any act of creative discovery. I emphasised the role of metaphor, which 
is equally grounded on forms of abductive logic, as a form of world disclosure. This I 
showed is most clearly at work in Middlemarch where the interlinked web of 
metaphors are a source of creative discovery and at the basis of the characters’ 
interpretation of their own reality. The latter I argued is nested through recursive 
feedback loops into a wider web of semiotic relations. Each character is thus seen as a 
sign relation and thus open to different interpretations. I suggested that this 
understanding provided Eliot with the possibility to explore in her novels and other 
writings the physical, psychological and ethical implications of nature as embodied 
through the human ability of sympathy.  
 
                                                     
84 D. Neubauer. “Sympathy”A More Developed Sign: Interpreting the Work of Jesper Hoffmeyer. Eds. 
Donald Favareau, Paul Cobley and Kalevi Kull. Tartu: Tartu University Press, (2012): 283-285.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Lady Victoria Welby’s Significs:  Mother-Sense, Meaning and 
Significance 
As things are it often takes a wise writer to read his own writing; perhaps it takes a 
still wiser one to read his own meaning. (Grains of Sense, p. 6) 
The flowering moments of the mind,  
Drop half their petals in our speech. (What is Meaning, p. 9) 
 
This chapter has two interrelated aims. The first is to discuss Lady Victoria Welby’s 
theory of signs and meaning, that is, Significs, in order to show how Significs proposes 
to transcend the old dichotomies of mind and matter (by showing how the world and 
our ideas about it are inextricably linked). Another aim is to illustrate how Significs 
anticipates important developments in biosemiotics, in particular, in the way in which 
Welby, postulated continuity between the natural, organic world and the cultural, 
human world on the basis of signifying processes or semiosis. 
 In the foreword to Susan Petrilli’s Victoria Welby and the Science of Signs: 
Significs, Semiotics, Philosophy of Language, Frank Nuessel defines Lady Welby ‘as 
remarkable, a truly extraordinary intellectual of Victorian England.’1 What certainly 
contributed to her being an extraordinary intellectual was, on the one hand, her 
interesting background (Her Royal Highness Princess Victoria, later Queen Victoria, 
acted as her god-mother together with the Duchess of Kent, the Queen Mother), and, 
                                                     
1 F. Nuessel. ‘Foreword.’ S. Petrilli. Victoria Welby and the Science of Signs: Significs, Semiotics, 
Philosophy of Language. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2015. As an intellectual 
and scholar, Welby became a member of the Aristotelian Society of London (founded in 1870); in 1890 
she was elected as member of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (founded in 
1871, permission to add the word ‘Royal’ was granted in 1907; the Anthropological Institute was the 
result of a merger between two rival bodies, the Ethnological Society of London, founded in 1843, and 
the Anthropological Society of London, 1863–1870); she was also one of the original promoters and a 
founding member of the Sociological Society of Great Britain (established in 1903). In S. Petrilli, op.cit., 
2009, p. 12. 
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on the other, her unconventional upbringing which she admitted in a letter written to 
Charles Peirce in 1903 that ‘this accounts in some degree for my seeing things in a 
somewhat independent way.’2 She spent her formative years travelling with her mother 
across the globe and in her later years she saw the advantage of such upbringing in the 
fact that she was educated and never ‘inducated,’ a term Welby used in a letter to W. 
J. Greenstreet (for many years the editor of the Mathematical Gazette) where she 
explained that what in other people had been induced in school training became for 
her the starting point for her inquiries and questions.3 This enabled her to preserve her 
open-mindedness and independence of thought which set her apart from her 
contemporaries. She remained conscious of the inadequacy of the education she 
received specifically when compared to that of other scientists, philosophers and 
scholars with whom she corresponded. Nevertheless, her theoretical reflections and 
inquiries, which encompassed disciplines as different as psychology, religion, 
theology, language studies, semantics, axiology, mathematics and physics, reflect a 
deep understanding and engagement with all these disciplines and do not show any 
lack of knowledge.  
She corresponded with more than 450 eminent scholars of her time among 
whom the most important were the linguist Michel Bréal (1831-1915), the poet and 
psychiatrist Frederik Van Eeden (1860-1913), the biologist Thomas A. Huxley (1828-
1895), the philosopher André Laland (1867-1963), the linguist and philosopher 
Charles K. Ogden (1889-1957), the mathematician Mary Everest Boole (1832-1916), 
the logician and mathematician Bertrand Russel (1872-1970), the linguist and 
anthropologist Max F. Müller (1823-1900), the philosopher Ferdinand C. S. Schiller 
                                                     
2 L. Welby to C. S. Peirce. Semiotics and Significs. Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and 
Lady Victoria Welby. Ed. C. S. Hardwick. Lubbock: Texas Tech. University Press, 1977, p. 165. 
3 V. Welby. Quoted in W. H. Schmitz and E. Achim. Eds. Essays on Significs. Papers presented on the 
occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912). Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Pub. Co., 1990, p. xxii. 
 181 
 
(1864-1937), the psychologist George F. Stout (1860-1944), the sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnies (1855-1936), the logician and semiotician Charles S. Peirce (1839Mi-1914) 
and the novelist, historian and literary critic Julia Wedgewood (1833-1913). All of 
them contributed in varying degrees to the formulation and discussion of Welby’s 
theory of language, signs and meaning, even though her correspondence with van 
Eeden (the Dutch poet who started the Significs Movement in Netherlands), with Stout 
and Schiller, who were her harshest critics, was the most prolific and lasted the 
longest.4 
 Welby’s main focus throughout her life was the problem of signifying (of 
meaning and communication through verbal signs) and the need for a critical 
interpretation of language and meaning which led her ultimately to propose a new 
philosophy of language. She coined the term Significs to indicate a particular focus she 
wished to place on her theory of signs and meaning and to distinguish it from other 
theories of language, as for instance, the philological-historical semantics of Michel 
Bréal. Instead, she focused on the generative nature of signifying processes and on their 
capacity for development and transformation as a condition of human experiential, 
cognitive, and expressive capacities.5 Engaged with the philosophical, scientific and 
psychological debates of the second half of the nineteenth century, and especially with 
the operation of language, mind and interpretation, Welby became acutely aware of the 
inadequacies of language which, she found, stemmed from the misconception of 
language as a system of fixed meanings. As such, she explained, language tended ‘to 
provide canons and limitations of permanent values’ thus hindering communication 
and understanding.6 She lamented the fact that although there has been an immense 
                                                     
4 S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 15. 
5 S. Petrilli. “Sign, Meaning and Understanding in Victoria Welby and Charles S. peirce.” Signs and 
Society. Vol. 3 n. 1 (2015): 71-102, p. 72. 
6 V. Welby. Quoted in Timothy J. Reiss. “Significs: The Analysis of Meaning as Critique of Modernist 
Culture.” Foundations of Semiotics. Essay on Significs. PapersPresented on the occasion of the 150th 
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advance in knowledge, thanks to scientific discoveries, ‘there has been no 
corresponding advance and no revolution of expression of this knowledge and of its 
relation to and effect upon philosophical preconceptions and systems.’7 Writing 
towards the end of the 1890s, she further expounds upon the problem of language and 
meaning by stating that: ‘at present, language betrays a disastrous lack of power to 
adapt itself to the growing needs of experience.’8 She understood the need to free 
language from obsolete theories and practices and she believed that this could be 
resolved only by recognising the live nature of language, which grows and changes 
with the development of human experience. Significs was thus conceived as a method 
to overcome the inadequate understanding of language as a fixed system of signs. In 
one of her many attempts to define Significs and its aim she says that: 
Significs is to be seen as a way out of even more stagnant, indeed 
retrograde culture. Knowledge had become hidebound and dormant. 
Both are caught in the repetition of dead metaphors imposed upon us by 
our language, which betrays a disastrous lack of power to adapt itself to 
the growing needs of experience. This difficulty is confronted by any 
writer who wishing to approach new ways of thinking, has to cope with 
the disability of having to write in those very idioms and to use those 
very figures of speech which needs in some cases to be superseded, in 
others to be vivified, to be raised to a higher power of significance. How 
can one avoid perpetuating the old deadlocks of thought?9   
Unlike  her contemporaries, such as Thomas Huxley for instance who believed that ‘it 
really matters very little in what sense terms are used, so long as the same meaning is 
always rigidly attached to them,’10 she was keenly aware that language is not fixed or 
invariable. On the contrary, language she saw as being highly context dependent and 
as such is ‘plastic’, or flexible and endowed with the capacity of ‘expressive 
ambiguity’ that renders it capable of adaptation and renewal to ever new expressive 
                                                     
anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912).  Ed. H.W. Schmitz. Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins Publication, 1990, p. 75. 
7 V. Welby. What is Meaning? Studies in the Development of Significance. London: Macmillan, 1903, 
p. 59. 
8 Ibid, p. 2. 
9 V. Welby. Quoted in H.W. Schmitz and E. Eschbach, op.cit., 1990, p. 63. 
10 T. Huxley. Quoted in V. Welby. Grains of Sense. London: J.M. Dent, 1897, p. 10. 
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situations.11 Welby recognised that plasticity is an essential characteristic of thought 
and language, since linguistic expressions are dynamic and alive in a way similar to 
living organisms. This is why she established an analogy between word and context 
and stated that they adapt to each other in the same way as the organisms adapt to the 
environment.12 As discussed in Chapter Four, a similar analogy had been proposed by 
George Eliot and G. H. Lewes. However, there is an important difference between 
these views. Where Lewes concentrated solely upon verbal language, Welby included 
non-verbal language in her study of signifying processes.13 As Petrilli explains, ‘part 
of her broader understanding of signifying processes went beyond the verbal.’14 
Indeed, by understanding plasticity as the capacity for creating connections, and as a 
necessary condition for successful communication in both the cultural and organic 
world, Welby prefigured important developments in twentieth-century semiotics and 
biosemiotics.15 
Welby developed her views on the plasticity of language and consequently her 
evolutionary view of meaning, partly as a result of engagement with discussions on 
biblical exegesis, in which she, like Newman before her, realised the need to consider 
religious questions in relation to other spheres of research and investigation. In this 
respect she proposed a new interpretive-cognitive method to the study of language, 
which she called translation. This consisted in relating things (signs) that seem distant 
from one another, but in reality present a homological similarity. By contrast to the 
analogical method which indicates surface similarity, the homological method 
                                                     
11 S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 21. 
12 V. Welby, op.cit.,1903, p. 60.  
13 Although there is no direct reference in Welby’s work to George Eliot, there is however reference to 
Lewes’s Problems to Life and Mind in her monograph What is Meaning. This suggests that Welby was 
aware of Lewes’s work and thought and indirectly also of Eliot’s writing since the last two volumes of 
Lewes’ work were edited by Eliot herself. Moreover, Welby entertained a long correspondence with 
Herbert Spencer whom both Eliot and Lewes knew. 
14 S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 29. 
15 Ibid., pp .360-361. 
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searches for profound structural and functional relationships which are expressed 
through figurative language and more precisely through metaphor. Once such example 
of homology is presented by Welby in her last monograph Significs and Language 
(1911) where she discusses the concept of beauty and meaning in language on the basis 
of the similarity with the language of music. Her view was that translation from one 
sign system to another was instrumental to the development of meaning, since it 
implied the ability to look at signs with the eyes of the other, developing them further 
across different verbal and non-verbal sign systems. She also claimed that all signs and 
expressions are in themselves the open result of translation and that knowledge and 
experience are generated or developed through these processes whereby signs from 
different sign systems (verbal and non-verbal) interact. Translation understood in these 
terms is not to be seen as concerning the human world alone but it emerges as a 
constitutive modality of semiosis.16 
Welby’s evolutionary view of language also grew out of her keen interest and 
engagement with biological sciences, in particular Darwin’s evolutionary theory. The 
influence of Darwin’s theory on Lady Welby’s thought has been largely documented. 
Timothy Reiss observes that ‘Darwin’s reference behind Welby’s work is common 
place.’17 Nevertheless, Darwin’s theory was influential in Welby’s overall 
understanding of language as a living organism that continually evolves, grows and 
develops. This is reflected in her statement that ‘as life rises in scale and worth, it rises 
in significance.’18 As humans develop, Welby asserts, so they adapt themselves to the 
environment (or fail to do so) and this type adaptation is what she calls experience. 
Such experience, Welby argues ‘is by definition meaningful, it is a way in which 
                                                     
16 S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, pp. 517-538. 
17 T. J. Reiss. “Significs: The Analysis of meaning as a Critique of Modernist Culture,” op.cit., 1990, 
pp. 63-83, p. 67.  
18 V. Welby. What is Meaning? Studies in the Development of Significance. London: MacMillan and 
Co., Ltd., 1903, p. 10. 
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events are provided with meaning.’ If experience changes as the organism adapts itself, 
it follows that the symbolic orders (language) used to ascribe meaningfulness must 
develop and adapt along with them.19 
Another Darwinian overtone in Welby’s thought is seen in her later 
conceptualisation of the relatedness and continuity between the biological and cultural 
realm. She expressed this continuity through the meaning triad sense-meaning-
significance, whereby meaning and significance are specific to the human dimension, 
whereas sense or what she later termed Mother-Sense, is to be understood as the  
immediate or interpretive intuition which she equates with the spontaneous reaction of 
an organism to its environment. Understood in this way, sense is common to all 
organisms being a pre-condition for evolutionary adaptation and therefore survival. In 
other words, Mother-Sense, in its organic conceptualisation, becomes for Welby a 
form of knowledge necessary for the survival of human race. Welby identified the 
concept of Mother-Sense as being the originating source of sense and meaning of all 
signifying processes at large which she believed are shared by all living organisms. In 
light of Sebeok’s concept of language as modelling device, Mother-Sense could thus 
be seen as a condition for the acquisition of knowledge through different sign systems 
(verbal and non-verbal) that are constitutive of human semiosis. 
In order to explore the importance of Welby’s particular take on the theory of 
language, and her original contribution to discourses on language, communication and 
interpretation in the second half of the nineteenth century, the focus here is on the 
original concept of Mother-Sense since it plays a central role in Welby’s 
conceptualisation of signifying and interpretive processes and in the modelling of 
worldviews. Since Mother-Sense is the generating source of meaning resulting from 
                                                     
19 Ibid., p. 27. 
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the ability to associate things that seem distant from each other, and to be able to do 
so is the result of a seemingly spontaneous grasp of some relation of similarity, I will 
argue that this concept echoes Peirce’s abductive logic. Second, I will explore how 
Welby’s emphasis on the need to recover the creative capacity of human intellect, that 
is Mother-Sense,  brought her to engage in her early writings with theories of meaning 
and interpretation in relation to religious matters in which she advocates the need to 
understand language in its dynamic and evolutionary form. Third, I will discuss 
Welby’s understanding of inferential processes and her introduction of ‘translation’ as 
an interpretive-cognitive method necessary for understanding and creative discovery, 
on the one hand, and as the key capacity for understanding the interconnectedness and 
interdependency among signs on the other.  
The discussion on inferential processes will explore Welby’s insistence on the 
importance of figurative language and its organic evolving quality, what she termed 
plasticity, in relation to her meaning triad and the consequent postulation of continuity 
between the natural and cultural realm through the evolutionary development of 
signifying processes. Finally, while considering the implications of the signifying 
processes in the development of meaning and experience, this chapter will discuss the 
interrelation between organic sense and mental life in order to show how signifying 
processes at large are shared by all living organisms in non-verbal domains.  
The concept of Mother-Sense as the generative source of Sense and 
Meaning 
Central to Welby’s thought system and her analysis of language and signifying 
processes is the original concept of Mother-Sense or what she subsequently called 
Primal-Sense. Mother-Sense is thematised by Welby as the generating matrix of the 
human capacity for language, for knowledge acquisition and experience, for the 
development of consciousness and ultimately for worldview. Mother-Sense is also 
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described as the originating source of sense and meaning, the capacity for 
interpretation and for solving problems. Although she formulated this term around the 
1890s she only elaborated her concept in a series of unpublished manuscripts at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.20 Encouraged by the public debate on Eugenics 
(founded by Sir Francis Galton 1822-1911) to which she contributed with two papers 
respectively in May 1904 and February 1905,21 she wrote a later essay entitled ‘Primal 
Sense and Significs’ (1907). In this essay she insisted on the importance of Mother-
Sense as a creative force that precedes mechanisms of control as enacted through the 
constitution of language and logic and she states that the so called rationalising 
intellect, the faculty for rational construction and critique, is only a subsequent 
development of Mother-Sense.22 In his discussion to the central role played by Mother-
Sense in Lady Welby’s Significs, Luke Simmons highlights the interrelation 
established by her between ‘intuitive knowledge’ and ‘rational knowledge’ and points 
out that it was on Mother-Sense or the ‘primordial method of mind’ that Welby founds 
her Significs.23 The relation between Mother-Sense and Significs is also discussed by 
Welby in the above mentioned essay in the following terms:  
Primal Sense is what takes up and supplies to us the material of 
immediate awareness, conscious and interpretive. It is the successor in 
evolution, or constitutes a further stage in value, of the animal’s instinct. 
It is thus primordial and universal, at all stages of human development; 
though varying greatly in the part which it plays in the thought-life of 
human beings at such stages. And as Primal sense is the Mother of 
senses, it is still occasionally found in women. [...] It is just here that 
the place and work of Significs is to be found, as the necessary link – 
rather, the medium of interpretive communication – between the 
constant ‘givings’ of Mother-Sense and the constant ‘constructions’ (in 
all senses) of the intellect.24  
                                                     
20 These papers and manuscripts are stored in the Welby Collection (Box 28, subject file 24) in the York 
University Archives and Special Collections in Toronto Canada. A selection of those are now published 
in S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, pp. 650-715. 
21 S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 573. 
22 Ibid., pp. 574-575. 
23 L. Simons. ‘Regaining Victoria Welby.’Editorial. The Semiotic Review of Books. Vol. 14 n. 1 (2004): 
1-4, pp. 3-4. 
24 V. Welby. “Primal Sense and Significs” in S. Petrilli, op.cit, 2009, pp. 574-575. 
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In the passage quoted above Welby distinguishes between Mother-Sense, on the 
one hand, and intellect or what she also termed Father-Sense on the other. The 
intention behind this distinction was to separate two main modalities: one being the 
generation and the other being the interpretation of sense. These, as Welby points out, 
may be separated only hypothetically, since in practice they were interrelated. Welby 
associated Mother-Sense with the generating source of sense and the capacity for 
knowledge achieved through perception and intuition which are traits that are 
commonly found in women. Although the woman emerges as its main guardian and 
disseminator, Mother-Sense is ‘an inheritance common to humanity.’25 On the other 
hand, Father-Sense, associated with intellect, alludes to the acquisition of knowledge 
through assertion, generalisation, experimentation in science and logic. This type of 
knowledge is traditionally entrusted to man; however, Welby noted, such knowledge 
is common to both male and female and should not be understood as a special male 
propensity.  
In terms of logic, according to Welby, the term intellect refers to that type of 
inferential process akin to deduction and induction. In contrast, Mother-Sense alludes 
to ‘the creative and generative forces of sense resulting from and in the capacity to 
associate things which would seem distant from each other while in fact they are 
mutually attracted to each other.’26  Therefore it alludes to the capacity of identifying 
homological relations among signs. Understood in these terms, Mother-Sense thus 
refers to that type of inferential processes associated with Peirce’s abductive logic or 
Bateson’s syllogism in grass, and is therefore not separated from intellect, but 
                                                     
25 S. Petrilli, “Gift-giving, Mother-Sense and Subjectivity in Victoria Welby: A study in Semioethics.” 
Il Dono/The Gift A Feminist Analysis. Athanor: Semiotica, Filosofia, Arte. Letteratura. Vol. XV n. 8 
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26 Ibid. p.182. Welby alludes here to the form of metaphoric working of Peircean iconic signs. It is 
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associated, respectively, to symbolicity and indexicality. Instead, abduction and in Welby’s case 
mother-sense represent the side of signifying processes oriented by the iconic dimension of signs which 
follows the logic of similarity and difference. 
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antecedent to it. In this respect, the implications of Mother-Sense, Petrilli observes, 
emerge even more when we consider it in the light of Sebeok’s understanding of 
language as modelling.27 Like Mother-Sense, the primary modelling device, is 
necessary for the acquisition and generation of knowledge through the various verbal 
and non-verbal systems that constitute human behaviour. As a modelling device, 
Mother-Sense, is the condition that makes the generation of infinite worldviews 
possible in potentially unending signifying processes.  
As a creative force, Mother-Sense, Petrilli observes, ‘includes Father-Sense, 
whereas the converse is not true.’28 For this reason Welby feels it is important to 
recover the original dialogic relationship between both, because true knowledge is 
possible only through an active cooperation of both. She sees Significs as the necessary 
link between the two. It is important to stress here that Welby does not establish a 
separation between sexes on the basis of the concept of sense. Mother-Sense should 
not, in fact, be confused with ‘feminine’ or ‘female’ or ‘woman.’ On the contrary, 
understood as the capacity for sense and significance, the concept should be seen as 
an a priori, as transcending gender differences since it indicates a condition that invests 
both sexes. Ferdinand C. Shiller was very critical of the term and in a letter to Lady 
Welby dated 2nd October 1907 he suggested to replace the term with common-sense 
in order to avoid oversimplified readings of her position. He felt that the term Mother-
Sense could be mistakenly interpreted as excluding the male sex, or as he put it: 
But why should you not identify your Mother-sense with Common-
sense and call it (mainly) that? It is what at bottom you mean – the 
wisdom of the ‘tout le monde’ which is wiser than the sages, which 
pervades Society and its history and is rarely formulated and never 
adequately expressed in set logical terms. It is truly ‘common’ in that 
it can be fathered upon no one, and in that it is at the basis of our 
‘common’ life in society; it is also ‘mother,’ in that the logical 
acumen grows out of it. I am also willing to believe that women in 
                                                     
27 See S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2015, p. 12. 
28 S. Petrilli. op.cit., 2015, p. 10. 
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general, when one gets beneath the surface of their frivolities and 
follies have retained a closer contact with this force and that e.g. the 
‘maternal instinct’ will (despite all appearance to the contrary) 
triumph over ‘race-suicide’ temptations, if only women are given a 
free hand in the regulation of things. So you would have ample reason 
for calling this ‘common-sense’ a ‘Mother-sense,’ but the more you 
emphasised the former phrase the more intelligible you would 
become to the mere male!29 
 
Welby chose to avoid the term common because of its negative associations. In her 
response to Schiller’s letter she agrees that the term ‘mother’ could potentially be 
interpreted reductively, as when it is identified with a mere organic or biological sense. 
This is why she uses the term Primal-Sense as another option. In a text dated 30th June 
1908 she explains that: 
My own transition (as a matter of precaution) from ‘mother’ to 
‘primal’ (with, as variant, ‘primary’) Sense, is an illustration of the 
difficulties created by our neglect of Significs. For it ought to be 
understood at once, that in such a context as mine I cannot possibly 
mean by Mother-sense, mainly, still less only, the shrewd or practical 
insight of the typical ‘mother’ in the actual or organic sense.  
Naturally I mean a primordial, inceptive, inborn, need-fertilised, 
danger-prompted, interest stimulated, Sense. ‘Mother’ is indeed or 
ought to be, the wide and general, ‘Father’ the specialised, term. The 
pre-sexual organism was the maternal, and included the paternal 
element. We already recognise this in our philosophical and scientific 
use of the term Matrix. We never, in this connection, use the term 
Patrix; and we are quite right. The ‘mother’ is enabled by stimulus to 
conceive, develop, nourish new life.30 
 
Welby’s insistence on the use of Primal or Mother-Sense was to indicate the necessity 
to recover the creative and critical capacity that was common to all human beings 
regardless of any gender differences. Welby does not refuse the dominant logic, of 
which she recognises the incalculable value, but she appeals to constructive criticism 
in relation to cognitive and interpretive models. Although Welby was writing at the 
time when women were challenging their role in society with vigorous support from 
                                                     
29 F. C. Schiller to V. Welby in S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 632. 
30 L. Welby in S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 710. 
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such figures as John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and John Ruskin (1819-1900)31 who 
openly rejected gender inequalities, she never actively engaged in any form of feminist 
writing.32 Having said that, in her contribution to the discussion on Eugenics at the 
meeting organised by the Sociological Society in 1904, she attempted to point out the 
possibility of women making a contribution to the Eugenics goal - that of developing 
innate human qualities to the greatest advantage of humankind - by emphasising the 
importance of a woman’s responsibility in society as a consequence of her being 
endowed with a larger share of the so called intuition or Mother-Sense. This is why, 
Welby believed, women were responsible to hand it down to future generations.33 
However, in the light of evolutionary theories prevailing at the time, Welby believed 
that Mother-Sense is a homogeneous faculty, an organic form of knowledge, necessary 
for the survival of human race and as such is common to both men and women. 
 One of the main tasks assigned to Significs, as Welby pointed out in the essay 
‘Primal-Sense and Significs’ was precisely that of recovering the relation between 
logic (intellect) and the creative part of human understanding, that is, Mother-Sense, 
which Welby tirelessly promoted as the generative force of all signifying processes 
and interpretation that would go beyond the conventions of any social, moral and 
religious order. Welby’s emphasis on the need to recover the creative capacity of 
human intellect and her view on the relation between practices of signification and 
interpretation developed as a result of her early engagement with discussions in 
religious matters. These (see also below), included her quest for an updated 
                                                     
31 J. S. Mill. The Subjection of Women. London: Longmans. 1869; J. Ruskin. Sesame and Lilies. Three 
Lectures. Chicago: Belford, Clarke, 1900. 
32 Sophia Melanson discusses the importance of Welby’s Significs within a feminist context and draws 
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33 H. W. Schmitz. Ed. and introduction. V. Welby. Significs and Language. The Articulate form of our 
Expressive and Interpretive Resources. In Foundations of Semiotics. Vol. 5. Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1985, pp. LXVIII-LXXIII. 
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interpretation of the Christian doctrine and its critical reinterpretation, which were 
based on Welby’s s organic and evolutionary view of language.  
Biblical Exegesis: towards Significs as the theory of Meaning 
Welby’s early research, which eventually led her to propose a general theory of 
meaning and communication in her later monographs What is Meaning (1903) and 
Significs and Language (1911), was dedicated to religious, theological and exegetical 
questions which she re-interpreted in the light of progress in sciences. Walter Schmitz 
comments that it is not known why Welby felt motivated to deal with religious and 
theological questions.34 However, Welby herself makes a particularly noteworthy 
comment on her motivations for doing so. In a letter written to C. K. Ogden on the 24th 
December 1910 she wrote:  
As to religion! That is where I began. I found out that none of us knew 
where we were and what we were battling for at the very centre of life, 
that which ought to focus all our interests and powers.35  
Here Welby expresses a common preoccupation about religion and faith which, as I 
discussed in Chapter Two above, stemmed from discoveries in science with its 
consequent feeling of disinheritance due to doubts about the truth of Christianity and 
its morality on the one hand, and about the correct interpretation of the Bible on the 
other. It is worth recalling that one basis for the dispute on biblical exegesis was the 
changing notion of language. This was either seen as immutable and God given or as 
organic and therefore as developing over time. The consequence of these contrasting 
views was that biblical writing was either bound to a dogmatic and fixed interpretation 
or was perceived more as a historical document and therefore subject to intentionalist 
accounts of it meaning. Echoing Newman, Welby reacted against the former view in 
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35 Ibid., p. xxviii. 
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the light of her evolutionary understanding of language as being flexible and mutable, 
and denounced the short-sighted tendency to assert orthodoxy and dogma over 
interpretation and meaning.  
Welby addressed these issues of dogma in a passage entitled ‘Recognition’ in 
her volume Links and Clues (1881), which she published under the pseudonym Vita. 
Asking whether the Church is the custodian of dogma she answers: ‘If by dogma we 
mean given expression, definitions of truths, yes.’36 Welby reiterated this view in her 
later monograph, What is Meaning?:Studies in the Development of Significance (1903) 
where she argued that ‘orthodoxy is of course a good thing insofar as it preserves 
tradition and order, and makes for reverence, dignity and truth. But, when as now, it is 
supposed to give canons and limitations of permanent value [...] it must inevitably 
bring about the results upon thought which we see: the cutting off or nipping or 
starving of the buds of original power.’37 Her critique was addressed against the 
ecclesiastic authority for its lack of critical thinking about the nature of truth and 
knowledge. She felt that truth can never be defined behind the fixity of canons, 
convention and dogmas and believed that the Holy Scriptures needed to be freed from 
what she saw as prejudice in interpretation reductively understood as decodification.  
As she explains in a letter to the anti-Christian theist Charles Voysey, her aim 
in writing Links and Clues (1881) was to ‘reverse the prevailing interpretations of the 
new testament and to reconcile the meaning of the whole with our reason and 
conscience.’38 What is especially interesting about the way Welby intended to do so 
was her method of text interpretation which differed greatly from any other attempt by 
                                                     
36 V. Welby. Links and Clues. London: Macmillan, 1881, p. 102. 
37 V. Welby, op.cit.,1903,  p. 55.  
38 Lady Welby to Charles Voysey. Echoes Larger than Life: A Selection of Early Correspondence of 
Victoria Lady Welby, 1879-1891. Ed. Mrs Henry-Cust, London: Jonathan Cape, 1929, p. 39. 
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her contemporaries, as it was based on her original understanding of language and 
meaning. Welby asserted that 
the freer we are from the bondage of confounding sign with the thing 
signified, event with the essential truth manifested by it, flesh with spirit, 
the freer to use sign in the spirit of loving obedience, and be blessed in 
our deed through it.39  
In other words, her conception of meaning transcended the pure arbitrary use of 
language and encompassed different fields of knowledge and research in order to 
generate new forms of discourse. These ideas are referred to more obliquely in the 
preface of Links and Clues in which in the quest for truth, understanding and creativity, 
she claimed she was not presenting a system of thought, but rather some suggestions 
which ‘acted as links between divided souls and clues for bewildered hearts’ and which 
were inspired uniquely by the Bible and the Book of Nature.40  By asserting that these 
suggestions were inspired by both religious and scientific discourse, Welby already 
highlighted the need to update the religious discourse in the light of scientific 
innovations thus echoing Newman’s earlier view (and perhaps reflecting Darwin’s 
thinking upon her own unfolding thinking). Moreover, Welby’s early views on this 
already point towards the elaboration, firstly, that religion was, as she viewed it, a 
system of signs and values that interacts with other systems and, secondly, her 
theorizing of an interpretive process whereby meaning is generated in terms of the 
capacity for responding to signs creatively and critically.  
In this respect it is interesting to note how the book Links and Clues is organised 
into a series of entries on specific themes that deal with sacred scripture, its 
interpretation, truth, knowledge, science, art and ethics showing how all these spheres 
are linked through a common interpretive process which she later came to recognise 
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as a signifying process rooted in Mother-Sense or what Peirce calls abduction. Paul 
Chipchase notes that the originality of Links and Clues ‘lies as much in the way it is 
organised as in the brilliance of its disintegrative criticism.’41 Although it is true that 
Welby was evidently deeply critical of religious discourse, Chipchase’s view that her 
criticism was disintegrative seems to be, however, at odds with Welby’s intentions to 
interrogate and reread the religious discourse in another key. Also, the positive reviews 
Links and Clues received seem to suggest that her criticism was largely well accepted. 
For example, this short extract from the letter written by Charles Kingsley testifies the 
need to update religious discourse in the way Welby suggested: ‘I am glad that anyone 
should speak as you [...] of so many things, in short, which “religious books” are for 
ever misleading people. Truth is one! but men see it through coloured glasses’.42 Also 
the Reverend F.G.M. Powell expressed his positive view about the book by saying that 
he lent it to a friend who was deeply impressed by her work and indebted to her ‘for 
having given him food for thought enough to last a lifetime.’43 Thus Welby’s 
conceptualisation of a familiar critique of biblical writings can be seen as both 
disruptive and an important contribution at the time.  
At the centre of Links and Clues is the preoccupation with meaning and the 
ambiguity of language. She considers how a single text or a simple word can be given 
different meanings and may therefore generate different interpretations. In the opening 
pages of Links and Clues, Welby reflects on the limits of human language, which leads, 
inevitably, to misunderstanding not only of texts but most importantly of the Holy 
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Scripture as a whole. She criticises a mechanical understanding of language which 
emphasises a rigid interpretation of meaning in a text, and she suggests that: 
Too many of us have not only looked on Holy Scripture as one dead 
level of mechanical inspiration, but have been content to accept and 
adopt, not only conventional, but even corrupt meanings of words.44  
Here Welby echoes both Newman and Eliot in denouncing the tendency to view 
language as having a technical precision in providing us with univocal, single 
meanings to words.  She criticises the concepts of ‘plain or obvious meaning’ and that 
of ‘plain common sense meaning’ as in her view they create obscurity as a 
consequence of reducing plurivocal meaning to univocal. Welby also points out that 
the term ‘sense’ has to be understood in its double reference: negatively as a reduction 
to simple, plain text, or positively as a kind of an a priori of signifying processes. In 
other words, what Welby identifies as the positive aspect of sense is what she called 
in her later work Primal-Sense or Mother-Sense, namely the primary part of or the 
necessary condition for all signifying processes in both the biological and cultural 
realm. Mother-Sense, is worth repeating here, is the ability to connect ideas or to 
associate things that would seem distant from one another or even contradictory. From 
a biosemiotic perspective, Mother-Sense can be likened to the iconic and indexical 
dimension of sign-relations, which are hidden from conscious reasoning and which are 
grounded in the logic of abduction. As discussed in Chapter One, the logic of abduction 
rests on the inferential processes which are based on patterns of similarity and 
difference, or rather on metaphor-like processes. For Welby, similarly, Mother-Sense 
is the condition for the interpretive process of meaning which is generated in terms of 
a creative response to signs. 
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Another important aspect that Welby raises in Links and Clues and that is 
strictly related to Welby’s understanding of Mother-Sense is the discussion of truth 
and attainment of knowledge. Here she starts her argument by pointing out that truth, 
just like language, is not univocal. That is, truth is not inherent in definitions or 
definitive formulae, but is open to creative discovery found in the plasticity of signs. 
In order to elaborate her view, Welby gives an example of how inadequate is human 
perception of truth by saying that if four people were looking at the planet Earth 
through four separate telescopes and each having a radius of a few miles and unable 
to change telescopes, they would each produce a different and contradictory truth 
about the planet. Such truths wouldn’t necessarily be wrong, but only partial as those 
men looking with the telescopes would say that all the Earth is either covered in water, 
forest, or mountain. And that would be so only because ‘they would use the word “all” 
instead of saying that What I see.’45 She proceeds to argue that things, in order to unite 
in central truth, must come from many quarters, each the opposite of another. 
Are not extremes discordant and divided because they don’t go far 
enough? […] Are not “extreme” thinkers opposed because they are 
unconsciously at the two ends of the segment of a circle of truth, so great 
that the curve is imperceptible by us; so that if they only would go on, 
on, they would all at last find the point of union?46  
What Welby seems to be suggesting is that truth is not sanctioned by dogma, but 
is to be found in the ability to see things from different perspectives that potentially 
unify, or even perhaps in the ability to recognise patters of similarity and difference. 
A significant aspect of Welby’s discussion of truth and knowledge is related to her 
consideration of the relations between Light and Knowledge, where the metaphor of 
God as Light becomes a significant religious analogy. 
Light, life, love – how these three thoughts, taken together, help us in 
conceiving a threefold perfectness, The Triune Glory! But of the three, 
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love alone fully includes the other two. We can conceive light without 
love, as knowledge; of light without life, only revealing, manifesting it. 
But we say the light, the life of love; and this is a fuller thought than the 
love of light or life.47 
Petrilli observes that the metaphor of light as truth and knowledge, as well as 
illumination indicates that the possibility or the idea of ‘seeing beyond vision, of 
knowing beyond knowledge,’ is as an act of abductive logic.48 The metaphor of light 
is also particularly poignant if we consider it from the standpoint found in the Book of 
Genesis. Light was in fact God’s first creation as he uttered ‘Fiat Lux!’49 (Let there be 
light) while on the last day the miracle was to endow man with Lumen Animae (the 
illumination of the soul) or Reason. According to the Book of Genesis, God created 
light before the sun, moon, and stars which appear on the fourth day. Howard Schwartz 
argues that the light thus created is a primordial light which is different from the sun.50 
It is this type of light, the primordial or the pre-rational one that becomes important in 
Welby’s concept of ‘Primal-Sense’ or ‘Mother-Sense.’  
As observed in the previous discussion, Welby also links Mother-Sense with the 
construction and interpretation of worldviews that ultimately afford new knowledge 
and truth.51 Petrilli notes that Welby defined sense as ‘knowledge that is instinctively 
religious, where religious has to be understood in etymological sense of the term 
religare, to link, unite or relate together.’52 The concept of Mother-Sense thus 
understood, presents similarities to Newman’s concept of ‘illative sense’ and to 
Peirce’s concept of abduction, inasmuch as they refer to that non-conscious capacity 
which, as Peirce argues, is necessary for responding to any sign creatively and for the 
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49 New Jerusalem Bible, Genesis 1:3. 
50 H. Schwartz. Tree of Souls: The Mythology of Judaism. Oxford University Press, 2004, p.85. 
51 The metaphor of Light will be used by Welby in other important writings such as the essay ‘Light’, 
printed in 1886, and in the parable ‘The Evolution of Heliology’, also printed in 1886 where she 
develops the metaphor of light as knowledge and criticizes the myth of the sun. Another important essay 
is ‘Light and Its Meaning’ which also appeared, together with ‘The Evolution of Heliology’ and ‘Light’ 
in her collection of parables and short essays entitled Grains of Sense (1897). 
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acquisition of knowledge and truth. Thus for Welby, true knowledge cannot be 
regulated by authority or given a definitive formula, but must be open for critical 
creativity; in other words be open to semiosis. She further develops the point of God 
as light in a letter to Lynn Linton, where she writes 
God is revealed as Light – in order to clear. God being Light does not 
follow that every intelligible question implies an intelligible answer, 
and that we are intended not to rest content until we find it? If we were 
incapable of receiving an answer, we should be incapable of 
conceiving the corresponding question. Each seeking “why?” is put 
into our hearts by the very Light, whereby we are at least to learn the 
answer. Our measure of what Light can do for us, morally, 
intellectually, spiritually is too often poor and contracted; and thus the 
advancing growth of men’s awakening faculties, the increasing area of 
scientific, historical and general knowledge, tends to deprive us of 
what little light we have; we tremble and we dare not look God’s own 
facts in the face, we shiver in a darkness miscalled faith. Yet even what 
we are not able yet to see we may sometimes, if we will use God’s gift, 
infer [...] Whole worlds of truth are surely hidden in the depths of the 
Living Word, ready for the patient and faithful inquirer, which uses 
fearlessly the instruments which God himself has given him, and as 
Light shall enable him to apply.53  
In this letter Welby criticizes the tendency to see truth as a definitive doctrine, a fixed 
meaning instead of seeing it as innovation. Truth, as she says in the last paragraph of 
her letter, is hidden in the living word. That is, it coincides with life and it cannot be 
rigid. She insists on the fact that in order to find truth one should use God’s gift, or the 
lumen anime, since modern scientific method would necessarily leave us in darkness. 
Importantly, such truth should be expressed not in dogmas, but with the living power 
of language which cannot be fixed, but should be allowed to be what it is, flexible and 
ever changing.  
This view about truth and language has a resounding similarity with Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s idea that language is an accurate description of Truth. In his ‘On Truth and 
Lying in a Non-Moral Sense’ (1873), Nietzsche argues that the belief that Euclidian 
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language with its emphasis on precision and logical/ denotative clarity is somehow true 
to nature is plainly erroneous since all language is essentially poetry, inherently 
metaphorical. A metaphor is by definition a figure of speech where relations are 
identified among seemingly different fields of experience. What this implies is the fact 
that language not only is creative, but is open to different interpretations, hence there 
couldn’t be one definitive Truth, but truth is, in Nietzsche's poignant phrase, ‘a mobile 
army of metaphors.’54 Welby used the metaphor of God as Light to criticize the 
imposition of dogma and the conventional canons of knowledge, not only in the 
Church, but also in lay institutions. She promoted a critical and active interrogation 
against passive acceptance of the sacred Truths and highlighted the importance of 
looking beyond the plain written word since the answers are not contained in words 
themselves, but in their metaphors or rather in their relation to all things, to life:  
We are ever tempted to assume that what is not revealed in plain words 
is not revealed at all. But running through every thought of mine will be 
found this main clue - the mother of many – that there is much implied 
in the words of Christ especially, and in the Holy Scripture generally, 
which, not lying on the surface, is to be discerned by the light of what 
He is: and that we are not merely to learn from words alone [...] For the 
Word of love and life interprets alike [...]55  
In a letter to Max Müller, Welby reiterated this point by saying that the only way we 
can define God is through ‘perceptible or intelligible things’. However, she felt that we 
should look ‘beyond the word, significance beyond meaning.’56 She was convinced 
that in order to find Truth and knowledge we should be ready to acknowledge the 
presence of many voices and not only one. This voice, she denounced, was usually 
anthropocentric. Truth, according to Welby’s view, is plurivocal, that is, it brings 
together different views and voices from different fields of research. As such it cannot 
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 201 
 
be rigidly attributed to specific concepts, ideas and disciplines. In the section entitled 
‘Truth’ Welby writes the following  
Things, in order to unite in central truth, must come from many quarters, 
each the opposite of some other - the line of which, if carried through 
the centre, would join and run in its opposite. The unity of truth to which 
all must converge involves the diversity and thus the apparent 
contradiction of converging paths to it.57 
Welby’s seminal idea of truth considered as an open process between different fields 
of research, and more precisely between the scientific and religious spheres, was 
further developed in an essay she published anonymously in the ‘Church Quarterly 
Review’ in 1888. In ‘Truthfulness in Science and Religion’ which was originally 
intended as a critical comment on Thomas Huxley’s essay entitled ‘Science and 
Bishops’ (1887), she analysed the concept of truthfulness as it emerged in the relation 
between science and religion. She criticises both scientists and theologians for their 
dogmatism and authoritarianism. She maintains that science and religion need not to 
be reconciled, since they both stem from the same principle. As she puts it ‘they radiate 
from one centre,’58 though she acknowledges that they pertain to two different 
domains. Here, ‘science can be separated from life and from personal intercourse’ 
whereas theology ‘introduces us, by communion to a living being.’59 Yet, as she argues, 
[...] there are connexions which are absolutely essential and which must 
render for ever impossible the attempt to cut off from each other by a 
dividing wall these two domains so different in their nature and their 
productions. Although science considered as the observation of 
phenomena and their sequences is something wholly different from 
thinking, feeling, and willing, yet science considered as the act of 
observing carried on by living minds imperatively requires the whole 
three. The difference is great. Observation is one thing, the act of 
observing is another; no observations help us to know what the act of 
observing is and how it is done, and the ideal instrument of observation 
would seem to be some automatic machine by which facts of all sorts 
should be registered without any of the failures and uncertainties which 
attend the use of human faculties. But as it is, observations can only be 
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made by observing. And the science of the most rigidly scientific man 
is thereby brought into the same sphere of thinking, feeling, and willing 
to which religion belongs. It is in this way that science often becomes a 
kind of religion to those who follow it, both in respect of devotion and 
of moral power.60 
 
Welby here points out that although science is traditionally seen as being concerned 
with facts and observations, this view is however deficient since it doesn’t take into 
account the fact that any observation is mediated by an interpreting self – the thinking, 
feeling and willing being part of such self -  hence the ideal of a detached, mechanical 
understanding is untenable. Most importantly she underlines that those interpreting 
faculties are the same for the scientist and the theologian alike and she explains, 
echoing Newman, that: 
When we regard the subject from the side of religion we equally 
perceive the impossibility of divorcing it from science. Religion is a 
matter of thinking, feeling, and willing, while it hands over to science 
the whole body of facts. But we find that feeling, thinking, and willing 
are dependent upon facts. Certain conditions are necessary before these 
acts of the mind become possible; and when science informs us that no 
act of the mind can in our present life be performed without a 
corresponding material change in the brain, there cannot be a doubt that 
the information is of high importance to religion. When religion leads 
us to think about God, to love Him, and to will what He wills, it is 
implied that God exists, and that His will can be known to men, and 
these are facts. Religion requires a theology, and theology is a science 
which cannot renounce connexion with other sciences, or refuse to 
accommodate herself to them. The thinking, feeling, and willing, of 
which religion consists, must be attached to facts either past or future, 
either in heaven or earth: from facts these actions must set out, and to 
facts they must tend. And no fact can be wholly withdrawn from 
science.61 
 
 By stating that science and religion share the same principles, or have a common 
grammar, Welby also implied that they stem from the inferential process, akin to that 
advocated by Newman and Peirce, which is used for the search and attainment of truth. 
The question Welby raised is whether modern scientific method based on inferential 
processes of induction and deduction can account for all the things in man’s life and 
                                                     
60 Ibid., p. 199. 
61 Ibid., p. 200. 
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actions. She realised just like Newman and Peirce, that such method could only 
provide a partial understanding, therefore she introduced Significs as a methodology 
which aimed to bridge, as Petrilli describes, ‘the various sciences, theoretical trends, 
and practices in human experience, be they scientific or pertaining to everyday’s 
life.’62  In the following section I’m going to discuss in more detail Welby’s view on 
inferential processes and show how translation, which is based on the ability to shift 
from one sign system to another, becomes for Welby a method of understanding and 
interpretation and acquisition of new knowledge. 
Significs as the Philosophy of Translation 
 A determining influence in Welby’s studies during the 1880s was William K. 
Clifford’s Lectures and Essays (1879) which acquainted her with Clifford’s peculiar 
take on the inferential process of inductive reasoning. Petrilli points out that what 
Clifford identifies as inductive logic is similar to what Peirce termed abduction or 
retroduction63 which he defines as ‘the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis; 
as the only logical operation which introduces any new idea’ (CP 5.172). It was this 
understanding that prompted Welby to question the validity of deductive reasoning 
processes in her quest to explore what exists and that sharpened her attention to the 
need to solve the problem about meaning. She expressed her realisation in a letter to 
Sir F. Pollock thus: 
Two or three years ago I discovered that I had begun (so far as 
explanation went) at the wrong - deductive – end of things. So I forced 
my way back and down step by step; nowhere satisfied till I had got to 
what I saw must be admitted as primary by all. Having descended from 
philosophy and psychology through biology to physics and the very 
elements of experience, I found that below these even there still 
everywhere arose the prior question: What do we mean by time and 
space, motion and mass, body and consciousness, and so on? What do 
we mean by ‘mind’ and ‘self’- by ‘reason’ or ‘moral sense’? And to my 
                                                     
62 Ibid., p.102. 
63 S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 194. 
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amazement I seemed to find that no one had ever asked the question in 
my sense or even explicitly recognized that change in some sense 
underlies all continuity. It is not enough to meet such questions, as 
scientific men admit, by a mere restatement of the ordinary positions, 
however able and brilliant; for they are worthy of notice on the 
assumption that they may thus come from a deeper layer of experience, 
bringing us new and vital messages.64  
Welby saw that true research should not be bound to the desire to defend truths already 
possessed; instead it should be moved by the desire to discover which stems not only 
from rational inferences, but from a ‘deeper layer of experience’ which she found in 
meaning. Welby considered meaning to be the connective tissue not only between all 
aspects of life, but also between all disciplines such as art, philosophy, linguistics, 
psychology, science, and anthropology. She felt that there is a fundamental continuity 
between all these spheres and she found in the unique intellectual capacity of 
translation a way of transcending certain limits of discipline-specific approaches 
which she considered sometimes inadequate and certainly partial most of the time. 
Translation was, in Welby’s view, a method to gain new knowledge, which involved 
comparison, association and analogy among different fields of experience. To translate 
means to interpret, to illustrate one piece of knowledge or experience in the light of 
another, becoming itself a new experience thus creating an open array of new 
possibilities. This is why a fundamental aspect of translation is the view that language 
is flexible and thus capable of adaptation to ever new expressive situations. 
Welby formulated the concept of translation, as we know, in the early stages 
of her studies on language and expression and more specifically during the time when 
she was mostly concerned to update interpretation of the Christian doctrine in the light 
of progress in the sciences. In true spirit of her Significs and the concept of translation 
she saw religion as a system of signs and values that interacts with other systems. She 
attempted an experimental translation of parts of Dr Hughlings Jackson’s ‘Croonian 
                                                     
64 V. Welby to Pollock, in N. Cust, op.cit. 1929, p. 268. 
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Lectures of the Nervous System’ (1884), translating from one field of experience, the 
scientific, to the other, the religious, and vice versa, in order to show the validity of 
both discourses. She proceeded by analogy to show the links between the scientific 
language (that of the nervous system) and religious language (that of ethics and value).  
A similar attempt had been carried out by G. H. Lewes when he tried to marry 
biological discourse to other sorts of discourse with a rather different outcome to that 
of Welby’s translation. Let us compare the two attempts. The first is taken from 
Welby’s translation of the Croonian Lectures where the parts in italics, as Welby 
explains, are the direct verbal quotations from the lecture. The second is Lewes’ 
example which he proposed in volume IV of his Problems of life and Mind (1879) 
where the words in italics are those which Lewes borrowed from different disciplines 
with the aim of eliciting a more complex and questioning response in the reader and 
achieving what he called a unitary language:  
1. Progressive muscular atrophy begins in the most voluntary limb - 
the arm; and in its most voluntary part - the hand and fingers. So 
also progressively spiritual atrophy befalling a Church (or 
community) or an individual, may perhaps be said to begin in 
prayer its most voluntary practice. The atrophy of insight, leading 
to the decay of prophetic, that is revealing power, is not here 
considered.65  
2. We find the impersonal experiences of tradition accumulating for 
each individual a fund of knowledge, an instrument of Power that 
magnifies its existence.66  
 
There is a stark difference between the two attempts which shouldn’t be understood 
only along the lines of a different theme they propose, but in terms of methods they 
use. Where Welby translates and interprets a discourse in the light of the other, 
showing similitude by analogy and by metaphor, Lewes simply borrows terms from 
different disciplines, such as ‘accumulation’ and ‘fund of knowledge’ which are drawn 
                                                     
65 V. Welby quoted. in S.Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 524 
66 G. H. Lewes, quoted  in R. Rylance,  op.cit., 2000, p. 279.  
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from economics, or power which could be applied to physics, history, politics etc., and 
applies those to a cultural discourse.67 As mentioned earlier, Lewes’s method was used 
to elicit a questioning response in the reader, whereas Welby’s method was used to 
show how different signifying systems can interact and thus open new possibilities for 
the acquisition of knowledge. The importance of both attempts, however, lies in the 
fact that they rely on the use of the figurative power of language, that is, metaphors. 
According to Welby, metaphors enhance processes of knowledge, understanding and 
ultimately translation. It is through metaphor that we discover the unknown on the 
basis of the known and this is why they have, according to Welby, a vital role in the 
developing of human cognition and human behaviour.68  
Welby pondered on importance of the figurative dimension of language and 
metaphor in particular in her major monographs, What is Meaning (1903) and Significs 
and Language (1911), although she discussed it in her earlier essays ‘Meaning and 
Metaphor’ (1893), and ‘Sense, Meaning and Interpretation’ (1896) where she 
theorised the relation between metaphorical, figurative or indirect meaning and literal 
or actual meaning. She criticises the fact that literal meaning is possibly even more 
ambiguous than the figurative one, by asserting that: ‘Most certainly much that is 
called ‘literal’ is tinged with the figurative in varying degrees, not always easy to 
distinguish, even with the help of context.’69 She focused on the symbolic use of 
language and, in her essay discussed Huxley’s remark on the difficulty in using it and 
his comment on the difference between a ‘philosopher’ and an ‘ignorant’ person in 
                                                     
67 Ibid., p. 278. 
68 See D. Neubauer. “Lady Welby and the Interpretive Mind.” Semiotica.  Spec. Issue On and beyond 
Significs: Centennial Issue for Victoria Lady Welby (1837-1912). Vol. 196  n.1/4 (2013): 243-260.  
69 V. Welby. Meaning and Metaphor (1893). Reprinted in S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 422. 
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dealing with symbolism,70 she underlined the inadequacy of language in scientific 
inquiry by stating that:  
On all sides we have to use, as best we may, modes of expression that 
inevitably convey ambiguous meanings, even to the thoughtful, even to 
the trained mind, which cannot but carry with them a background of 
outgrown disproved premises, vitiating more or less every conclusion 
that we draw from them.71 
 
Some of the main issues of looking at these linguistic inadequacies are that they 
seem to be fixed and invariable in meaning and, permanently uniform. Hence, 
according to Welby, our assumption that words do not change their meanings, or, 
rather, that the value we endow a word with is necessarily exactly the same as it was 
in the past.72 To clarify this point, Welby highlights the fact that in modern culture we 
do not mean the same things as Copernicus did when he uttered ‘the sun rises’, or when 
we use the word heaven which could mean both sky and human destiny. The meaning 
of such words, according to Welby, is changing due to the swaying between the 
‘literal’ and the ‘metaphorical.’ In order to solve this problem she hypothesized a third 
value of meaning, one that would be ‘neither wholly figurative, nor wholly literal in 
which both are present to varying degrees’,73 and where new meaning can be created. 
The third value of meaning alludes to a third dimension of signifying process where 
the literal and figurative converge.  She was aware that figurative meaning can be so 
deeply rooted in human consciousness that is often mistaken for the so called plain 
                                                     
70 Ibid., p. 421. In this essay Welby summarises Huxley’s comment thus: The difference he sees is ‘that 
the philosopher who is worthy of the name knows that his personified hypotheses, such as law, and 
force, and ether, and the like, are merely useful symbols, while the ignorant and the careless take them 
for adequate expressions of reality.’ He then goes on to warn us against dealing with symbols as though 
they were ‘real existences.’ 
71 Ibid., p. 421. 
72 A similar discourse had been observed in the twentieth century by the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre 
when discussing the relation between language and morality. In After Virtue he suggested that what 
human beings possess in terms of understanding are fragments of a conceptual scheme which lacks 
contexts from which the significance of the word ethikos (lat. moralis) originally derived. He argues 
that we possess what he identifies as ‘simulacra of morality’ which means that we continue to use many 
of the key expressions although we lost our comprehension of them. A. MacIntyre. After Virtue. A Study 
in Moral Theory. 2nd Ed., London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1985.  
73 V. Welby in S. Petrilli, op.cit, p. 423. 
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meaning. She describes it as a ‘linguistic trap and a major cause of confusion and 
error’,74 and she advocates for a plain meaning critique, namely to critique the 
erroneous idea that meaning is literal and defined once and for all. As already stated, 
language was, for Welby, like an evolving and living organism where words acquire 
new meaning, or as Petrilli says, ‘a fresh impress’75 each time they are used as the 
factors conditioning meaning change. For Welby the relation between meaning 
(understood in the broad sense of her meaning triad, sense, meaning and significance) 
and language (which comprises text or utterance) is creative as it lies in the capacity 
to form new metaphorical associations that are at the basis of new cognitive 
combinations. In order to clarify this point, in the next section I’m going to address 
Welby’s understanding of language as organic and show how her postulation of the 
parallel development between the biological meaning and cultural meaning prefigures 
the concept of semiotic scaffolding in biosemiotics. 
The Organic Quality of Language: Signs, Life and the Meaning triad Sense, 
Meaning and Significance 
 
Drawing on Darwin’s evolutionary theory, Welby turned to analogies from the 
organic world when discussing verbal language in her attempt to prove that the 
essential quality of language is its plasticity, that is, its adaptability which she sees as 
an organic quality. In What is Meaning she writes:  
What we do want really is a plastic language. The biologist tells us that 
rigidity in organic activities can never secure accuracy – is indeed fatal 
to it. The organism can only survive by dealing appropriately with each 
fresh emergency in more and more complex conditions. Only the utmost 
degree of plasticity compatible with persistence of type can give the 
needed adaptiveness to varying circumstances.76 
 
                                                     
74 Ibid., p. 357. 
75 S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 360. 
76 V. Welby, op.cit.,1903, p. 60. 
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Welby reinforced this position by postulating an analogy between word and context 
and organism and its environment. In What is Meaning she expressed this view as ‘we 
must postulate an analogy between Context and Environment: the adaptation of a 
word, as of the organism, to its surroundings, and conversely its effect upon this.’77 
The underlying implication of this view is that language not only is dynamic and in a 
way living, but that it evolves, adapts and therefore changes according to the 
expressive needs of the environment much like an organism needs to be flexible in its 
adaptation to the environment in order to survive.  
One can thus see why Welby insisted on the plasticity of language as a 
necessary condition for successful communication in the social as well as in the 
organic world, and especially understand her emphasis on the use of metaphor as a 
way to enhance the process of knowledge and discovery. This is because metaphor-
like processes afford the identification of relations that had not been previously 
observed, and, by doing, thus create new ones ex novo. Meaning thus develops in a 
signifying network made of the various associative connections which form language 
and is fundamentally evolutionary and dynamical. 
Welby’s view here prefigures the biosemiotic insight about the parallel behind 
the evolution of biological meaning and cultural meaning. As discussed in Chapter 
One, this parallel is seen in the way in which semiotic scaffolding devices both in 
nature and culture are dependent upon changes in time (history/evolution) and upon 
interpretation. This interpretation relies on the organism’s ability to recognise patterns 
of similarity and difference of form (iconic and indexical) which brings forth new 
semiotic associations. Evolutionary layers of meanings are built on preceding 
meanings via semiosis or signifying processes. Thus meaning on a cultural level 
emerges from the biological inasmuch as it is based on similar patterns of metaphorical 
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recognition (iconic and indexical), however it grows in complexity because it is 
embedded in symbolic referencing. 
According to Welby meaning involves three levels: sense, meaning and 
significance, each of which involves a progression in the capacity for interpretation and 
signification. Yet the definition of ‘sense’ can be ambiguous as it could have different 
meanings relating either to the biological world, or to the cultural world with its 
connection with value and ideology. ‘Meaning’ on the other hand, is related to 
intention, whereas ‘significance’ is the overall effect.  In What is Meaning (1903) she 
defines these three levels as follows:  
There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as the Sense of a word, but 
only the sense in which it is used-the circumstances, state of mind, 
reference, ‘universe of discourse’ belonging to it. The Meaning of a 
word is the intent which it is desired to convey - the intention of the user. 
The Significance is always manifold and intensifies its sense as well as 
its meaning, by expressing its importance, its appeal to us, its moment 
for us, its emotional force, its ideal value, its moral aspect, its universal 
or at least social range. All science, all logic, all philosophy, the whole 
controversy about aesthetics, about ethics, about religion ultimately 
concentrate on this: What is the Sense of, What do you mean by, What 
is the significance of, that is Why do we care for Beauty Truth 
Goodness? Why do we value experience? And why do we seek for 
Significance, and resume the value of innumerable observed facts under 
formulae of significance like gravitation or natural selection? Because 
we are the expression of the world, as it were ‘expressed from’ it by the 
commanding or insisting pressure of natural stimuli not yet 
understood.78  
 
As Petrilli points out, the term significance replaced the original term 
interpretation in the meaning triad as Welby believed that interpretation ‘invests all 
three levels of meaning.’79 Moreover, with reference to significance, Petrilli argues, 
‘meaning is delineated in all its signifying valences, and signs (verbal and nonverbal) 
emerge in their specificity as human social signs.’80 
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The continuity between the organic and the cultural realms was identified by 
Welby in the double reference of her basic meaning triad: sense, meaning and 
significance. She first discussed it in Grains of Sense (1897) where she introduced the 
hypothesis that the organic dimension of sense, and its counterpart in the human 
dimension, are closely related. She gave it her full attention in What is Meaning where 
she gave a double reference of sense; on the one hand the organic and, on the other, the 
human with its linguistic, intellectual, aesthetic and moral world: 
Sense, in all its senses may be called the link or nexus between the 
intellectual, the moral and the aesthetic worlds. For in all senses, it is the 
sense wherein and whereby they are possible. The double reference is 
the condition of this.81 
By emphasising both aspects of sense, Welby showed that there was a 
fundamental continuity between the natural and cultural realm due to the signifying 
processes - the process by which signs are exchanged and by which meaning is 
generated - thus echoing Peirce’s understanding of sign relations and prefiguring  
Sebeok’s view of semiosis as the ‘criterial attribute of life.’82  
Welby’s evolutionary understanding of the meaning triad was applied to other 
aspects of life. Like Peirce, she recognized a tendency to triadism throughout the 
universe.  For instance, on the level of knowledge and experience she devised the triad 
consciousness/intellect/reason, whereas on the level of psychological processes she 
devised the triad instinct/perception/ conception, and on the level of consciousness she 
devised the triad solar/planetary and cosmic. Peirce, who also based his theory of signs 
on a triadic relation, commented in his review of What is Meaning that: 
The greatest service the book can render is that of bringing home the 
question which forms its title, a very fundamental question of logic, 
which has commonly received superficial, formalistic replies. Its vital 
and far-reaching significance has been even more ignored than usually 
happens with matters of universal and ubiquitous concern. To direct 
                                                     
81 V. Welby, op.cit., 1903, p. 48. 
82 See P. Cobley, op.cit., 2010, p. 227.  
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attention to the subject as one requiring study, both on its theoretical and 
on its practical side, is the essential purpose of the work. But in doing 
this the authoress had incidentally made a contribution towards the 
answer to the question, in pointing out three orders of signification. She 
has wisely abstained from any attempt at formal definitions of these 
three modes of significance. She tells us what she means only in the 
lowest of those three senses. To have gone further would have shunted 
her off upon a long and needless discussion.83 
 
Peirce’s acknowledgment of Welby’s contribution to the study of signs is 
particularly important if we consider that despite Welby’s efforts to institutionalise 
Significs during her lifetime, her ideas and her work were forgotten until the recent re-
discovery by Schmitz and Petrilli. The only exception to this, is represented by Charles 
K. Ogden and Ivor A. Richards who, at the beginning of the twentieth century, raised 
to Welby’s challenge of developing an approach to the study of signs that would 
incorporate philosophy and psychology. In chapter three of their monograph The 
Meaning of Meaning (1923) they develop the basic premises of behaviourism which 
they wed to Welby’s sign theory.84 
Evolution, Mind and Meaning in Nature and the Human Realm 
In considering the signifying implications in the development of meaning and 
experience, Welby postulated an interrelation between organic sense and mental life 
based on her meaning triad. She elaborated this position in relation to developments in 
sciences and psychology, specifically in connection to George Romanes’ Mental 
Evolution in Man (1888) where he tried to show that there is an essential similarity 
                                                     
83 C.S. Peirce, in Semiotic and Significs: Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady 
Welby. Ed. C. S. Hardwick. Lubbock: Texas tech University Press, 1977, p.159.  Peirce and Welby 
were familiar with each other’s work, yet they developed their sign theory completely independently 
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1911. As Gerard Deladalle explains, Welby took the initiative of the correspondence after reading 
Peirce’s entries in Baldwin’s dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology in 1902. She also promoted 
Peirce’s ideas among the intellectuals of her time, such as Bertrand Russel, C. K. Ogden and others. See 
G. Deladalle. “Welby and Peirce: Meaning and Signification.” Ed. H.W. Schmitz., op.cit.,1990,  pp.133-
146. 
84 Quoted in G. Deladalle, op.cit., 1990, p. 135. See C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. The Meaning of 
Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace &World, 1923. 
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between the reasoning processes of higher animals and human beings based on his 
discussion of sign theory in chapters V, XII and XIII.  Romanes’ work prompted 
Welby to address this issue from her unique language theory perspective. She did so 
in three papers, namely ‘Is there a Break in Mental Evolution?’ (1890), ‘An Apparent 
Paradox in Mental Evolution’ (1891) and ‘The Significance of Folk-Lore’ (1892). In 
these papers, she reflects on the thought processes in the animal kingdom and proceeds 
by analogy to the discussion of thought processes in human beings through her 
understanding of the different levels in sign activity. 
However, it was in an earlier paper, ‘Mental Biology or Organic Thought’ 
(1887), where Welby first addressed the issue of the understanding of mind and 
thought and where she turned to developments in biology in order to explain the history 
and nature of thought. She realised that there was a continuity between organism and 
thought, or rather between mind and body, and her aim in the essay was, as she put it, 
to ‘critically analyse the analogy between body and mind and to denounce a fatal 
defect’,85 namely that when we talk about mind we define it in terms of physical 
organism, or as an activity called in its lowest form sense, mind, consciousness and in 
its highest form rational thought. On the other hand, she continues ‘we postulate 
nothing as corresponding to the brain in its capacity of means or condition of the 
knowledge of body and brain.’86  
Welby criticised the tendency to over simplify mental processes from a 
mechanistic point of view, and she insisted that there is correspondence between the 
‘Thought-history of man with the history of life.’87 Traditionally, she argued, men 
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accept as evidence those aspects which are verifiable by sense experience and which 
coincide with three states of matter. As she put it: 
as sensible people our experience is as yet limited to three forms of 
impression, corresponding to the three forms of matter. We know things, 
so to speak, in mental sense, as solid and fixed, as liquid and flowing, 
or as gaseous and volatile. What answers to touch gives us the first and 
the second; and, as refined and specialised, the third; -in flavour and 
odour.88 
Yet, she states ‘we find that the first definite mental act is unreasoned response to a 
‘palpable’ impression corresponding to that of Touch.’89 She comes to this conclusion 
by analysing the various and complex responses human beings and organisms present 
to external stimuli or environment and she states, echoing G. H. Lewes whom she 
quotes from, that our understanding is the product of both internal and external factors. 
Once more, to quote a passage in Mr G. H. Lewes’s ‘Problems of Life 
and Mind’ which I had neither seen nor heard of when I first used the 
term ‘mental organism’: – ‘Let us now pass from Life to Mind. The vital 
organism we have seen to be evolved from the Bioplasm, and we now 
see how the psychical organism is evolved from what may analogically 
be called the psychoplasm. . . The movements of the Bioplasm constitute 
vitality; of the Psychoplasm, sensibility. The forces of the cosmical 
medium which are transformed in the physiological medium build up 
the organic structure, which in the various stages of its evolution react 
according to its statical conditions, themselves the result of preceding 
reactions. It is the same with what may be called the Mental Organism. 
Here also every phenomenon is the product of two factors, external and 
internal, impersonal and personal, objective and subjective. . . An 
organism lives only in relation to its medium. What growth is, in the 
physical sense, that is experience in the psychical sense; namely, organic 
registration of assimilated material. 90 
 
She further asserts that:  
As the physical body can only become aware of itself through the 
agency of the physical brain, which it includes, so the mind in its turn 
cannot know itself except through the medium of the mental brain.  And 
as the physical brain can receive, verify and utilise impressions entirely 
beyond the scope of the rest of the organism, so the ‘mental brain’ can 
deal with regions and subjects which to the ‘mental body, corresponding 
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to the organism in which brain in the full sense is not yet specialised, 
must be strictly inaccessible and apparently supernatural.91 
As mind interprets body by its power of perception, judgement, reflection and 
inference, so both the connection of the mind and its connection with the body need to 
be ‘interpreted by that of which in its turn is an embodiment.’92 In Welby’s view the 
secret of the link between thought and things may lie in what she calls the ‘further 
dimension’ of consciousness which also puts us in relation with a spiritual or cosmic 
sphere. What she means by a further dimension is what she later identifies as Primal-
Sense or Mother-Sense, or what, at one stage, as Rita Nolan points out, she calls 
‘human tacit understanding’ or pre-rational thought.93 In the twentieth century Michael 
Polanyi will employ the same term, that is, ‘tacit knowledge’ to refer to that embodied 
capacity which precedes rational thought and knowledge.94 For both, Welby and later 
Polanyi, the concept of tacit knowledge represents a challenge to the received 
conception that humans are consciously fully and articulately aware of the stimuli they 
respond to. As Nolan argues, Welby ‘challenged the empirical notion that all 
phenomena, including mental ones, should be explained in terms of spatio-temporal 
properties and having precise boundaries and unique, stable constituents.’95 
Welby’s interest in the evolution of human mind was also stimulated by her 
friendship with the psychologist James Ward, the philosopher George F. Stout (editor 
of Mind) and the American psychologist William James (1842-1910) all of whom were 
in varying degrees critical, on experimental, biological and introspective grounds, of 
the atomistic and mechanistic conception of human psychology inherited from the 
eighteen-century empiricist, Hume and Locke. As Nolan points out, the science of 
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Welby’s days was still under the influence of the Newtonian mechanical paradigm of 
explanation according to which the events are the effects of the motion of material 
bodies.96 Lady Welby saw this presupposition as being partly responsible for the 
interpretation of myth and religion which judged ‘primitive’ humans as far more out 
of touch with the natural world than other species. On this account Welby entertained 
a long correspondence with the anthropologist and linguist Max Müller. Welby with 
Müller shared similar views about the great religions and myths of primitive human 
beings and their anthropomorphic representation of natural forces, however she 
disagreed with his assertion that these representations functioned as a theoretical 
construct in a mistaken, primitive understanding of the natural world. In the Victorian 
era, as Petrilli suggests, ‘the dominant anthropological theories of primitive religions, 
which were widely viewed as important expressions of early stages in the development 
of human mind, presupposed and conceptualised a possible break in the relation 
between organism and environment.’97 Welby was highly critical of this hypothesis 
and showed why such theory was unacceptable as stated before, in three papers: ‘Is 
there a Break in Mental Evolution?’ (1890), ‘An Apparent Paradox in Mental 
Evolution’ (1891) and ‘Abstract of an Apparent Paradox in Mental Evolution’ (1890). 
She then developed this argument in chapters 22 to 25 in What is Meaning, chapters 
that Peirce suggested in his review of the monograph, should be read first.   
In these works Welby analysed the evolution of intelligence by applying her 
theory of meaning to anthropology in order to show how signifying processes 
developed from primitive forms to more complex ones through translation or 
translative processes. She theorised an evolutionary continuity between organism and 
environment through three levels of development of mind, namely sense, imagination 
                                                     
96 Ibid., p. 91. 
97 S. Petrilli and A. Ponzio, op.cit., 2005, p. 118. 
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and intellect. Drawing analogies from evolutionary theory she suggested that the 
evolution of mind began with a practical phase inspired by common sense and then 
moved onto a figurative phase, imagination, representation and signification.98 
In ‘An Apparent Paradox in Mental Evolution’, for instance, Welby argued that 
examples of primitive myths and theories were the results of primitive man’s attempts 
to understand the natural world he inhabited. Such efforts were to be understood as 
expressions and practical translations of an intuitive and instinctive comprehension of 
nature and the universe. These latter are the preconditions for the development to 
higher and more complex activity which is the consequence, as she states in ‘An 
Apparent Paradox in Mental Evolution’, of an ‘unbroken correspondence between 
thing and thought.’99 The central issue that Welby addresses here is the fact that the 
development of human mind, described merely on a model of stimulus-response, does 
not account for man’s capability of producing figurative language and therefore the 
use of imagination. In ‘Is there a Break in Mental Evolution?’ she writes 
It may be argued that the imaginative or figurative power of the savage, 
like that of a child, lacks a corrective which is subsequently supplied. 
But why should this corrective have lapsed at all, since we find it 
throughout organic development in the automatic and increasingly 
complex form? When, then, in the developing consciousness does the 
link with nature fail, and the answer to stimulus go astray? And even if 
the majority of primitive men had failed to carry on the organic tradition 
of adjustment, why was not the tendency preserved amongst a dominant 
minority? [...] The truest ideas (however simple and even vague) of the 
element of experience ought to be most widely transmitted. Why, then, 
was the general tendency towards persistent illusion? The growing 
‘mind’ must have lost the primordial ability to penetrate through mask 
of any kind to reality. But to have thus lost touch with nature ought to 
lead to the non survival of the false thinker.100 
Welby thus suggests that to say that human beings have lost touch with nature is to 
presuppose that they lack in the biologically endowed adaptive responses to the 
                                                     
98 Ibid., pp. 121-123. 
99 V. Welby. “An Apparent Paradox in Mental Evolution” in S. Petrilli, op.cit., 2009, p. 212. 
100 Ibid., p.208. 
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environment and that they possess, instead, traits of imagination which should have 
made the species extinct. In other words, she queries why the mental powers of 
imagination and representation didn’t develop in the early stages of evolution. As 
pointed out before, Welby thought that mind developed through different stages, 
namely from a practical phase inspired by common sense, to the pictorial or 
imaginative level where religious ideas and practices can be found as well as the 
capability for understanding through the production of images. What is important to 
note is that in its primary meaning, the term sense corresponds to pre-rational life - to 
the primitive level of signification - and as such to the organic and instinctive response 
to the sign forming its environment.  
Understood this way, Petrilli suggests, ‘the concept of “sense” is fundamentally 
organistic and involves all entities populating the organic world.’101 What this view 
implies is the fact that insofar as sense concerns the living world (plants, animals and 
human beings), the capacity for sense is not specific to human beings but is a shared, 
evolutionary capacity which gives rise in human beings to higher capacities such as 
meaning. In ‘What is Meaning’ Welby asserts: 
The whole animal kingdom shares the sense world; whereas in the 
course of evolution the advent of the sense of meaning – the highest kind 
of sense – marks a new departure: it opens a distinctively new era.102 
This seems to be why Welby was critical of those who chose to hypothesise a break in 
the evolution of mental faculties; a standard account at the time for scholars in various 
fields. Her critique was mainly methodological since she uses signifying processes and 
their development from an evolutionary perspective with a focus on verbal signs as her 
starting point. In ‘An Apparent Paradox in Mental Evolution’ she writes: 
Where, then is the missing link? Our very idea of mental and spiritual 
inter-communion in any exalted sense is among the latest of mental 
                                                     
101 S. Petrilli and A. Ponzio, op.cit., 2005, pp. 128-129. 
102 V. Welby, op.cit., 1903, p. 28. 
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products. But are we not betrayed even by the ambiguities of language 
into ascribing such ideas to the primitive sense-bound mind? Where and 
why do we suppose that early men broke away from the strongest tie 
they had – those to the actual – and where are we to look for their link 
which bridges the chasm between the sensuous and the non-sensuous, 
which in much early animism might well be spelt nonsensuous?103  
Thus Welby emphasised the inconsistency of the prevailing hypothesis that primitive 
groups made a sudden break in their relation with the sense world and she thus rejected 
the suggestion which ignored the fact that men inherited a ‘tendency to right reaction 
or correspondence’ in the relationship between organism and environment. Instead, she 
believed in the continuity of this ingrained tendency which had to be understood at a 
linguistic level: 
Do not all the theories hitherto advanced really imply that the primordial 
mind had affected all signs of its pre-intellectual ancestry and 
bequeathed to the earliest of its descendants of whom we can find traces, 
a practical tabula rasa? Do they not one and all involve the assumption 
that primitive men had to begin from the very beginning in their 
responses to environment, instead of inheriting a tendency to right 
reaction of correspondence ingrained in them from protoplasmic days 
and in the protozoic nursery, a tendency, which has but to be carried 
over and utilised in every fresh departure in development.104  
Welby’s view of the mind as somehow being a ramification of evolutionary life forms 
sets her apart from her contemporaries and places her among those intellectuals that 
most contributed to the future developments in biosemiotics.  
Conclusion  
Welby’s Significs represents her unique understanding of the signifying processes 
which include both verbal and non-verbal language. Drawing on evolutionary theory 
she postulated connections between life and evolution, and life and semiosis through 
her concept of Mother-Sense. She emphasised the organic interrelation between 
                                                     
103 S. Petrilli and A. Ponzio, op.cit., 2005, p. 221. 
104 Ibid., pp. 221-222. 
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organic sense and mental life and understood the mental processes of the human psyche 
in terms of sign interpretation. She endeavoured to show how mental life originally 
developed through interpretive-translative processes. Similarly to Peirce, she held that 
language and mental processes are not separate entities, but part of the same process, 
that is semiosis. Her assertion that there is a fundamental continuity between the natural 
and cultural realm which is grounded in the logic of interpretive-translative processes 
as well as her insight that human beings uniquely possess the capacity for articulate 
language-speech, locates her not just as a remarkable thinker, but also to some extent 
as a precursor of biosemiotics. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has traced, investigated and explored the philosophical and other 
writing of three very different Victorian thinkers, John Henry Newman, George Eliot 
and Lady Victoria Welby, all of whom contributed to the cultural environment from 
which biosemiotics emerged in the second half of the twentieth century and whose 
ideas they prefigured. The thesis has argued that Newman, Eliot and Welby envisaged 
a holistic understanding of life based on a developmental tradition of biology, 
philosophy and language - Naturphilosophie – which was familiar to Charles Darwin 
himself, as well as to C.S. Peirce and Jakob von Uexküll. The evolutionary ontology 
based on Naturphilosophie, with its ideas about nature as a self-organising, creative 
and living whole and its aesthetic postulation of the scientist/poet as being especially 
capable of the profound articulation and understanding of such creativity, necessitated 
a new epistemology, which was grounded in a mode of non-conscious creative 
inference, and which I have called biosemiotic imagination. This, I have argued, is 
akin to Charles Peirce’s concept of abduction. Abduction, as defined by Peirce, is the 
only logical operation which introduces a new idea, and as such is the only source of 
adaptive and creative growth. For Peirce, it is closely tied to the growth of knowledge 
via the evolutionary action of sign relations. This thesis has shown how Newman, Eliot 
and Welby have conceptualised and articulated their own version of what would come 
to be understood as biosemiotic imagination within religious, literary and 
philosophical contexts respectively. 
I developed Peirce’s views in Chapter One, where I introduced his philosophy 
of signs and abduction, as well as Jakob von Uexküll’s Umweltehre, as the two 
fundamental concepts that underpin biosemiotics. I showed how these concepts led to 
the biosemiotic insight that culture and nature are not separated, but rather that culture 
 222 
 
is evolutionarily emergent in nature. Uexküll’s Umwelt, as well as Peirce’s semiotics 
introduce a way of seeing the natural world as being shaped by processes and 
organisation which are based on the living organism’s ability to interpret and act upon 
the sign relations discovered in the environment. The implications of this and Peirce’s 
semiotic theory more broadly are far-reaching in suggesting that mind, thinking and 
reasoning cannot be narrowly identified with human cognition; instead, mind, thinking 
and reasoning are a process of semiosis and therefore a capacity of all living organisms 
(e.g. Peirce and Welby) and systems (e.g. Bateson). It also points to the insight that 
the bulk of knowing is non-conscious knowledge shared by all organisms, living 
systems or, as Bateson might say, throughout the living world. These seminal ideas 
arguably contributed to the eventual biosemiotic view that creative knowing in culture 
is emergent in nature and repeats, at ever greater levels of complexity and abstraction, 
natural patterns. Based on this biosemiotic view, I have suggested that any form of 
creativity in art, science and religion is grounded in abductive inferences and it 
represents a link between nature and culture.  
The continuity between nature and culture was more directly explored in 
Chapter Two which offered a historical and contextual overview of the role both 
language theory and evolutionary theory played in the development of nineteenth-
century thought. Although the cultural climate in which biosemiotics arose was 
different to the cultural climate of the Victorian period, what became clear in my 
analysis was that there are striking similarities between nineteenth-century biologists 
and linguists (and similarly between biologists and semioticians in the second half of 
the twentieth century) who were deeply connected by their concerned attitudes toward 
the investigation and understanding of study of living nature. I highlighted how 
language theory and evolutionary theory were indebted to the core principles of 
Naturphilosophie, which saw nature as a self-organising, living whole and thought of 
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language as an equally living, organic medium that changes and adapts over a period 
of time. These concepts, which emphasised ideas of continuity and relatedness and 
which introduced the notion of historicity, came to be of central importance in the 
debates in religion, science and mind, since they challenged and questioned the very 
notion of man’s place in nature.  
An interesting and potentially important aspect that emerged from this 
discussion in this chapter and which I have tried to underline is the finding that 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory, although it is part of a wider debate about evolution 
itself, was in part inspired by language theory and, more precisely, comparative 
philology. With its insistence on the developing and changing nature of language, 
philology not only offered an important thought-model during the period in which 
Darwin was organizing and elaborating his theory of evolution, but also became one 
of the constitutive models for Darwin’s attempt to develop a naturalistic account of the 
origin of language. Indeed, rather than yielding to beliefs that language was a 
distinguishing feature of homo sapiens, Darwin argued that it was through natural 
selection that the primitive vocal efforts of animals and human beings had evolved into 
a vast array of songs, sounds and cries, and ultimately into speech that was shared by 
human beings and animals, for discussion inasmuch as they provide an insight into the 
idea of continuity between the animal and human realm not only in terms of a common 
ancestor, but also in terms of language as a way of world modelling. Another 
interesting aspect which emerged from the broader discussion in the chapter and which 
offers a platform for future research was the fact that Darwin didn’t seem to conceive 
of natural selection in mechanistic terms, but rather as a self-organising process. 
Naturphilosophie furnished important metaphors that Darwin, like Newman, Eliot and 
Welby, drew upon to help articulate their respective views of language as a living 
organism. It also provided Newman, Eliot and Welby with a powerful metaphor for 
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their common understanding of a unifying force that subtends human cognition, and 
this is what I have come to call biosemiotic imagination. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, for John Henry Newman, illative sense (his 
original conceptualisation of what I have called biosemiotic imagination) was the 
grounding principle on which both faith and science are based. In this respect, I showed 
how his argument shares important similarities with another significant precursor of 
biosemiotics, Gregory Bateson, and his view that intimations of the sacred (expressed 
in abductive inference) found in religion are also found in forms of abduction in nature. 
Although as I pointed out, Newman didn’t explicitly state that such forms of abductive 
logic are shared by humans and other organisms, he implicitly acknowledged this 
through  his equation of the instinct of the mind necessary for the recognition of God 
with the instinct other organisms possess. This instinct, I argued, is to be understood 
in relation to his broader view of natural forms of reasoning or abduction.  
In Chapter Four I explored Eliot’s philosophical reflections on epistemology and her 
view of reality. I argued that her adherence to an organic and evolutionary view of 
culture prompted her to understand reality in a proto-biosemiotic way; as a web of 
suprasubjective semiotic relations in which reality is always partial since it is based on 
the cyber-semiotic interaction between an individual’s Umwelt and Innenwelt. I also 
argued that her postulation of the continuity between nature and culture through 
aesthetic practice, which she understood through her reading of Schelling and the 
Naturphilosophen, is akin to Peirce’s abduction. Emphasising metaphor, I argued that 
the aesthetic imagination or biosemiotic imagination is a form of world disclosure or 
word modelling. This, I argued, is most clearly at work in Middlemarch where the 
interlinked web of metaphors - the perception of analogies, connections and affinities 
between separate objects - are not only set as examples of figurative speech, but rather, 
they are a source of that type of creativity that begins with the discovery of similitude 
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in difference and goes on to explore the nature of semiotic relations that Peirce 
identified as semiosis. I showed how metaphors, as semiotic relations, are at the basis 
of Middlemarch’s characters interpretation and understanding of their own reality or 
Umwelt which is nested through recursive feedback loops into a wider web of semiotic 
relations with other characters. Each character, I argued, is thus seen as a sign, or 
rather, as a sign relation or interpretant of the Peircean triad in an open evolutionary 
process of semiosis where sign relations become the connective links not only between 
characters, but also between characters, the narrator and reader.  
In chapter five I focused on Welby’s Significs and her unique understanding of 
signifying processes, which include both verbal and non verbal language. Drawing on 
evolutionary theory she postulated connections between life and evolution, and life 
and semiosis. She emphasised the organic interrelation between organic sense and 
mental life and understood the mental processes of the human psyche in terms of sign 
interpretation. She endeavoured to show that it is through interpretive-translative 
processes, again akin to Peirce’s abduction, that creativity emerges in nature and 
culture and that mental life develops. Similarly to Peirce, she held that language and 
mental processes are not separate entities, but part of the same process, namely, 
semiosis. Her assertion that there is a fundamental continuity between the natural and 
cultural realm which is grounded in the logic of interpretive-translative processes as 
well as her insight that human beings uniquely possess the capacity for articulate 
language-speech, sets her apart from her contemporaries, and locates her not only as a 
remarkable thinker, but as a precursor to biosemiotics in the development of thought. 
 Through the use of a biosemiotic framework to investigate the thesis’s main 
question – ‘does the biosemiotic imagination allow the comparison of creativity in 
nature and human beings’ – this thesis has proposed that important elements of 
semiotic thinking were already present in embryonic form in the nineteenth century, 
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as expressed by Welby, Eliot and Newman, and that forms of creative formal discovery 
in culture were thought to be similar to the creative process of evolution and 
development in nature. Biosemiotics, with its evolutionary focus grounded in semiosis, 
enables us to re-imagine culture and literature as being themselves evolving processes 
of semiosis, and suggests new ways in our understanding of culture and literary work.  
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